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FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS
OF PROGRAM OBFUSCATION
OMER PANETH
Boston University, Graduate School Arts and Sciences, 2018
Major Professor: Ran Canetti, Professor of Computer Science
ABSTRACT
Code is said to be obfuscated if it is intentionally difficult for humans to un-
derstand. Obfuscating a program conceals its sensitive implementation details and
protects it from reverse engineering and hacking. Beyond software protection, obfus-
cation is also a powerful cryptographic tool, enabling a variety of advanced applica-
tions.
Ideally, an obfuscated program would hide any information about the original
program that cannot be obtained by simply executing it. However, Barak et al.
[CRYPTO 01] proved that for some programs, such ideal obfuscation is impossible.
Nevertheless, Garg et al. [FOCS 13] recently suggested a candidate general-purpose
obfuscator which is conjectured to satisfy a weaker notion of security called indistin-
guishability obfuscation.
In this thesis, we study the feasibility and applicability of secure obfuscation:
• What notions of secure obfuscation are possible and under what assumptions?
• How useful are weak notions like indistinguishability obfuscation?
Our first result shows that the applications of indistinguishability obfuscation go
well beyond cryptography. We study the tractability of computing a Nash equilibrium
vii
of a game – a central problem in algorithmic game theory and complexity theory.
Based on indistinguishability obfuscation, we construct explicit games where a Nash
equilibrium cannot be found efficiently.
We also prove the following results on the feasibility of obfuscation. Our starting
point is the Garg at el. obfuscator that is based on a new algebraic encoding scheme
known as multilinear maps [Garg et al. EUROCRYPT 13].
1. Building on the work of Brakerski and Rothblum [TCC 14], we provide the first
rigorous security analysis for obfuscation. We give a variant of the Garg at el.
obfuscator and reduce its security to that of the multilinear maps. Specifically,
modeling the multilinear encodings as ideal boxes with perfect security, we prove
ideal security for our obfuscator. Our reduction shows that the obfuscator resists
all generic attacks that only use the encodings’ permitted interface and do not
exploit their algebraic representation.
2. Going beyond generic attacks, we study the notion of virtual-gray-box obfusca-
tion [Bitansky et al. CRYPTO 10]. This relaxation of ideal security is stronger
than indistinguishability obfuscation and has several important applications
such as obfuscating password protected programs. We formulate a security
requirement for multilinear maps which is sufficient, as well as necessary for
virtual-gray-box obfuscation.
3. Motivated by the question of basing obfuscation on ideal objects that are simpler
than multilinear maps, we give a negative result showing that ideal obfuscation
is impossible, even in the random oracle model, where the obfuscator is given ac-
cess to an ideal random function. This is the first negative result for obfuscation
in a non-trivial idealized model.
viii
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prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. For any A of size 2O( "2 ) and every   2 N,
Pr
24PRFS(T ) A(fVS,  1)
      
S  KPRF(1 )fVS iO(VSS)
 1  PRFS(1)
35  2 ⌦( "2 ) .
Proof. Fix any such A. To prove the proposition we show that except with sub-
exponentially small probability, A(fVS,  1) cannot output  ⇤ such that fVS(T,  ⇤) 6= ?
which is equivalent to showing that  ⇤ 6= PRFS(T ). We prove this via a sequence of
indistinguishable hybrid experiments where the obfuscated fVS is gradually augmented
to return ? on an increasing interval, until it eventually returns ? on some interval
[u, T ] (for every possible signature), meaning in particular that A(fVS,  1) cannot find
an accepting signature  ⇤ for T . The second input  1 remains PRFS(1) throughout
all hybrids.
Hyb1. The original experiment, where fVS is an iO of VSS = VS(1)S .
Hyb2. Here fVS is an iO of a circuit VS(2)v,S,K0 . The circuit has a random one-way
function image v = OWFK0(u), and on any input (i,  ), it returns ? if OWFK0(i) = v.
The circuit is formally described in Figure 3·3.
VS(2)v,S,K0
Hardwired: a PRF key S  KPRF(1 ), an injective OWF key K 0  
KOWF(1 0) for  0 = log T , an image v = OWFK0(u), for u [T ].
Input: index i 2 [T ], string   2 {0, 1} .
1. If OWFK0(i) = v, return ?.
2. If   6= PRFS(i), return ?.
3. If i = T , return SOLVED.
4. Return i+ 1,PRFS(i+ 1).
Padding: The circuit is padded so that its total size is s( ), for a fixed poly-
nomial s(·) specified later.
Figure 3·3: The circuit VS(2)v,S,K0 .
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Hyb3,j, j 2 [T + 1]. Here fVS is an iO of a circuit VS(3,j)u,S . The circuit has a random
index u, and on any input (i,  ), it returns ? if i 2 [u, u+ j]. The circuit is formally
described in Figure 3·4.
VS(3,j)u,S
Hardwired: a PRF key S  KPRF(1 ), a random index u  [T ], and j =
min{j, T   u}.
(This is a convenient abuse of notation, which should be interpreted as “if j > T  u, truncate
it”.)
Input: index i 2 [T ], string   2 {0, 1} .
1. If i 2 [u, u+ j   1], return ?.
2. If   6= PRFS(i), return ?.
3. If i = T , return SOLVED.
4. Return i+ 1,PRFS(i+ 1).
Padding: The circuit is padded so that its total size is s( ), for a fixed poly-
nomial s(·) specified later.
Figure 3·4: The circuit VS(3,j)u,S .
Hyb4,j, j 2 [T ]. Here fVS is an obfuscation of a circuit VS(4,j)u,S{u+j}, u+j . The circuit is
the same as VS(3,j)u,S , only that it has a punctured PRF key S{u + j}, and the value
 u+j = PRFS(u+ j) is hardwired. The circuit is formally described in Figure 3·5.
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VS(4,j)u,S{u+j}, u+j
Hardwired: a random index u  [T ], j = min{j, T   u}, a punctured PRF
key S{u + j} Punc(S, u + j), the PRF value  u+j = PRFS(u + j), where
S  KPRF(1 ).
Input: index i 2 [T ], string   2 {0, 1} .
1. If i 2 [u, u+ j   1], return ?.
2. If i = u+ j and   6=  u+j, return ?.
3. If i 2 [u+ j + 1, T ] and   6= PRFS{u+j}(i), return ?.
4. If i = T , return SOLVED.
5. Return i+ 1,PRFS{u+j}(i+ 1).
Padding: The circuit is padded so that its total size is s( ), for a fixed poly-
nomial s(·) specified later.
Figure 3·5: The circuit VS(4,j)u,S{u+j}, u+j .
Hyb5,j, j 2 [T ]. Here fVS is an obfuscation of a circuit VS(5,j)u,S{u+j}, u+j . The circuit is
the same as VS(4,j)u,S{u+j}, u+j , only that the hardwired  u+j is not set to PRFS(u + j),
but sampled uniformly at random from {0, 1} ,
Hyb6,j, j 2 [T ]. Here fVS is an obfuscation of a circuit VS(6,j)u,S,v,K . The circuit is the
same as VS(5,j)u,S{u+j}, u+j , only that instead of storing  u+j in the clear v = OWFK( u+j)
is stored, and comparison of  u+j and   is done by comparing OWFK( u+j) and
OWFK( ). Here K is a key for an injective OWF from the family OWF . In addition,
the PRF seed S is no longer punctured. The circuit is formally described in Figure 3·6.
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VS(6,j)u,S,v,K
Hardwired: a random index u  [T ], j = min{j, T   u}, a PRF key S  
KPRF(1 ), an image v = OWFK( u+j), where K  KOWF(1 ),  u+j  {0, 1} .
Input: index i 2 [T ], string   2 {0, 1} .
1. If i 2 [u, u+ j   1], return ?.
2. If i = u+ j and OWFK( ) 6= v, return ?.
3. If i 2 [u+ j + 1, T ] and   6= PRFS(i), return ?.
4. If i = T , return SOLVED.
5. Return i+ 1,PRFS(i+ 1).
Padding: The circuit is padded so that its total size is s( ), for a fixed poly-
nomial s(·) specified later.
Figure 3·6: The circuit VS(6,j)u,S,v,K .
The padding parameter s( ). We choose s( ) so that each of the circuits fVS
considered above can be implemented by a circuit of size at most s( )/3. (The extra
1/3 slack is taken to satisfy Lemma 3.1 in the analysis below.)
We prove the following:
Proposition 3.2. For any 2O( 
"2 )-size distinguisher D, all   2 N, and all j 2 [T ]:
1. |Pr[D(Hyb1) = 1]  Pr[D(Hyb2) = 1]|  2 ⌦( "
2
),
2.
  Pr[D(Hyb2) = 1]  Pr[D(Hyb3,1) = 1]    2 ⌦( "),
3.
  Pr[D(Hyb3,j) = 1]  Pr[D(Hyb4,j) = 1]    2 ⌦( "),
4.
  Pr[D(Hyb4,j) = 1]  Pr[D(Hyb5,j) = 1]    2 ⌦( "),
5.
  Pr[D(Hyb5,j) = 1]  Pr[D(Hyb6,j) = 1]    2 ⌦( "),
6.
  Pr[D(Hyb6,j) = 1]  Pr[D(Hyb3,j+1) = 1]    2 ⌦( "),
where the view of D in each hybrid consists of the corresponding obfuscated fVS and
 1 = PRFS(1).
1Chapter 1
Introduction
The goal of general-purpose program obfuscation is to make an arbitrary computer
program “unintelligible” while preserving its functionality. Accordingly, obfuscation
aims to hide any implementation secrets that cannot be learned from the program’s
input-output behavior such as proprietary algorithms, hidden execution paths, or
cryptographic keys. An obfuscated program can therefore be seen as the software
analog of a “black box” that evaluates the program on any given input, while hiding
the actual computation.
1.1 Background and Motivation
While the earliest examples of obfuscated code were presented as a pure intellectual
challenge,1 program obfuscation has since emerged as a “heavy hammer” with diverse
applications in security and cryptography. Motivated by these application, numerous
heuristic obfuscation methods were suggested. However, the security of these methods
is rooted in their obscurity and in most cases they can only slow down an attacker
recovering the original code. For many years, obfuscation whose security is based on
cryptographically hard problems was only suggested for extremely simple programs
(e.g., [Can97]). Very recently, Garg et al. [GGH+13b] suggested the first candidate
construction of cryptographic obfuscation for general programs.
Today, the feasibility of program obfuscation is the subject of much investigation.
1For example, the International Obfuscated C Code Contest (http://www.ioccc.org/) features
creative and entertaining examples of obfuscated code.
2However, before we address these feasibility questions, we present some of the far
reaching applications that motivate the decades-long pursuit of program obfuscation.
1.1.1 On the Applications of Program Obfuscation
The notion of program obfuscation has a wide range of applications in different ar-
eas. For instance, obfuscation is often used in practice to shield sensitive code, such
as security-critical code or code that contains intellectual property, from reverse en-
gineering. In this thesis we concentrate on applications of program obfuscation to
complexity theory and cryptography.
Complexity theory. Some of the pivotal problems in computability and complex-
ity theory, such as the halting and satisfiability problems, deal with under-
standing properties of programs. These principal hard problems lie at the heart of
our quest to understand the nature of computation, and through them we can study
the computational hardness of rich classes of problems.
Program obfuscation is instrumental in proving the hardness of such problems.
Hardness is proved by demonstrating an obfuscated instance which is, by design,
hard to understand. An important example is related to the hardness of computing
a Nash equilibrium of a game. This problem is conjectured to be intractable and it
is complete to the complexity class PPAD [Pap94, DGP09, CDT09]. Other PPAD-
complete problems deal with finding special inputs (such as fixed points) for programs
of a specific structure. The hardness of such PPAD-complete search problems can
be established by designing hard instances where the input programs are obfuscated.
These obfuscated instances can then be translated into games where an equilibrium
is hard to find through the reductions of [DGP09, CDT09].
3Cryptography. In cryptography, computational hardness is leveraged to “tie the
hands” of a computationally bounded adversary. For example, the existence of one-
way functions is sufficient (as well as necessary) for the task of secure secret key
communication [HILL99]. More advanced cryptographic applications, however, call
for a fine-grained control over the adversary’s abilities and knowledge and often require
stronger assumptions. For example:
• Public-key encryption allows the adversary to encrypt messages to Alice, but
not to decrypt a ciphertext generated for Alice by Bob.
• Fully homomorphic encryption [RAD78, Gen09] allows the adversary to com-
pute arbitrary functions over an encrypted message, but not to decrypt the
message.
• Functional encryption [O’N10, BSW11] lets the adversary learn certain autho-
rized functions of the encrypted message and nothing else.
The above applications and many others are not known to follow from one-way
functions, and are often based on the hardness of specific problems related to number
theory or lattices [RSA83, Gen09]. In many cases, basing security on the hardness of
a simple and well-studied problem is a major technical challenge.
Program obfuscation suggests an appealing alternative. Simple obfuscation-based
constructions exist for the above applications as well as for almost every other plau-
sible cryptographic application. For some applications there are no known construc-
tions based on alternative assumptions (e.g., deniable encryption [SW14]).
Intuitively, the power of program obfuscation lies in its allowing for fine-grained
control over the adversary’s access to secret information. The design paradigm is
to publish the scheme’s secrets inside an obfuscated program that controls the way
these secrets are used. For example, intuitively, any secret key encryption scheme can
4be made public key, fully homomorphic, or functional by publishing programs that
provide restricted access to the secret encryption key [DH76, BGI+01].
1.1.2 On the Feasibility of Program Obfuscation
The main open question in the field of program obfuscation is the question of feasi-
bility:
Question 1.1. Which programs can be obfuscated and what is the achievable level of
security?
Previous works provided both positive and negative evidence.
Negative evidence. The first step to understanding the feasibility of program
obfuscation is to set a formal definition of security. Natural attempts to define secure
obfuscation, however, encounter strong impossibility results. Hada [Had00] suggested
a definition following the simulation paradigm: the output of any efficient adversary
given an obfuscated program can be efficiently simulated given access to a black-
box that evaluates the program. As observed by Hada, this definition cannot be
satisfied when the program’s code is not efficiently learnable. Learning an efficient
implementation of the program is necessary in order to simulate an adversary that
simply outputs the obfuscated program itself.
Barak et al. [BGI+01] study a natural relaxation of Hada’s definition called
virtual-black-box (VBB) obfuscation. This definition considers the restricted task
of learning deterministic properties of the program. That is, every deterministic
function of the program that can be efficiently learned from the obfuscation can also
be learned given access to a black-box that evaluates the program. Hada’s impossibil-
ity does not rule out VBB obfuscation where the obfuscation process is randomized,
since a randomized obfuscation may not reveal any deterministic function of the orig-
inal program. Nonetheless, Barak et al. show that even their relaxed definition is
5unachievable for some programs. They demonstrate a family of programs parame-
terized by a secret key such that given access to a black box computing a random
program from the family, the key remains secret. However, given any implementation
of the program, the key can be efficiently recovered. This generic attack means that
there is no VBB obfuscation for all programs.
Positive evidence. Garg et al. [GGH+13b] put forward a candidate construction
of program obfuscation for all programs (represented as boolean circuits). Following
the construction of Garg et al., many other constructions were suggested: [BR14,
BGK+14, AGIS14, MSW14, PST14, AB15, Zim15, BV15, AJ15, GLSW15, BMSZ16,
Lin16], among others. To date, all known constructions are based on the recently
introduced framework of cryptographic multilinear maps [BS02, GGH13a].
Clearly, all recent obfuscation candidates are susceptible to the attack of Barak
et al.. For some candidates, however, no other attacks are known. For other can-
didates, there exist attacks that exploit flaws in existing multilinear map candidates
(e.g., [MSZ16]) and could potentially be eliminated through better constructions of
multilinear maps.
Relaxed notions. Much of the current research on obfuscation is focused on the
gap between the positive and negative results above. Addressing this gap, one central
line of research explores relaxations of the VBB security definition. The following
general questions are posed:
Question 1.2 (Applicability). What are meaningful notions of secure obfuscation,
and which applications can be based on such notions?
Question 1.3 (Feasibility). Which notions of secure obfuscation can be achieved, for
which programs, and based on what assumptions?
6Indistinguishability obfuscation. One relaxed notion of secure obfuscation that
has been studied in recent years is indistinguishability obfuscation [BGI+01]. Indistin-
guishability security simply means that the obfuscations of two functionally equivalent
programs of the same size are indistinguishable from each other.
In terms of feasibility, the generic attacks of Barak et al. do not break indistin-
guishability security, since the information recovered by this attacks can be learned
from any functionally equivalent circuit. Therefore, as far as we know, indistinguisha-
bility obfuscation may exist for all functions.
In terms of applicability, many important cryptographic applications of VBB ob-
fuscation are known to follow also from indistinguishability obfuscation2 [GGH+13b,
SW14]. In most cases, however, constructions based on indistinguishability obfus-
cation are more complicated than VBB based constructions. For some applications,
constructions based on indistinguishability obfuscation require additional assump-
tions or are simply not known (e.g. [CLTV15, AS15]).
In complexity theory, some applications, such as exponential lower-bounds for
the Satisfiability problem, follow from VBB obfuscation [Wee05], but are not known
based on indistinguishability obfuscation.
1.2 Results
This thesis explores applicability and feasibility of different notions of secure obfus-
cation.
1.2.1 Applications: On the Hardness of Finding a Nash Equilibrium
We focus on the complexity theoretic applications of program obfuscation. Specif-
ically, proving the hardness of the complexity class PPAD [Pap94] and that of the
PPAD complete problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a game [DGP09, CDT09].
2Most application also require a minimal worst-case complexity assumption such as NP 6⊆ BPP .
7The tractability of finding a Nash equilibrium is of theoretical and philosophical
significance and has received much attention in the past decade. Previously, hard
instances to complete PPAD problems (such as NASH) were demonstrated based
on VBB obfuscation [AKV04]. Specifically, the construction of such instances re-
lied on obfuscation of pseudo-random functions. VBB obfuscation of pseudo-random
functions is in particular subject to strong limitations, extending the impossibility of
Barak et al. [GK05, BCC+14].
Providing new evidence for the hardness of PPAD, we prove that:
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Assuming sub-exponential indistinguishability obfuscation
and one-way functions, there exists a hard distribution over NASH instances.
The construction goes through the canonical PPAD complete problems called
End-of-the-Line [Pap94]. Hard End-of-the-Line instances can be translated into hard
NASH instances through the reduction of [DGP09, CDT09]. An End-of-the-Line
instance consists of an exponential size directed graph and a source node in the graph
(a node with in-degree zero). The in-degree and out-degree of every node in the graph
is at most one, and the graph is implicitly described by a program that computes the
successor and predecessor of every node (if they exist). A solution to the instance is
any source or sink in the graph (a node with in-degree or out-degree zero) other than
the source that was given. The End-of-the-Line problem is total since, by a simple
parity argument, any instance has at least one solution.
In the hard End-of-the-Line instance of Theorem 1.1, the graph is an exponentially
long path and the label of every node on this path is pseudo-random. The program
describing the graph is obfuscated so that, intuitively, the only way to traverse the
nodes on the path is to evaluate the obfuscated program once par edge. Following this
intuition, if the obfuscated program is VBB secure, proving hardness is straightfor-
ward. However, proving hardness based only on indistinguishability security requires
new proof techniques.
8Interestingly, this is also the first construction of a hard total search problem based
on indistinguishability obfuscation. Hard total search problems are not known based
on any one-way function or even public-key encryption. Previous constructions relied
on assumptions with more structure such as Discrete Log, Factoring, or assumptions
that imply one-way permutations or collision-resistant hash functions.
Related work. Theorem 1.1 appears in the work of Bitansky, Paneth and Rosen
[BPR15]. The complexity class PPAD was defined by Papadimitriou [Pap94] in order
to capture the hardness of the NASH problem as well as other fix-point problems.
The PPAD completeness of NASH was proven in [DGP09, CDT09]. Various works
show hardness results for variants of the Nash problem, and explore other notions of
equilibria with related hardness (see [Gol11, OPR14, Rub15] and references within).
Huba´cek and Yogev [HY17] strengthen Theorem 1.1, showing that indistinguisha-
bility obfuscation implies the hardness of the class CLS of continuous local search
problems [DP11], which lies in the intersection of PPAD and the class PLS [JPY88].
Garg, Pandey, and Srinivasan [GPS16] improve the assumption in Theorem 1.1 to
indistinguishability obfuscation with polynomial (rather than sub-exponential) secu-
rity, or even functional encryption. Rosen, Segev, and Shahaf [RSS16] show that
certain types of PPAD hardness cannot be based on more standard cryptographic as-
sumptions via a black-box reduction. Bitansky, Paneth, and Wichs [BPW16] modify
the hard End-of-the-Line instance construction of Theorem 1.1 and obtain trapdoor
permutations from indistinguishability obfuscation.
1.2.2 Feasibility: Obfuscation from Multilinear Maps
While for some obfuscation constructions there are no known attacks other than the
generic ones, presenting positive evidence that existing constructions satisfy meaning-
ful relaxed notions of security is imperative. Since all known constructions are based
9on the notions of multilinear maps,3 we focus on the following question:
Question 1.4. Can the security of obfuscation constructions be reduced to the secu-
rity of the underlying multilinear map? Which notion of obfuscation security can be
obtained based on what security properties of multilinear maps?
Our focus is on the connection between the security of obfuscation and that of
multilinear maps. We therefore consider an abstract interface and security properties
of multilinear maps and do not focus on any particular candidate implementation.
We also do not address the question regarding the security achieved by the existing
candidate constructions of multilinear maps.
1.2.2.1 Obfuscation from Ideal Multilinear Maps
Our first feasibility result is a construction of obfuscation and a proof of security
based on multilinear maps with ideal security. We start by presenting the notion of
multilinear maps.
Multilinear maps. A multilinear map is an encoding scheme for elements of some
ring (e.g., integers modulo a large prime) that supports the following operations:
• Homomorphic evaluation of arithmetic expressions up to some bounded degree.
• Test if two encodings are of the same value.
Each encoding maintains an integer level that tracks the degree of the arithmetic
expression whose evaluation resulted in this encoding. When encodings are added
or subtracted, their level remains unchanged and when encodings are multiplied,
their levels are summed. The homomorphic evaluation and equality test can only
3An obfuscation construction that is based on the notion of functional encryption and does not
use multilinear maps directly was suggested in [BV15, AJ15]. Today, however, all known functional
encryption constructions of the required type are based either on obfuscation or on multilinear maps
[GGH+13b, GGHZ16].
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be performed on encodings that did not exceed the degree bound. We also consider
asymmetric multilinear maps where levels are vectors that track the individual degree
of every input to the arithmetic expression, and the degree bound is set separately
for every input.
Ideally, the above should be the only meaningful operations that can be performed
on the encoding. Specifically, it should be hard to learn anything about the value
of any arithmetic expression evaluated over the encodings whose degree exceeds the
degree bound. Special cases of this ideal security requirement were put forward as
hardness assumptions. For example the Multilinear DDH assumptions [GGH13a] on
multilinear maps with maximal degree d states that given encodings of d+ 1 random
elements, an encoding of their product is indistinguishable from an encoding of an
independent random element.
Our first step is to investigate the feasibility of obfuscation based on multilin-
ear maps with ideal security. However, since we do not know how to formalize the
intuitive notion of ideal security with a simple and plausible hardness assumption
on multilinear maps, we adopt a model where multilinear maps have ideal security
built-in.
The ideal multilinear map model. In the ideal multilinear map model, all par-
ties have access to an oracle implementing a multilinear map with ideal security. This
stateful oracle generates encodings of elements and maintains a mapping between en-
codings and the elements and levels they encode. The encodings themselves, however,
are otherwise completely independent of the elements they encode. Therefore, the
only meaningful way to manipulate encodings is through the oracle that implements
the permitted operations (comparison and homomorphic evaluation). This modeling
of ideal multilinear maps follows the same lines as the random oracle model or the
generic group model [BR93, BS84, Sho97] used to model hash functions or group
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homomorphisms with ideal security.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). There exists a VBB obfuscator for low-depth (NC1) circuits
in the ideal multilinear map model.
Based on computational assumptions, the above obfuscator can be transformed
into a VBB obfuscator for all polynomial-size circuits in the ideal multilinear map
model through a technique known as bootstrapping [GGH+13b, BR14, App14].
Discussion. Contrasting the above result with the impossibility of Barak et al. for
general purpose VBB obfuscation, we observe that this impossibility does not extend
to the ideal multilinear map model or, in fact, to any model where the obfuscator is
assisted by a non-trivial oracle. To see why, recall that the function given by Barak
et al. contains a secret key that must be leaked by any implementation and therefore
cannot be obfuscated. However, in a model where the obfuscated program can only
be evaluated given access to some oracle and the state of this oracle remains secret,
there is no way to recover a full implementation of the function and extract the secret
from the obfuscated program.
The above observation calls for an investigation of the feasibility of obfuscation in
the range between the plain model and the ideal multilinear map model. In particular
we are interested in models where the ideal oracle admits a cryptographic plain-model
implementation. Construction in such models are often used as heuristics and may
satisfy meaningful relaxed notions of security in the plain model (see, for example,
the random oracle methodology [BR93]).
Question 1.5. Is VBB obfuscation possible in ideal models that are weaker than the
ideal multilinear map model? Are there non-trivial ideal models where VBB obfusca-
tion is impossible?
We address the above question in Section 1.2.2.3.
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The obfuscation scheme from Theorem 1.2 in the ideal multilinear map model
achieves security that is impossible in the plain model. It is therefore not imminently
clear how to interpret this result. In particular, any attempt to instantiate the scheme
by replacing the ideal multilinear map with a concrete construction of a multilinear
map in the plain model will result in a scheme that is not VBB.
One interpretation of Theorem 1.2 is as providing a proof of security against purely
algebraic attacks. That is, instantiations of the scheme with a concrete multilinear
map in the plain model will be secure against a restricted class of attacks that only
manipulate the underlying encodings through the permitted algebraic operations.
Conversely, any attack on a plain-model instantiation of the scheme must rely on the
specific implementation of the multilinear map. (Indeed, the attack of Barak et al.
makes generic use of said implementation.)
Going beyond the above interpretation, the proof of Theorem 1.2 is connecting
the security of the obfuscation construction to that of the multilinear map. We view
this as a first step towards basing secure obfuscation on multilinear maps in the plain
model. Specifically, we ask:
Question 1.6. Can we show that plain-model instantiations of the obfuscation scheme
from Theorem 1.2 satisfy relaxed notions of security based on specific security prop-
erties of the underlying multilinear map?
We address the above question in Section 1.2.2.2 using Theorem 1.2 as a starting
point.
Related work. Theorem 1.2 appears in the work of Barak et al. [BGK+14]. Goyal
et al. [GIS+10] and Bitansky et al. [BCG+11] construct VBB obfuscation with the
help of a simple ideal oracle that can be implemented with trusted hardware of fixed
polynomial size. Canetti and Vaikuntanathan [CV13] obtain VBB obfuscation in
an ideal model implementing a pseudo-free group with a certain structure. Today,
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however, there is no candidate implementation of these oracles in the plain model.
Garg et al. [GGH+13b] analyze the security of their obfuscator in an ideal model
that strengthens the ideal multilinear map model. Brakerski and Rothblum [BR14]
give the first security proof in the ideal multilinear map model. There they achieve
the weaker notion of indistinguishability security where the simulator is unbounded.
They also give a construction that has a quasi-polynomial-time simulator assuming
the Exponential Time Hypothesis from computational complexity [IP01]. Miles, Sahai
and Weiss [MSW14], Badrinarayanan et al. [BMSZ16], and Garg et al. [GMM+16]
study obfuscation in different ideal models which captures multilinear maps with
weakened security.
1.2.2.2 Obfuscation in the Plain Model
Motivated by Question 1.6 above, we explore the possibility of obtaining obfuscation
in the plain model by replacing the ideal multilinear map in the obfuscation scheme
from Theorem 1.2 with a construction of multilinear maps in the plain model. We
start by formulating a security property of multilinear maps that yields indistinguisha-
bility security. Recall that indistinguishability security states that the obfuscations
of two functionally equivalent programs are computationally indistinguishable.
Uber secure multilinear maps. As a first attempt, we formulate a security prop-
erty for multilinear maps that will allow us to leverage the security of the obfuscation
in the ideal multilinear map model and get indistinguishability security. Intuitively,
the property says that the only way to distinguish between two distributions over
encodings, is by using the permitted algebraic operations.
We say that a pair of distributions (D0, D1) over vectors of ring elements are
indistinguishable by an efficient algebraic adversary (with respect to a vector of levels
L) if no efficient adversary in the ideal multilinear map model can distinguish between
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ideal encodings (with levels according to L) of elements sampled from D0 and elements
sampled from D1. A multilinear map is said to have uber security (in the plain
model) if for every pair of distributions (D0, D1) that are indistinguishable by an
efficient algebraic adversary with respect to a levels vector L, encodings with levels
according to L of elements sampled from D0 and from D1 are also computationally
indistinguishable. This notion is analogous to the notion of uber security for bilinear
maps defined in [BBG05].
The indistinguishability security of the obfuscation follows from uber secure mul-
tilinear maps in a straightforward way. The obfuscation scheme from Theorem 1.2
is VBB secure and therefore also satisfies the weaker notion of indistinguishability
security in the ideal multilinear map model. This means that obfuscations of two
functionally equivalent programs (viewed as a pair of distributions over ring elements)
are indistinguishable by an efficient algebraic adversary. By the uber security of the
multilinear map, the obfuscations of the two programs in the plain model will be in-
distinguishable as well. Indistinguishable obfuscation for NC1 can be bootstrapped to
support all polynomial-size circuits based on additional computational assumptions
[GGH+13b].
Relaxing uber security. As observed by Pass, Seth and Telang [PST14], the
above notion of uber security is too strong and cannot be satisfied by any multilinear
map. The indistinguishability security proof above can in fact be extended beyond
functionally equivalent programs to any pair of (distributions over) programs that
cannot be distinguished by an efficient adversary that only accesses the programs as
black boxes. This type of strong security is also ruled out by the lower bound of
Barak et al..
To get around this impossibility, the work of [PST14] suggests a relaxation of uber
security that considers only pairs of distributions that are indistinguishable even by
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an inefficient algebraic adversary. If the inefficient algebraic adversary is allowed
to query the ideal multilinear map oracle an unbounded number of times it may
be able to distinguish any pair of distributions that are not statistically close.4 The
computationally unbounded algebraic adversary is therefore restricted to make only a
polynomial number of queries to the ideal multilinear map oracle. We refer to such an
algebraic adversary as semi-efficient. Our relaxed version of uber security therefore
states that for every pair of distributions (D0, D1) that are indistinguishable by a semi-
efficient algebraic adversary with respect to a levels vector L, encodings with levels
according to L of elements samples from D0 and from D1 are also computationally
indistinguishable.
On the one hand, relaxed uber security is sufficient for proving indistinguishability
security. This is due to the fact that the obfuscation scheme from Theorem 1.2 in
the ideal multilinear map model is VBB even against semi-efficient adversaries. On
the other hand, relaxed uber security does not imply any security property that is
known to be impossible. In particular, the impossibility of Barak et al. (in the
settings described above) which relies on computational assumptions5 does not hold
for semi-efficient algebraic adversaries.
Taking the above connection between indistinguishability obfuscation and uber
secure multilinear maps as a starting point, we ask:
Question 1.7. Can the plain-model obfuscation satisfy stronger security? Can we
rely on multilinear maps with weaker security?
We show that the obfuscation scheme from Theorem 1.2 using multilinear maps
with relaxed uber security satisfies a security notion called virtual-grey-box (VGB).
We also provide evidence to the necessity of uber secure multilinear maps for VGB
obfuscation.
4Obfuscations of two different programs are unlikely to be statistically close [GR14].
5This is the case for obfuscation of programs that are represented as circuits. A stronger impos-
sibility is given for Turing machine obfuscation.
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VGB obfuscation. Bitansky and Canetti [BC10] introduce and study the notion
of VGB security that lies between VBB and indistinguishability security. Recall that
an obfuscator is VBB secure if every deterministic function of the program that can be
efficiently learned from the obfuscation can also be learned by an efficient algorithm
called a simulator, given access to a black-box that evaluates the program. The VGB
definition relaxes VBB security by allowing the simulator to be semi-efficient. In this
context, semi-efficiency means that the simulator is computationally unbounded, but
it can only make a polynomial number of queries to the black-box that evaluates the
program.
As observed in [BC10], VGB security implies indistinguishability security. In fact,
indistinguishability security can be equivalently defined as VGB security, except that
the simulator is allowed to be completely unbounded and may therefore evaluate the
black-box on all possible inputs.
In terms of feasibility, just as in the case of indistinguishability obfuscation, no
generic attacks are known on VGB security.6 In terms of applicability, VGB obfusca-
tion has applications that are not known to follow from indistinguishability obfusca-
tion. Consider, for example, the simple task of obfuscating password programs (also
known as point programs). This is a program that accepts a single secret password
and rejects all other inputs. If the obfuscated password is entropic and cannot be
guessed with noticeable probability, then VGB obfuscation of the password program
will provably hide the password. In general, VGB may be more meaningful than
indistinguishability obfuscation for families of concentrated programs. A family of
programs is said to be concentrated around a function f , if for every input x a ran-
dom program from the family will agree with f on x with overwhelming probability.
Applications of obfuscation for concentrated programs were explored for example in
6This is the case for obfuscation of programs that are represented as circuits. VGB obfuscation
of Turing machines is impossible in general [BC10].
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[Can97, BC10, CRV10, BR13, BBC+14, CFP+16].
We prove the following feasibility result of VGB obfuscation:
Theorem 1.3 (Informal). The obfuscation scheme from Theorem 1.2 instantiated
with multilinear maps satisfying relaxed uber security is VGB.
A couple of remarks are in order:
• Theorem 1.3 requires a strong formulation of uber security that holds even
for pairs of distributions that are not efficiently samplable. In contrast, the
application to indistinguishability security only requires uber security for pairs
of samplable distributions.
• Theorem 1.3 gives an obfuscator for circuits in NC1. Unlike the case of VBB
and indistinguishability obfuscation, we do not know how to bootstrap VGB
obfuscation from NC1 to stronger classes.
Implications to VBB security. We observe that for some function families, the
simulator constructed in the proof of Theorem 1.3 can be made completely efficient.
It follows that for these families, VGB security and VBB security are, in fact, equiv-
alent. As a corollary, we obtain VBB security for the same function families based
on multilinear maps with relaxed uber security. For some of these families, VBB
obfuscation was not previously known.
Strong indistinguishability obfuscation. The proof of Theorem 1.3 introduces
an intermediate notion that we call strong indistinguishability obfuscation. Recall that
standard indistinguishability security requires that the obfuscations of two function-
ally equivalent circuits, C and C ′, be indistinguishable. An obfuscator for a family of
programs P satisfies strong indistinguishability security, if indistinguishability holds
even for C and C ′ that are not functionally equivalent, but are instead sampled from
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a pair of distributions over P such that for every input x, C and C ′ agree on x
with overwhelming probability. That is, the circuit distributions C and C ′ are both
concentrated around the same function.
The first step in the proof of Theorem 1.3 is obtaining strong indistinguishability
obfuscation based on Theorem 1.2 and multilinear maps with relaxed uber security.
This step is similar to the proof of standard indistinguishability described above. The
rest of the proof shows that strong indistinguishability security is in fact equivalent
to the simulation-based notion of VGB security.
Theorem 1.4 (Informal). An obfuscator is VGB secure for a family of programs if
and only if it is strong indistinguishability secure for the same family.
On the necessity of uber secure multilinear maps. We provide evidence of
the necessity of uber secure multilinear maps for VGB obfuscation. To this end, we
consider a variant of multilinear maps with restricted functionality called multilinear
jigsaw puzzles [GGH+13b]. In contrast to multilinear maps, in multilinear jigsaw
puzzles, encodings can only be generated at the time the system parameters are sam-
pled. We refer to the public parameters together with the set of initialized encodings
as a puzzle. Instead of performing permitted operations over the encodings one at a
time, all the jigsaw puzzle user can do is specify an arithmetic expression of bounded
degree (represented as in arithmetic circuit7) and test whether it vanishes on the en-
coded elements or not. Uber security of multilinear jigsaw puzzles is defined similarly
to that of multilinear maps. Despite their restricted functionality, multilinear jigsaw
puzzles can replace multilinear maps in Theorems 1.2 and 1.3.
Theorem 1.5 (Informal). Assuming VGB obfuscation for all polynomial-size circuit,
there exist multilinear jigsaw puzzles with relaxed uber security. In the converse di-
rection, multilinear jigsaw puzzles with relaxed uber security imply VGB obfuscation
for NC1.
7In our formulation of jigsaw puzzles, we also restrict the size of the arithmetic circuits that can
be evaluated over the encodings. This size bound is set during the puzzle initialization.
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Related work. Theorems 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 appear in the work of Bitansky et al.
[BCKP14a]. Pass, Seth and Telang [PST14] base indistinguishability obfuscation
on multilinear maps satisfying a relaxation of uber security that is weaker than the
one discussed above. Lin [Lin16] constructs indistinguishability obfuscation from
multilinear maps with a constant degree bound satisfying a similar notion of uber
security. Gentry et al. [GLSW15], Lin and Vaikuntanathan and the works of Bitansky
and Vaikuntanathan [BV15], Ananth and Jain [AJ15], and Garg et al. [GGHZ16]
give constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation from different assumptions on
multilinear maps (that are not a type of uber assumption). Agrawal, Prabhakaran
and Yu [APY16] generalize the notion of strong indistinguishability obfuscation and
the equivalence to VGB obfuscation to a broad class of cryptographic primitives.
1.2.2.3 Obfuscation in Other Ideal Models
VBB obfuscation is possible in the ideal multilinear map model, but impossible in
the plain model. This fact may simply reflect a limitation of the techniques of Barak
et al.. However, it may also suggest that there is some ideal algebraic structure that
is necessary for VBB obfuscation. Motivated by Question 1.5 above, we study the
feasibility of obfuscation in intermediate models with simpler ideal structure. We are
interested, for example, in the following models:
• The ideal constant-degree multilinear map model, where the degree of the arith-
metic expressions that can be homomorphically evaluated is constant. When the
degree bound is 2, the oracle implements an ideal bilinear map [Mil85, Kob90].
• The generic group model, where the oracle implements an ideal group structure
[Sho97, BS84].
• The random oracle model, where the oracle implements a random function with
no algebraic structure [BR93].
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We give the first impossibility result for VBB obfuscation in a non-trivial ideal
model.
Theorem 1.6 (Informal). Assuming trapdoor permutations, there exists a family of
functions that cannot be VBB obfuscated, even if all parties have access to a random
oracle.
The function family in Theorem 1.6 was constructed by Bitansky and Paneth
[BP13]. This family cannot be obfuscated with VBB security even if we relax the
correctness requirement of the obfuscation and allow the obfuscated program to dis-
agree with the original program on a constant fraction of the inputs.
The proof gives a generic transformation from any obfuscator in the random oracle
model to an obfuscator in the plain model that is approximately correct in the above
sense. This transformation, combined with the impossibility of [BP13], yields an
impossibility for VBB obfuscation also in the random oracle model.
Related work. Theorem 1.6 appears in the work of Canetti, Kalai and Paneth
[CKP15]. Lynn, Prabhakaran and Sahai [LPS04] study obfuscation in the random
oracle model. They give constructions for simple functions and pose the question
of general purpose obfuscation in this model. The techniques in the proof of Theo-
rem 1.6 are inspired by the work of Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR88], showing how to
remove random oracles from key-agreement protocols. Pass and shelat [PS16] extend
Theorem 1.6 to rule out VBB obfuscation in the ideal constant-degree multilinear
map model. Mahmoody, Mohammed and Nematihaji [MMN16] extend Theorem 1.6
to ideal models that implement more general groups as well as random trapdoor
permutations. Bitansky and Vaikuntanathan [BV16] give transformations from any
obfuscation with approximate correctness to a perfectly correct obfuscation based
on different computational assumptions. These transformations preserve both VBB
and indistinguishability security. Combining the transformations of [BV16] with the
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transformations in the proof of Theorem 1.6 and its extensions allows the conversion
of indistinguishability obfuscation constructions in various ideal models into indistin-
guishability obfuscation in the plain model by eliminating the use of the ideal oracle.
Lin [Lin16], and Lin and Vaikuntanathan [LV16] constructs indistinguishability ob-
fuscation in the plain model based on constant-degree multilinear maps. We note
that the above transformations from obfuscation in ideal constant-degree multilinear
map model to the plain model cannot be applied to remove the use of multilinear
maps from the constructions of [Lin16, LV16] since these transformations only ap-
plies to obfuscation constructions that use multilinear maps as a black-box, while the
construction of of [Lin16, LV16] uses the implementation of the multilinear maps.
1.3 Thesis Organization
In Chapter 3 we present the application of indistinguishability obfuscation to the
hardness of finding a Nash equilibrium described in Section 1.2.1. In Chapter 4
we present the feasibility result for VBB obfuscation in the ideal multilinear map
model described in Section 1.2.2.1. In Chapter 5 we present the connection between
VGB obfuscation in the plain model and uber secure multilinear maps described in
Section 1.2.2.2. In Chapter 6 we present the impossibility result for VBB obfuscation
in the random oracle model described in Section 1.2.2.3.
Each chapter starts with an overview of the relevant concepts, the results, and
techniques. The chapters are mostly self-contained, with occasional references to each
other, and can in principle be read in any order.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we review basic notation and definitions that reoccur throughout the
thesis.
Basic notations. We denote by f : X → Y a function f mapping elements from
a domain set X to a range set Y . A pair of functions f, g : X → Y are equivalent
(denoted by f ≡ g) if f(x) = g(x) for all x ∈ X. For a pair of string x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗
we denote by x|y the concatenation of the strings. For a pair of integers n,m ∈ N,
n ≤ m we denote by [n,m] the set {i ∈ N : n ≤ i ≤ m}. We denote by [n] the set
[1, n].
Asymptotics. We use standard O-notations O, o,Ω, ω,Θ to denote order of growth
of functions. A positive function f : N→ R+ is said to be negligible if f(n) = n−ω(1)
and it is said to be noticeable if f(n) = n−O(1). The function f is polynomial if
f(n) = nO(1) and it is super polynomial if f(n) = nω(1). We say that an event occurs
with overwhelming probability if it occurs with probability 1−f(n) for some negligible
function f . We denote by poly(n) an unspecified polynomial.
Distributions. For a distribution D, the support of D is the set of elements to
whichD assignees a positive probability. We denote by x← D the process of sampling
x according to the distribution D. We denote by Un the uniform distribution over
strings in {0, 1}n. For a finite set S, we denote by x ← S the process of sampling x
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from S uniformly at random.
Models of computation. We use the standard notions of Turing machines and
circuits. We consider both boolean and arithmetic circuits. A boolean circuit con-
tains fan-in 2 AND and OR gates, fan-in 1 NOT gates and constants from {0, 1}. An
arithmetic circuit over a ring R contains fan-in 2 addition, subtraction and multipli-
cation gates and constants from R. All gates have unbounded fan-out. We say that
an algorithm is PPT if is implemented by a (uniform) probabilistic Turing machine
and runs in polynomial time. A polynomial-size circuit family C is a sequence of
circuit C = {Cλ}λ∈N such that each circuit Cλ is of polynomial size λO(1). We often
refer to Turing machines M f or circuits Cf that make black-box use of some oracle
function f .
Adversaries. We model any efficient adversary strategy as a family of polynomial-
size circuits. For an adversary Adv corresponding to a family of polynomial-size
circuits {Advλ}λ∈N we often omit the subscript λ, when it is clear from the context.
Computational indistinguishability. Two distribution ensembles D,D′ where
D = {Dλ}λ∈N, D′ = {D′λ}λ∈N are said to be computationally indistinguishable is for
every polynomial size adversary Adv there exists a negligible function µ such that for
every λ ∈ N ∣∣∣∣ Prx←Dλ[Adv(x) = 1]− Prx←D′λ[Adv(x) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ(λ) .
The Schwartz-Zippel lemma. The Schwartz-Zippel lemma [Sch80, Zip79, DL78]
bounds the density of zeros of multivariate polynomials. We use the following simple
version of the lemma over finite fields.
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Lemma 2.1. Let F be a finite field and let P ∈ F [x1, . . . , xn] be a non-zero n-variate
polynomial over F of total degree d. Then
Pr
r1,...,rn←F
[P (r1, . . . , rn) = 0] ≤ d|F | .
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Chapter 3
On the Cryptographic Hardness of
Finding a Nash Equilibrium
This chapter shows that finding a Nash equilibrium of a game is hard, assuming the
existence of indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions with subexponen-
tial hardness. This provides further evidence of the intractability of finding a Nash
equilibrium, one that is extrinsic to the evidence presented so far.
This chapter is based on [BPR15].
3.1 Overview
This section gives a high-level overview of the results and techniques introduced in
this chapter. We start by recalling the relevant background and motivation, that were
briefly described in Section 1.2.1 of the introduction.
3.1.1 Background and Motivation
The notion of Nash equilibrium is fundamental to game theory. While a mixed Nash
equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in any game [Nas51], there is no known polynomial-
time algorithm for finding one. The tractability of the problem has received much
attention in the past decade, in large part due to its theoretical and philosophical sig-
nificance. Prominent evidence for the hardness of finding a Nash equilibrium emerges
from a line of works, originating in Papadimitriou [Pap94] and ultimately showing
that the problem is complete for the complexity class PPAD [DGP09, CDT09]. The
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class PPAD contains several other search problems that are not known to be tractable,
such as finding a fixed point of the kind guaranteed by Brouwer’s Theorem. Akin to
the phenomenon of NP-completeness, this could be interpreted as evidence to com-
putational difficulty. However, unlike in the case of NP, currently known problems in
PPAD appear to be of fairly restricted nature, and carry similar flavor to one another.
Seeking further evidence for the hardness of PPAD, we aim to base its hardness
on new types of problems. As observed in [MP91, Pap94] problems in PPAD cannot
be NP-complete unless NP = coNP, since the class is total. A potential source for
such problems, already pointed out in [Pap94], is cryptographic hardness. Indeed,
many classical cryptographic problems are believed to reside “on the boundary of
P”; namely, they are believed to be hard, but not NP-hard. (Indeed, for some total
super-classes of PPAD, such as PPA or PPP, hardness is known based on factoring
or collision-resistant hashing, respectively [Jer16].)
Towards identifying a suitable problem from the domain of cryptography, let us
first take a closer look into the definition of PPAD. The class PPAD consists of all
total search problems reducible to the following end-of-the-line problem. We are
given a program that succinctly represents an exponential size directed graph over
the nodes {0, 1}n, together with a source node xs. The graph is defined such that
the in-degree and out-degree of every node are at most one, and the in-degree of the
source xs is zero. Our goal is to find another node, other than xs, with in-degree or
out-degree zero. Such a node must exist by a simple parity argument.
The end-of-the-line problem can always be solved in exponential time by eval-
uating the program representing the graph on all inputs and reconstructing the graph.
An efficient solution, however, intuitively requires some sort of “reverse-engineering”
of the program. Indeed, under minimal cryptographic assumptions, there is no effi-
cient solution to the problem that treats the program as a black-box. For instance,
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the program may internally invoke a pseudo-random permutation [LR88] to describe
a “random looking” end-of-the-line graph that cannot be solved efficiently with
only black-box access.1
This suggests a natural approach for constructing PPAD-hard problems based on
cryptographic obfuscation, a compiler that transforms any program into an unintel-
ligible one while preserving functionality. Ideally, an obfuscated program should be
equivalent to a virtual-black-box (VBB): it should reveal nothing more than what
can be learned from its input-output behavior [BGI+01]. In particular, an obfuscated
program describing a pseudo-random end-of-the-line instance should be hard to
solve even given full access to the obfuscated program’s description. Abbot, Kane and
Valiant [AKV04] further show that PPAD-hardness can be based on VBB obfuscation
of an even simpler program that essentially computes some natural pseudo-random
function.
Neither of the above programs, however, is known to be VBB obfuscatable. In-
deed, VBB obfuscation is currently known only for a few simple functions based on
strong assumptions. Moreover, certain functions are impossible to VBB obfuscate
[BGI+01], and VBB obfuscation of pseudo-random functions, including the one con-
sidered in [AKV04], is in particular subject to strong limitations [GK05, BCC+14].
In light of the impossibilities for VBB obfuscation, Barak et al. [BGI+01] defined
indistinguishability obfuscation, a relaxed notion requiring only that the obfuscations
of any two equal-size circuits computing the same function are indistinguishable from
one another. For indistinguishability obfuscation, no impossibilities are known. Fur-
thermore, starting with the work of Garg et al. several candidate constructions of
indistinguishability obfuscation were recently suggested based on the notion of cryp-
tographic multilinear maps [GGH+13b, BR14, BGK+14, AGIS14, MSW14, BMSZ16,
1If we do not require succinct representation of the graph, unconditional black-box hardness
results are known [HPV89, Pap94].
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AB15, Zim15, PST14, GLSW15, Lin16, BV15, AJ15]. A natural question is whether
the comparatively weak indistinguishability security guarantee suffice for establishing
PPAD hardness.
3.1.2 Results
We show PPAD hardness based on indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way func-
tions with super-polynomial hardness.
Theorem 3.1 (Informal). Assuming one-way functions and subexponentially secure
indistinguishability obfuscation for all polynomial-size circuits, the the end-of-the-
line problem is hard.
In fact, under the above assumptions, we show that PPAD is hard on average for
subexponential algorithms. Specifically, there exists an efficiently-samplable distribu-
tion on end-of-the-line instances that fails probabilistic subexponential algorithms
(for some subexponential time bound that depends on the obfuscation security). We
note that the assumption of one-way functions in Theorem 3.1 can be replaced with
the worst case assumption that NTime(2O(n
ε)) 6= ioBPTime(2O(nε)) [KMN+14].
While we mainly interpret Theorem 3.1 as evidence for the hardness of PPAD,
one may also consider a converse interpretation: any algorithmic breakthrough re-
sulting, say, in a subexponential algorithm for computing Nash equilibria will lead to
a subexponential attack on indistinguishability obfuscation or one-way functions.
3.1.3 Main Ideas
To demonstrate the hardness of PPAD, we construct a hard distribution over end-
of-the-line instances. Recall that an end-of-the-line instance is defined by a
program representing an exponential size directed graph. In more detail, an end-
of-the-line graph is described by a pair of circuits S and P. Given an input node
x ∈ {0, 1}n, S(x) outputs a “candidate successor” and P(x) outputs a “candidate
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predecessor” of x. We say that there is an edge from x to x′ in the graph if S(x) = x′
and P(x′) = x (this guarantees that the in-degree and out-degree of every node are
at most one). The instance also defines a source node xs ∈ {0, 1}n and we require
that P(xs) = xs 6= S(xs) (this guarantees that the in-degree of the source node xs is
zero). The solution is any node other than xs with in-degree or out-degree zero.
A simplified construction. To convey the main ideas behind the hardness proof
we first describe a simplified construction of end-of-the-line instances that will
only satisfy a weak form of hardness, and then extend it to obtain the sought-after
result. In the constructed (distribution over) instances, the circuits S and P contain
the description a function PRF : [T ] → {0, 1}m sampled from a family of pseudo-
random functions, where T is of super-polynomial size.
Nodes x in the graph are of the form (i, σ) ∈ [T ] × {0, 1}m. We say that a node
(i, σ) is valid if σ = PRF(i). The graph defined by S and P contains a single path
passing though all valid nodes. Every invalid node will be connected to itself by a
self-loop. The graph contains a single source node xs = (1,PRF(1)) with in-degree
zero and a single sink node (T,PRF(T )) with out-degree zero.
Given a node (i, σ), the circuit S computes the candidate successor as follows:
1. If the node is valid and i < T , S outputs the node (i + 1,PRF(i + 1)) as the
candidate successor.
2. If the node is invalid or if i = T , S outputs the node (i, σ) unchanged.
The function P is defined analogously in the reverse direction. The end-of-the-
line instance is the triplet (S˜, P˜, (1,PRF(1))), where S˜ and P˜ are indistinguishability
obfuscations of the circuits S and P respectively and (1,PRF(1)) is the source node.
Note that this instance has a unique solution (T,PRF(T )).
30
Intuition. The path from the source (1,PRF(1)) to the sink (T,PRF(T )) should be
thought of as an authenticated chain where a signature σ corresponding to some valid
node (i, σ) cannot be obtained without first obtaining all previous signatures. It is
not difficult to show that any efficient algorithm that only invokes the circuits S and P
as a black box cannot find the signature PRF(T ), and thus cannot solve the instance.
We would like to prove that the same hardness holds even given the obfuscated circuits
S˜ and P˜. However, we first prove something weaker: finding the sink (T,PRF(T )) is
hard given only the successor circuit S˜. We then modify the construction and extend
the proof to show that the sink is hard to find given both S˜ and P˜.
To prove that it is hard to find the signature PRF(T ) corresponding to the sink, we
show that the obfuscated S˜ is computationally indistinguishable from a circuit that
on input (T,PRF(T )) returns some fixed value ⊥, rather than (T,PRF(T )) itself as S˜
would. This implies that an efficient algorithm would not be able to obtain PRF(T )
from either one of the circuits, or it could distinguish the two. Next, we argue the
indistinguishability of these two circuits.
For every j ≤ k ≤ T , we consider a circuit Sj,k that is identical to S, except that for
every i ∈ [j, k], Sj,k on the input (i,PRF(i)) outputs the fixed value ⊥. The argument
proceeds in two steps. First, we show that for a random u ∈ [T ], an obfuscation
S˜u,u of Su,u is computationally indistinguishable from S˜. Intuitively, this step “splits”
the authenticated chain into two parts. While given the source node it is possible to
compute additional signatures in the first part of the chain [1, u − 1], we show that
is it hard to find a signature for any i in the second part of the chain [u, T ]. More
concretely, in the second step, we prove that the obfuscated circuits S˜u,u and S˜u,T are
computationally indistinguishable by a sequence of hybrids. For every j ∈ [u, T ], we
show that the obfuscations S˜u,j and S˜u,j+1 are computationally indistinguishable. In
total, we have T hybrids; relying on one-way functions (which come up in the analysis)
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and indistinguishability obfuscation with subexponential security (related to the size
of T ), we show that every two obfuscations are T−Θ(1)-indistinguishable. Overall we
deduce that the obfuscations S˜ and S˜u,T are also computationally indistinguishable
as required. To summarize, the hardness proof follows two steps:
1. Split the chain into two parts: For a random u ∈ [T ], prove that S˜ and S˜u,T
are indistinguishable.
2. Erase second part: For every u ≤ j < T , prove that S˜u,j and S˜u,j+1 are
T−Θ(1)-indistinguishable.
Next, we explain the proof of the steps above. For simplicity, we assume the existence
of an injective length-doubling pseudo-random generator PRG : [T ] → [T 2]. In the
actual proof we relax this assumption and rely only on injective one-way functions.
As shown in [BPW16], injective one-way functions can be constructed from plain one-
way functions and indistinguishability obfuscation. The two steps rely on the ideas
of hidden triggers and punctured programs introduced by Sahai and Waters [SW14].
First step. To prove that S˜ is indistinguishable from S˜u,u for a random u ∈ [T ], we
first observe that for a random v ∈ [T 2] in the range of PRG, the circuit S˜ is indistin-
guishable from an obfuscation of a circuit Sv(i, σ) that has an extra “if statement”:
1. If σ = PRF(i) and PRG(i) = v, return ⊥.
2. Otherwise return the same as S(i, σ).
Here v is chosen at random from the range [T 2] of PRG. Observe that, with over-
whelming probability 1 − T−1, v is not in the image of PRG, the condition in (1) is
never met, and the alternative behavior is never triggered. Thus, S and Sv compute
the same function and their obfuscations are indistinguishable. Next, relying on the
pseudo-randomness guarantee of PRG, we can indistinguishably replace the uniformly
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random v with a pseudo-random value PRG(u). It is left to note that, because PRG is
injective, Sv, with v = PRG(u), and Su,u compute the exact same function and their
obfuscations are therefore indistinguishable. Indeed, both circuits compute the same
function as S except on (u,PRF(u)), where an alternative behavior is triggered and
⊥ is returned.
Second step. To prove that S˜u,j and S˜u,j+1 are indistinguishable we require that
PRF is puncturable. This means that for every input i ∈ [T ], we can sample a
punctured function PRF{i} that agrees with PRF on all inputs j 6= i, but computa-
tionally hides any information on the value PRF(i); namely PRF(i) is pseudo-random
even given the description of PRF{i}. Such puncturable pseudo-random functions are
known to exist based on any one-way function [BW13, KPTZ13, BGI14].
Note that the circuits S˜u,j and S˜u,j+1 differ only on input (j + 1,PRF(j + 1)):
while the first returns (j + 2,PRF(j + 2)), the second returns ⊥. In particular, to
guarantee indistinguishability the two circuits must hide PRF(j + 1). What enables
hiding the value PRF(j+ 1) is that both circuits never output PRF(j+ 1), but rather,
on input (j,PRF(j)) both return ⊥. The value PRF(j + 1) is only used to test if an
input (j + 1, σ) is valid by comparing σ to PRF(j + 1). Relying on puncturing, this
comparison can be performed in “encrypted form” while hiding PRF(j + 1).
Concretely, we first move from S˜u,j to S˜
(1)
u,j that uses the punctured function
PRF{j+1}. The circuit S˜
(1)
u,j also has the value σj+1 = PRF(j+ 1) hardwired, and given
(j+1, σ) it directly compares σ to σj+1. The obfuscated circuits S˜u,j and S˜
(1)
u,j compute
the same function, and are therefore indistinguishable. Then, since the value σj+1
is pseudo-random (even given PRF{j+1}), we can move to S˜
(2)
u,j where σj+1 is replaced
with a truly random value in {0, 1}m. Next, we move to S˜(3)u,j where the comparison of
σj+1 and σ is not done in the clear, but rather under an injective (length-doubling)
pseudo-random generator PRG : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}2m; in particular, σj+1 is not stored
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in the clear, but rather PRG(σj+1) is stored. This does not change functionality and
thus indistinguishability is again preserved. Now, using the pseudo-randomness of
PRG, we move to yet another circuit S˜
(4)
u,j, where PRG(σj+1) is replaced by a truly
random string v ∈ {0, 1}2m. Finally, as in the proof of the first step, note that v
is not in the image of PRG with overwhelming probability 1 − 2−m. Thus we can
indistinguishably change the circuit to return ⊥ when given the input (j + 1, σj+1).
We can then reverse the above steps and go back to computing σj+1 = PRF(j + 1),
using the non-punctured PRF.
The full construction. So far we only proved that that finding PRF(T ) is hard
given S˜. Proving that the same holds given also P˜ encounters a barrier. Indeed, when
erasing the output of S˜ on valid inputs (i,PRF(i)) we crucially relied on the fact that
in the hybrid circuit S˜u,j, the value PRF(j + 1) is never returned in the clear and is
only used in comparison, which could be done in encrypted form. However, in the
presence of P˜ this is no longer the case since the signature PRF(j + 1) can also be
reached “from the other direction”; namely, on input (j+2,PRF(j+2)), P˜ does return
PRF(j + 1) in the clear.
To overcome this barrier, we modify the construction. We transform the original
end-of-the-line instance (S˜, P˜, xs) into a new instance (S
′,P′, x′s). Similarly to the
original instance, the graph defined by the new instance contains a single path (every
node outside this path is a self-loop). Intuitively, a walk on the path in the new
graph “emulates” a walk on the path in the original graph. In particular, the new
source x′s can be computed from the original source xs, and the new sink contains
the original sink (T,PRF(T )). The key property of the new construction is that both
the new successor circuit S′ and predecessor circuit P′ can be efficiently constructed
based only on the original successor circuit S˜. Thus, the already proven hardness of
obtaining PRF(T ) from S˜ carries over when given both the circuits S′ and P′, and
34
therefore the resulting instance distribution has the required hardness.
Abbot, Kane and Valiant [AKV04] describe a construction of suitable circuits S′
and P′ given any circuit for S˜ satisfying a certain verifiability property: for every i < T ,
there should be an efficient way to test if a given node is the i-th node on the path
defined by S˜. In the construction above this can done by testing that the node is of the
form (i, σ) and that S(i, σ) is of the form (i+ 1, σ′). The [AKV04] construction relies
on reversible computation: a method for simulating any computation in a reversible
way [Ben89].2
Later in this chapter we formulate the sink-of-verifiable-line problem, which
captures the required properties for the Abbot et al. construction. For completeness
we also describe the reduction to the end-of-the-line problem based on reversible
computation.
3.1.4 Related Work
In addition to the already mentioned works on PPAD and the PPAD-completeness of
finding Nash equilibria, various works show hardness results for different variants on
the problem of finding Nash equilibria, and explore other notions of equilibria with
related hardness. We refer the reader to [Gol11] and to the related work sections of
[OPR14, Rub15] for further details.
Next, we mention several subsequent works that have either relied or extended
the main result of this chapter (Theorem 3.1):
• In [GPS16], Garg, Pandey, and Srinivasan augment the proof of Theorem 3.1
and prove PPAD hardness based on indistinguishability obfuscation with poly-
nomial (rather than subexponential) security, or even based on the notion of
polynomially hard public-key functional encryption.
2Reversible computation was also used in [Pap94] to prove that a variant of PPAD contains
PSPACE.
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• In [HY17], Huba´cek and Yogev strengthen Theorem 3.1 to show the hardness of
the class CLS of continuous local search problems [DP11], which lies in the inter-
section of PPAD and the class PLS of polynomial local search problems [JPY88].
Their work gives a combinatorial reduction from the sink-of-verifiable-line
problem to CLS.
• In [RSS16], Rosen, Segev, and Shahaf further investigate the possibility of bas-
ing PPAD hardness on cryptographic assumptions. They show that average-case
hardness of PPAD instances with subexponentially-many solutions cannot be
reduced in a black-box way to the security of any primitive implied by trapdoor
functions (e.g., public-key encryption) .
• In [ARS16, BDV16], Asharov, Rosen, and Segev and Bitansky, Degwekar, and
Vaikuntanathan show that NP ∩ coNP hardness cannot be based on indistin-
guishability obfuscation and one-way functions via a black-box reduction. One
of their corollaries, based on Theorem 3.1, is that there is no black-box reduction
from PPAD to NP ∩ coNP or to the class statistical zero-knowledge.
• In [BPW16], Bitansky, Paneth, and Wichs show how to construct trapdoor
permutations based on subexponential indistinguishability obfuscation and one-
way functions. This is the only known construction not based on the hardness
of factoring. Their construction is based on a tweaked version of the sink-of-
verifiable-line instances constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
3.1.5 Chapter Organization
In Section 3.2 we define the complexity class PPAD and the end-of-the-line and
sink-of-verifiable-line problems. In Section 3.3 we define the basic cryptographic
primitives used in the rest of the chapter. In Section 3.4 we construct and analyze the
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hard distribution on sink-of-verifiable-line instances based on indistinguishabil-
ity obfuscation and one-way functions. In Section 3.5 we describe the reduction from
the sink-of-verifiable-line problem to the end-of-the-line problem based on
reversible computation.
3.2 PPAD and the Sink-of-Verifiable-Line Problem
A search problem (I, R) is defined by a set of instances I ⊆ {0, 1}∗ and by an NP
relation R. A search problem is total if there is polynomial-time algorithm for testing
membership in I, and for every z ∈ I the set of witnesses R(z) is non-empty. We
say that a search problem (I, R) is reducible to a search problem (I ′, R′) if there
exists a pair of polynomial-time computable functions f, g such that for every z ∈ I,
f(z) ∈ I ′, and for every w ∈ R′(f(z)), g(w) ∈ R(z).
3.2.1 PPAD
The class PPAD [Pap94] contains all total search problems that are reducible to the
end-of-the-line problem (EOL).
Definition 3.1 (end-of-the-line). An instance (xs, S,P) is defined by a starting
node xs ∈ {0, 1}n and a pair of circuits S,P with inputs and outputs in {0, 1}n such
that P(xs) = xs 6= S(xs). A string w ∈ {0, 1}n is a valid witness if and only if:
P(S(w)) 6= w ∨ S(P(w)) 6= w 6= xs .
Intuitively, the circuits S,P define a directed graph over vertices {0, 1}n where
the in-degree and out-degree of every node is at most one. For a pair of nodes x, y
there is an edge from x to y if and only if S(x) = y and P(y) = x. The condition
P(xs) = xs 6= S(xs) grantees that the starting node xs has in-degree zero. A witness
w is any other node with in-degree or out-degree zero. Such node must exists by a
simple parity argument.
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3.2.2 The Sink-of-Verifiable-Line Problem
The sink-of-verifiable-line problem (SVL) is a search problem described in
[AKV04] (there it is not given any specific name).
Definition 3.2 (sink-of-verifiable-line). An instance (S,V, xs, T ) is defined by a
starting node xs ∈ {0, 1}n, a target index T ∈ [2n], and a pair of circuits S : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n, V : {0, 1}n × [T ]→ {0, 1}, with the guarantee that, for (x, i) ∈ {0, 1}n × [T ],
it holds that V(x, i) = 1 if and only if x = xi = S
i−1(xs), where x1 = xs. A string
w ∈ {0, 1}n is a valid witness if and only if V(w, T ) = 1.
Intuitively, S defines a path over a subset of vertices in {0, 1}n starting at xs,
progressing according to xi = S(xi−1), and ending at the target xT = ST−1(xs).
Unlike in the EOL problem, an SVL instance defines a single directed path, and
there is no algorithm describing backward edges on this path. Furthermore, it is
possible to test whether a given node x is the i-th node on the path. Note that while
every valid SVL instance has a single witness, the problem may not be total, since
we do not know how to efficiently test if an instance (S,V, xs, T ) is valid. Specifically
it is hard to verify that V(x, i) = 1 if and only if x = xi.
3.3 Cryptographic Definitions
In this section we define the cryptographic primitives used in the reduction in Sec-
tion 3.4.
3.3.1 Indistinguishability Obfuscation
We define indistinguishability obfuscation with respect to a give class of circuits. The
definition is formulated as in [BGI+01].
Definition 3.3 (Indistinguishability obfuscation [BGI+01]). A PPT algorithm iO is
an indistinguishability obfuscator for a class of circuits C, if it satisfies:
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1. Functionality: for any C ∈ C,
Pr
iO
[∀x : iO(C)(x) = C(x)] = 1 .
2. Indistinguishability: for any polynomial-size distinguisher D there exists a
negligible function µ(·), such that for any two circuits C0, C1 ∈ C that compute
the same function and are of the same size λ:
Pr [D(C0, C1, iO(Cb)) = b | b← {0, 1}] ≤ 1
2
+ µ(λ) .
where the probability is also over the coins of D and iO.
We further say that iO is (t, δ)-secure, for some function t(·) and concrete
negligible function δ(·), if for all t(λ)O(1)-size distinguishers the above indistin-
guishability gap is at most δ(λ)Ω(1).
We say that iO is an indistinguishability obfuscator for all polynomial-size circuits,
if it is an obfuscator for every class C of polynomial-size circuits.
3.3.2 Puncturable Pseudorandom Functions
We consider the simple case of puncturable pseudo-random functions (PRFs) where
any PRF may be punctured at a single point. The definition is formulated as in
[SW14], and is satisfied by the constructions in [BW13, KPTZ13, BGI14] based on
the PRF of [GGM86].
Definition 3.4 (Puncturable PRFs). Let n, k be polynomially bounded length func-
tions. A polynomial-time computable family of functions
PRF = {PRFS : {0, 1}n(λ) → {0, 1}λ ∣∣ S ∈ {0, 1}k(λ), λ ∈ N} ,
associated with a PPT key sampler KPRF , is a puncturable PRF if there exists a
polynomial-time puncturing algorithm Punc that takes as input a key S, and a point
x∗, and outputs a punctured key S{x∗}, so that the following conditions are satisfied:
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1. Functionality is preserved under puncturing: For every x∗ ∈ {0, 1}n(λ),
Pr
S←KPRF (1λ)
[∀x 6= x∗ : PRFS(x) = PRFS{x∗}(x) ∣∣ S{x∗} = Punc(S, x∗)] = 1 .
2. Indistinguishability at punctured points: for any polynomial-size distin-
guisher D there exists a negligible function µ(·), such that for all λ ∈ N, and
any x∗ ∈ {0, 1}n(λ),
|Pr[D(x∗, S{x∗},PRFS(x∗)) = 1]− Pr[D(x∗, S{x∗}, u) = 1]| ≤ µ(λ) ,
where S ← KPRF(1λ), S{x∗} = Punc(S, x∗), and u← {0, 1}λ.
We further say that PRF is (t, δ)-secure, for some function t(·) and concrete
negligible function δ(·), if for all t(λ)O(1) distinguishers the above indistinguisha-
bility gap is smaller than δ(λ)Ω(1).
3.3.3 Injective One-Way Functions
As shown in [BPW16], a family of injective one-way functions can be constructed
from indistinguishability obfuscation and plain one-way functions, which in turn can
be constructed from indistinguishability obfuscation and the assumption that efficient
probabilistic algorithms cannot decide non-deterministic classes [KMN+14].
Definition 3.5 (Injective OWF). Let `, k be polynomially bounded length functions.
A polynomial-time computable family of functions
OWF = {OWFK : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}`(λ) ∣∣ K ∈ {0, 1}k(λ), λ ∈ N} ,
associated with a PPT key sampler KOWF , is an injective OWF if every function in
the family is injective and for any polysize inverter A there exists a negligible function
µ(·), such that for all λ ∈ N,
Pr
[
A(K,OWFK(x)) = x
∣∣∣∣ K ← KOWF(1λ)x← {0, 1}λ
]
≤ µ(λ) .
We further say that OWF is (t, δ)-secure, for some function t(·) and concrete negli-
gible function δ(·), if for all t(λ)O(1) inverters the above inversion probability µ(λ) is
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smaller than δ(λ)Ω(1).
3.4 Hardness of Sink-of-Verifiable-Line
In this section, we show that the SVL problem is hard, assuming indistinguishability
obfuscation. As a corollary, we deduce that the EOL problem is hard.
Our basic construction will show that SVL is not only hard in the worst-case,
but also in the average case. Concretely, we construct a PPT sampler I(1λ) for SVL
instances of λO(1) size such that no of λO(1)-size A can solve an instance sampled
by I accept with some negligible probability λ−ω(1). We rely on super-polynomial
hardness assumptions; for a convenient setting of parameters we describe the basic
sampler assuming that all underlying cryptographic primitives are subexponentially
hard. Accordingly we get subexponential hardness of SVL (albeit with some loss in
parameters). In Section 3.4.5, we discuss relaxations to more mild (but still super-
polynomial) hardness.
3.4.1 Ingredients
Fix any constant ε < 1, and let T = T (λ) = 2λ
ε/2
. We require the following primitives:
• iO is a (2λε , 2−λε)-secure indistinguishability obfuscator for all polynomial-size
circuits.
• PRF is a (2λε , 2−λε)-secure family of puncturable pseudo-random functions,
which for λ ∈ N maps [T ] to {0, 1}λ.
• OWF is a (2λε , 2−λε)-secure family of injective one-way functions, which for
λ ∈ N maps {0, 1}λ to {0, 1}`(λ), for some λ ≤ `(λ) ≤ λO(1).
41
3.4.2 Obfuscated Verify-and-Sign
The core of the hard SVL distribution produced by I will be an obfuscated verify
and sign circuit that given a valid signature on an index i produces a signature on
the next index i+ 1, where signatures will be implemented by the puncturable PRF.
The circuit is formally described in Figure 3·1.
VSS
Hardwired: a PRF key S ← KPRF(1λ).
Input: index i ∈ [T ], string σ ∈ {0, 1}λ.
1. If σ 6= PRFS(i), return ⊥.
(Formally ⊥ and SOLVED are represented by some canonical strings in {0, 1}log T+λ.)
2. If i = T , return SOLVED.
3. Return i+ 1,PRFS(i+ 1).
Padding: The circuit is padded so that its total size is s(λ), for a fixed poly-
nomial s(·) specified later.
Figure 3·1: The circuit VSS.
3.4.3 The Hard SVL Distribution
A random instance ΦV˜S,σ1 ← I(1λ) is associated with a (random) obfuscation V˜S of
a verify-and-sign circuit (with respect to a random PRF seed) and a signature σ1
on 1 ∈ [T ]. This induces a SVL instance (S,V, xs, T ) where the successor circuit S
computes V˜S, the verification circuit V uses V˜S to test inputs along the chain from
the source input xs = (1, σ1) to the target input (T, σT ). The SVL distribution is
formally described in Figure 3·2.
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ΦV˜S,σ1 ← I(1λ)
Sampling: Given security parameter 1λ,
1. Sample S ← KPRF(1λ).
2. Compute an obfuscation V˜S← iO(VSS).
3. Compute a signature σ1 = PRFS(1).
The induced instance: for (V˜S, σ1) sampled as above, let ΦV˜S,σ1 =
(S,V, xs, T ), where
1. S : {0, 1}log T+λ → {0, 1}log T+λ,
S(i, σ) = V˜S(i, σ).
2. V : {0, 1}log T+λ × [T ]→ {0, 1},
V((i, σ), j) = 1 if and only if i = j and V˜S(i, σ) 6= ⊥.
3. xs = (1, σ1).
4. T = T (λ).
Figure 3·2: Sampling the hard SVL distribution.
I is an SVL sampler. To show that I indeed samples SVL instances (S,V, xs, T )
according to Definition 3.2, we only need to check that, for i ∈ [T ] and for x ∈
{0, 1}log T+λ, V(x, i) = 1 if and only if x = Si−1(xs); the rest of the requirements are
purely syntactic and are satisfied by the way we have defined our sampler. To see
that the verification requirement is satisfied, note that by the definition of VSS, S, V,
and xs it holds that S
i−1(xs) = VS
i−1
S (1, σ1) = (i,PRFS(i)), and V((j, σ), i) = 1 if and
only if j = i and VS(j, σ) 6= ⊥, implying that (j, σ) = (i,PRFS(i)).
3.4.4 Hardness
We now show that I samples hard SVL instances; namely instances (S,V, xs, T ) for
which circuits of some subexponential-size cannot find the target xT = S
T−1(xs). We
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prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. For any A of size 2O(λε2 ) and every λ ∈ N,
Pr
PRFS(T )← A(V˜S, σ1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
S ← KPRF(1λ)
V˜S← iO(VSS)
σ1 ← PRFS(1)
 ≤ 2−Ω(λε2 ) .
Proof. Fix any such A. To prove the proposition we show that except with sub-
exponentially small probability, A(V˜S, σ1) cannot output σ∗ such that V˜S(T, σ∗) 6= ⊥
which is equivalent to showing that σ∗ 6= PRFS(T ). We prove this via a sequence of
indistinguishable hybrid experiments where the obfuscated V˜S is gradually augmented
to return ⊥ on an increasing interval, until it eventually returns ⊥ on some interval
[u, T ] (for every possible signature), meaning in particular that A(V˜S, σ1) cannot find
an accepting signature σ∗ for T . The second input σ1 remains PRFS(1) throughout
all hybrids.
Hyb1. The original experiment, where V˜S is an iO of VSS = VS(1)S .
Hyb2. Here V˜S is an iO of a circuit VS(2)v,S,K′ . The circuit has a random one-way
function image v = OWFK′(u), and on any input (i, σ), it returns ⊥ if OWFK′(i) = v.
The circuit is formally described in Figure 3·3.
VS
(2)
v,S,K′
Hardwired: a PRF key S ← KPRF(1λ), an injective OWF key K ′ ←
KOWF(1λ′) for λ′ = log T , an image v = OWFK′(u), for u← [T ].
Input: index i ∈ [T ], string σ ∈ {0, 1}λ.
1. If OWFK′(i) = v, return ⊥.
2. If σ 6= PRFS(i), return ⊥.
3. If i = T , return SOLVED.
4. Return i+ 1,PRFS(i+ 1).
Padding: The circuit is padded so that its total size is s(λ), for a fixed poly-
nomial s(·) specified later.
Figure 3·3: The circuit VS(2)v,S,K′ .
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Hyb3,j, j ∈ [T + 1]. Here V˜S is an iO of a circuit VS(3,j)u,S . The circuit has a random
index u, and on any input (i, σ), it returns ⊥ if i ∈ [u, u+ j]. The circuit is formally
described in Figure 3·4.
VS
(3,j)
u,S
Hardwired: a PRF key S ← KPRF(1λ), a random index u ← [T ], and j =
min{j, T − u}.
(This is a convenient abuse of notation, which should be interpreted as “if j > T −u, truncate
it”.)
Input: index i ∈ [T ], string σ ∈ {0, 1}λ.
1. If i ∈ [u, u+ j − 1], return ⊥.
2. If σ 6= PRFS(i), return ⊥.
3. If i = T , return SOLVED.
4. Return i+ 1,PRFS(i+ 1).
Padding: The circuit is padded so that its total size is s(λ), for a fixed poly-
nomial s(·) specified later.
Figure 3·4: The circuit VS(3,j)u,S .
Hyb4,j, j ∈ [T ]. Here V˜S is an obfuscation of a circuit VS(4,j)u,S{u+j},σu+j . The circuit is
the same as VS
(3,j)
u,S , only that it has a punctured PRF key S{u + j}, and the value
σu+j = PRFS(u+ j) is hardwired. The circuit is formally described in Figure 3·5.
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VS
(4,j)
u,S{u+j},σu+j
Hardwired: a random index u ← [T ], j = min{j, T − u}, a punctured PRF
key S{u + j} ← Punc(S, u + j), the PRF value σu+j = PRFS(u + j), where
S ← KPRF(1λ).
Input: index i ∈ [T ], string σ ∈ {0, 1}λ.
1. If i ∈ [u, u+ j − 1], return ⊥.
2. If i = u+ j and σ 6= σu+j, return ⊥.
3. If i ∈ [u+ j + 1, T ] and σ 6= PRFS{u+j}(i), return ⊥.
4. If i = T , return SOLVED.
5. Return i+ 1,PRFS{u+j}(i+ 1).
Padding: The circuit is padded so that its total size is s(λ), for a fixed poly-
nomial s(·) specified later.
Figure 3·5: The circuit VS(4,j)u,S{u+j},σu+j .
Hyb5,j, j ∈ [T ]. Here V˜S is an obfuscation of a circuit VS(5,j)u,S{u+j},σu+j . The circuit is
the same as VS
(4,j)
u,S{u+j},σu+j , only that the hardwired σu+j is not set to PRFS(u + j),
but sampled uniformly at random from {0, 1}λ,
Hyb6,j, j ∈ [T ]. Here V˜S is an obfuscation of a circuit VS(6,j)u,S,v,K . The circuit is the
same as VS
(5,j)
u,S{u+j},σu+j , only that instead of storing σu+j in the clear v = OWFK(σu+j)
is stored, and comparison of σu+j and σ is done by comparing OWFK(σu+j) and
OWFK(σ). Here K is a key for an injective OWF from the family OWF . In addition,
the PRF seed S is no longer punctured. The circuit is formally described in Figure 3·6.
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VS
(6,j)
u,S,v,K
Hardwired: a random index u ← [T ], j = min{j, T − u}, a PRF key S ←
KPRF(1λ), an image v = OWFK(σu+j), where K ← KOWF(1λ), σu+j ← {0, 1}λ.
Input: index i ∈ [T ], string σ ∈ {0, 1}λ.
1. If i ∈ [u, u+ j − 1], return ⊥.
2. If i = u+ j and OWFK(σ) 6= v, return ⊥.
3. If i ∈ [u+ j + 1, T ] and σ 6= PRFS(i), return ⊥.
4. If i = T , return SOLVED.
5. Return i+ 1,PRFS(i+ 1).
Padding: The circuit is padded so that its total size is s(λ), for a fixed poly-
nomial s(·) specified later.
Figure 3·6: The circuit VS(6,j)u,S,v,K .
The padding parameter s(λ). We choose s(λ) so that each of the circuits V˜S
considered above can be implemented by a circuit of size at most s(λ)/3. (The extra
1/3 slack is taken to satisfy Lemma 3.1 in the analysis below.)
We prove the following:
Proposition 3.2. For any 2O(λ
ε2 )-size distinguisher D, all λ ∈ N, and all j ∈ [T ]:
1. |Pr[D(Hyb1) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb2) = 1]| ≤ 2−Ω(λε
2
),
2.
∣∣Pr[D(Hyb2) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb3,1) = 1]∣∣ ≤ 2−Ω(λε),
3.
∣∣Pr[D(Hyb3,j) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb4,j) = 1]∣∣ ≤ 2−Ω(λε),
4.
∣∣Pr[D(Hyb4,j) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb5,j) = 1]∣∣ ≤ 2−Ω(λε),
5.
∣∣Pr[D(Hyb5,j) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb6,j) = 1]∣∣ ≤ 2−Ω(λε),
6.
∣∣Pr[D(Hyb6,j) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb3,j+1) = 1]∣∣ ≤ 2−Ω(λε),
where the view of D in each hybrid consists of the corresponding obfuscated V˜S and
σ1 = PRFS(1).
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Proving the above claim will conclude the proof of Proposition 3.1 since it implies
that
Pr
[
σ ← A(V˜S, σ1)
V˜S(T, σ) 6= ⊥
∣∣∣∣ V˜S← iO(VSS)] ≤
Pr
[
σ ← A(V˜S, σ1)
V˜S(T, σ) 6= ⊥ ‘
∣∣∣∣ V˜S← iO(VS(3,T+1)S,u )]+ 2−Ω(λε2 ) + T · 2−Ω(λε) =
0 + 2−Ω(λ
ε2 ) + 2λ
ε/2 · 2−Ω(λε) = 2−Ω(λε2 ) ,
where the first to last equality follows from the fact that VS
(3,T+1)
S,u (T, σ) = ⊥ for any
σ.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We now prove each of the items in the claim.
Proof of (1) and (6). Recall that here we need to show that
1. |Pr[D(Hyb1) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb2) = 1]| ≤ 2−Ω(λε
2
),
6.
∣∣Pr[D(Hyb6,j) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb3,j+1) = 1]∣∣ ≤ 2−Ω(λε).
In both cases, one obfuscated program differs from the other on exactly a single point,
which is the unique (random) preimage of the corresponding image v (in the first case
v = OWFK′(u), and in the second v = OWFK(σu+j)).
To prove the claim, we rely on a lemma proven in [BCP14] that roughly shows
that, for circuits that only differ on a single input, indistinguishability security implies
what is known as differing input security [BGI+01], where it is possible to efficiently
extract from any indistinguishability obfuscation distinguisher an input on which the
underlying circuits differ.
Lemma 3.1 (special case of [BCP14]). Let iO be a (t, δ)-secure indistinguishability
obfuscator for all polynomial-size circuits. There exists a PPT oracle-aided extractor
E, such that for any tO(1)-size distinguisher D, and two equal size circuits C0, C1
differing on exactly one input x∗, the following holds. Let C ′0, C
′
1 be padded versions
of C0, C1 of size s ≥ 3 · |C0|.
If |Pr[D(iO(C ′0) = 1]− Pr[D(iO(C ′1) = 1]| = η ≥ δ(s)o(1) ,
then Pr
[
x∗ ← ED(·)(11/η, C0, C1)
] ≥ 1− 2−Ω(s) .
48
Using the lemma, we show that if either item (1) or (6) do not hold, we can
invoke the distinguisher D to invert the underlying one-way function. The argument
is similar in both cases up to different parameters; for concreteness, we focus on
the first. Assume that for infinitely many λ ∈ N, D distinguishes Hyb1 from Hyb2
with gap η(λ) = 2−o(λ
ε2 ). Then, by averaging, with probability η(λ)/2 over the
choice of u,K ′, D distinguishes the two distributions conditioned on these choices
with gap η(λ)/2. Thus, we can invoke the extractor E given by Lemma 3.1 to invert
the one-way function family OWF with probability η(λ)
2
· (1 − 2−Ω(λ)) ≥ 2−o(λε2 ) in
time tE(λ) · tD(λ) ≤ η(λ)−O(1) · 2O(ε2) = 2O(λε
2
). Note that, indeed, given the image
and the one-way function key, the inverter can construct the corresponding circuits
efficiently. Recall that OWF′K is defined on inputs of size λ
′ = log T = λε/2, and is
(2−λ
′ε
, 2λ
′ε
)-secure. Thus we get a contradiction to its one-wayness.
Proof of (2). Recall that here we need to show that
2.
∣∣Pr[D(Hyb2) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb3,1) = 1]∣∣ ≤ 2−Ω(λε).
Here the two obfuscated programs compute the exact same function. Specifically,
a comparison in the clear of two values i and u is replaced by comparison of their
corresponding values under an injective one-way function. Thus, the required indis-
tinguishability follows from the (2λ
ε
, 2−λ
ε
)-security of iO .
Proof of (3). Recall that here we need to show that
3.
∣∣Pr[D(Hyb3,j) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb4,j) = 1]∣∣ ≤ 2−Ω(λε).
Here also, the two obfuscated programs compute the exact same function. Specifically,
rather than computing σu+j = PRFS(u + j) using the PRF key S, the value σu+j
is hardwired and directly compared to σ. For any other index, the punctured key
S{u+j} is used. Thus, by the functionality guarantee of puncturing the two functions
are the same, and indistinguishability follows from the obfuscation security.
Proof of (4). Recall that here we need to show that
4.
∣∣Pr[D(Hyb4,j) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb5,j) = 1]∣∣ ≤ 2−Ω(λε).
The only difference between the two obfuscated circuit distributions is that in the
first the hardwired value σu+j is PRFS(u + j), whereas in the second it is sampled
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independently uniformly at random. Indistinguishability follows from the (2λ
ε
, 2−λ
ε
)-
pseudo-randomness at the punctured point guarantee. Note that, indeed, given punc-
tured key S{u+ j} and σu+j, a distinguisher can construct the corresponding circuits
efficiently.
Proof of (5). Recall that here we need to show that
5.
∣∣Pr[D(Hyb5,j) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb6,j) = 1]∣∣ ≤ 2−Ω(λε).
Here also, the two obfuscated programs compute the exact same function. First, the
comparison of σ and σu+j is replaced by comparison of their corresponding values un-
der an injective one-way function. In addition, the punctured key S{u+j} is replaced
with a non-punctured key S. This does not affect functionality as the two keys com-
pute the same function on all points except u+ j, and the circuits in the two hybrids
treat any input u + j, σ, independently of the PRF key. Thus, indistinguishability
follows from the obfuscation security.
This concludes the proof of the Proposition 3.2 and Proposition 3.1.
3.4.5 Hardness Tradeoffs
In the hard SVL distribution constructed above, we assumed all cryptographic prim-
itives are subexponentially hard. We now explain how this can be relaxed, and what
are the tradeoffs between the hardness of the different primitives (and the SVL hard-
ness itself). Let f(·), g(·), h(·) be sub-linear functions and assume that OWF is
(2f(λ), 2−f(λ))-secure, PRF is (2g(λ), 2−g(λ))-secure, and iO is (2−h(λ), 2−h(λ))-secure.
We can restate Proposition 3.2 as follows.
Proposition 3.3 (Proposition 3.2 generalized). For any distinguisher D of size at
most 2O(m(λ)) where m(λ) = min(f(λ), g(λ), h(λ)), all λ ∈ N, and all j ∈ [T ]:
1. |Pr[D(Hyb1) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb2) = 1]| ≤ 2−Ω(f(log T )) + 2−Ω(h(λ)),
2.
∣∣Pr[D(Hyb2) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb3,1) = 1]∣∣ ≤ 2−Ω(h(λ)),
3.
∣∣Pr[D(Hyb3,j) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb4,j) = 1]∣∣ ≤ 2−Ω(h(λ)),
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4.
∣∣Pr[D(Hyb4,j) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb5,j) = 1]∣∣ ≤ 2−Ω(g(λ)),
5.
∣∣Pr[D(Hyb5,j) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb6,j) = 1]∣∣ ≤ 2−Ω(h(λ)),
6.
∣∣Pr[D(Hyb6,j) = 1]− Pr[D(Hyb3,j+1) = 1]∣∣ ≤ 2−Ω(f(λ)) + 2−Ω(h(λ)).
The overall probability of solving the SVL can be then bounded by
2−Ω(f(log T )) + T · (2−Ω(f(λ)) + 2−Ω(g(λ)) + 2−Ω(h(λ))) .
In particular, for m(·) defined as above, we can guarantee (2m(λ), 2−m(λ))-hardness
of SVL as long as
1. m(λ) = ω(log(T ) + logm(λ)).
2. f(log T ) = ω(logm(λ)).
For instance, for any constant ε < 1, we can set
• T = 2(log λ)2/ε ,
• f(λ) = λε (OWF is still subexponential),
• g(λ) = h(λ) = (log λ)2+2/ε (PRF and iO are qausipolynomial).
Alternatively, we can set
• T = 22(log λ)ε ,
• f(λ) = g(λ) = h(λ) = 2(log λ)
1+ε
2 (all primitives are only 2λ
o(1)
-secure).
Relying only on polynomial hardness. We do not know how to show SVL hard-
ness based only on polynomially secure primitives. In particular, with the approach
described above OWF cannot be quasi-polynomially (let alone polynomially) secure,
since f(f(λ)) = ω(logm(λ)) = ω(log f(λ)). In addition, T (λ) cannot be polynomial
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as long as we aim to deal with distinguishers of arbitrary polysize λO(1), which in turn
implies that PRF and iO cannot be polynomially secure.
We could, however, relax iO and PRF to be polynomially secure if we assume
OWF is exponentially secure; concretely, that OWF cannot be inverted with proba-
bility greater than 2−ελ in time less than 2ελ for some constant ε < 1. Moreover, doing
so we need to settle for worst-case hardness of SVL, rather than average-case as above.
Specifically, rather than considering SVL instances with respect to one fixed function
T (λ), we can consider SVL instances with respect to every T (λ) ∈ {λ, λ2, . . . , λlog λ}.
In the resulting distribution, for any λc-size circuit family, there exists a sequence
of instances (or distributions on instances) on which it fails; these are the instances
with T  λc′·c/ε, where c′ is a constant that depends on polynomial overhead of the
extractor given by Lemma 3.1.
3.5 Reducing Sink-of-Verifiable-Line to End-of-the-Line
In this section, we give a reduction from the SVL problem to the EOL problem. This
reduction was sketched in [AKV04], for completeness we describe the reduction in full.
The reduction is an efficient mapping from any SVL instance to an EOL instance such
that from any witness to the EOL problem, the witness to the SVL problem can be
efficiently computed. Note that the SVL problem is not total and therefore (although
reducible to EOL) it is not in PPAD. However, by our reduction, the existence of
a hard distribution on SVL instances implies the existence of a hard distribution on
EOL instances.
As the main step of mapping an SVL instance to an EOL instance, the reduc-
tion has to come up with an efficient implementation of the predecessor function.
This relies on ideas from reversible computation [Ben89]. Following [Ben89, AKV04],
we start by describing a simple pebble game capturing the main ideas used in the
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reduction.
3.5.1 The Pebble Game
Consider the following pebble game, also known as the east model [Jac91, CDG01].
We are given a set of t pebbles meant to be placed in a set of positions represented
by positive integers. In a valid move, a pebble can either be placed or removed from
position i provided that either i = 1 or position i − 1 is occupied by a pebble. In
particular, valid moves are reversible, and any sequence of valid moves can be reversed
by another sequence of valid moves. The goal of the game is to place a pebble in
position 2t − 1.
An efficient strategy can be described recursively as follows. Assume there is a
sequence of moves, using only the first t− 1 pebbles, and resulting in a pebble placed
in position 2t−1 − 1. Now, place the t-th pebble in position 2t−1. Next, free the
first t − 1 pebbles by reversing the original sequence of moves. Once the first t − 1
pebbles are free, repeat the original sequence of moves shifting every position up by
2t−1 resulting in a pebble placed in position 2t − 1.
The above strategy essentially allows to simulate any computation in a reversible
way, while incurring only polynomial blowup in running time. The reduction from
SVL to EOL relies on the above idea. We next describe it in detail.
3.5.2 The Reduction
Let (S,V, xs, T ) be an SVL instance where xs ∈ {0, 1}n and let t = log(T ) (assume
without loss of generality that t is an integer). We construct an instance (xs, S
′,P′)
for the EOL problem where xs ∈ {0, 1}m and m = t · (n+ t). We interpret every node
in {0, 1}m as a sequence (u1, . . . , ut) of t states where, for every j ∈ [t], the state uj is
of the form (x, i) ∈ {0, 1}n × [T ]. We say that a state (x, i) is valid if V(x, i) = 1 and
denote the i-th valid state (Si−1(xs), i) by v(i). Given u = (x, i), we abuse notation
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(overloading the function S) and denote S(u) = (S(x), i + 1). Given u = (x, i) and
u′ = (x′, i′), we say that u < u′ if i < i′.
Intuitively, the EOL instance will correspond to a graph with a single path. Every
node (u1, . . . , ut) ∈ {0, 1}m on this path describes a configuration of the pebble game
in the efficient strategy above. To express that the j-th pebble is in position i we set
uj = v(i+ 1). If the j-th pebble is not used we set uj = v(1) and say that the sate uj
is free. The starting node xs describes the starting configuration of the pebbling game
where all states are free. The last node on the path describes the final configuration
and contains the state v(T ). The circuits S′ and P′ traverse the path following moves
of the winning strategy. To place a the j-th pebble in position i, given that the k-th
pebble in position i − 1 we set uj ← S(uk). The j-th pebble is removed to free the
state uj by setting uj = v(1). Given any node that does not describe a configuration
reached by the strategy, the circuits S′ and P′ output the node unchanged indicating
that the node is a self-loop. The the only witness for the the instance (xs, S
′,P′) is
the final node on the path, and it is possible to compute xT from this node. (We
note that if we apply the reduction to a tuple (S,V, xs, T ) that is not a valid SVL
instance, we will still get an EOL instance with one or many solutions, but there is
no guarantee on their relation to the tuple (S,V, xs, T ) we started from.)
We continue with a formal description of the reduction. For j ∈ [t], we define the
functions (Sj,Pj) that traverse some segment of the entire path. The nodes in this
segment differ only on the first j states, whereas the last t − j states of all nodes in
the segment are the same. In the first node of the segment, the first j states are all
free. In the last node of the segment the value of the first j states will depend on
the base state of the segment. The base state of the segment ub can be any one of
the states {uj+1, . . . , ut} (that are fixed along the segment) or the free state v(1). If
ub = v(i) for some i ∈ [T ], then the last node in the segment is such that for every
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k ∈ [j], uk = v(i+ 2j − 2k−1).
The function Sj takes as input the base state ub and the current node N and
outputs the next node in the segment. If N is not in the segment, or if it is the last
node in the segment, the function Sj outputs N unchanged. The function Pj behaves
analogously. The functions S′ and P′ that traverse the entire path are simply the
functions St and Pt executed with the free base state v(1).
Next, we describe the implementation of the function Sj in more detail, but still at
high-level; the function Pj is analogous to Sj only in reverse. Pseudo-code for the
functions Sj and Pj is given in Section 3.5.3.
The function Sj. the function Sj takes as input a base state ub = v(i) and a node
N = (u1, . . . , ut). We start by describing the behavior of Sj when N is indeed in the
segment traversed by Sj. Later we explain how nodes that are not in the segment are
recognized. The function Sj traverses the segment using the functions Sj−1 and Pj−1
following this strategy:
1. In the first node of the segment, the states u1, . . . , uj are all free.
2. The first part of the segment is traversed using the function Sj−1 with the base
node ub. When the function Sj−1 reaches the end of its segment we have that
for every k ∈ [j − 1]:
uk = v(i+ 2
j−1 − 2k−1) ,
in particular, u1 = v(i+ 2
j−1 − 1).
3. The next node on the path is obtained by setting the free state uj (this state is
not changed by Sj−1) to the state S(u1) = v(i+ 2j−1).
4. The second part of the segment is traversed using the function Pj−1 with the
base node ub. This “reverses” the changes to the first j − 1 states made in the
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first part of the segment. When the function Pj−1 reaches the end of its segment
we have that u1, . . . , uj−1 are all free (while uj = v(i+ 2j−1) was not changed).
5. The third part of the segment is traversed using the function Sj−1 with the base
node uj = v(i + 2
j−1). When the function Sj−1 reaches the end of its segment
we have that for every k ∈ [j − 1]:
uk = v(i+ 2
j−1 + 2j−1 − 2k−1) = v(i+ 2j − 2k−1) ,
as required.
Above we described the sequential execution of Sj on the nodes in each of the three
parts of the segment. We now explain how Sj identifies which segment is currently
being traversed (we continue to assume that the input node is indeed in the segment).
Given an input node N = (u1, . . . , ut):
1. If the state uj is free the node belongs the the first part of the segment.
2. If the state uj is not free and for every k ∈ [j − 1], uk < uj then the node
belongs the second part of the segment.
3. If the state uj is not free and for every k ∈ [j − 1], uk > uj then the node
belongs the third part of the segment.
Finally, we explain how Sj recognizes that the input node N = (u1, . . . , ut) is not
in the segment, in which case it will output the node unchanged. A node is not in
the segment if and only if one of the following occurs:
1. The node contains an invalid state ui = (x, i) such that V(x, i) 6= 1.
2. The state uj is not free and it is also not the state v(i + 2
j−1) where ub = v(i)
is the base state.
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3. There exist k, k′ ∈ [j − 1] such that uk ≤ uj ≤ uk′ .
4. The call to Sj−1 or to Pj−1 did not modify the node N even though the node is
not the end point of the segment traversed by Sj−1 or by Pj−1.
3.5.3 Pseudo-code Descriptions of S and P
In this section we give pseudo-code for the functions Sj and Pj used in the reduction
in Section 3.5. The functions are defined recursively and we describe separately the
code for the based case j = 1 (Algorithms 1 and 3), and the case j > 1 (Algorithms 2
and 4). In the documentation in Algorithms 1, 2, 3 and 4 we refer to the three parts
of a segments defined in Section 3.5.2. We also refer to the four conditions used to
recognize a node that is not in the segment, as defined in Section 3.5.2 .
Algorithm 1: The function S1
input: Base state ub = (x, i) and the current node N = (u1, . . . , ut)
if N contains an invalid state then
return N unchanged ; // Not on path (Condition 1)
end
if uj is free then
Set u1 ← S(ub);
return (u1, . . . , ut);
else
return N unchanged // End of path or not on path (Condition 2)
end
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Algorithm 2: The function Sj for j > 1
input: Base state ub = (x, i) and the current node N = (u1, . . . , ut)
if N contains an invalid state then
return N unchanged ; // Not on path (Condition 1)
end
if uj is free then
N ′ ← Sj−1(ub, N) ; // First part
if N ′ 6= N then
return N ;
else if for all k ∈ [j − 1], uk = v(i+ 2j−1 − 2k−1) then
Set uj ← S(u1) ; // First part end, second part start
return (u1, . . . , ut);
end
return N unchanged ; // Not on path (Condition 4)
else if uj = v(i+ 2
j−1) then
if for every k ∈ [j − 1], uk is either free or uk < uj then
N ′ ← Pj−1(ub, N) ; // Second part
if N ′ 6= N then
return N ′;
else if for all k ∈ [j − 1], uk is free then
return Sj−1(uj, N) ; // Second part end, third part start
end
return N unchanged ; // Not on path (Condition 4)
else if for every k ∈ [j − 1], uk is either free or uk > uj then
return Sj−1(uj, N) ; // Third part
end
end
return N unchanged ; // Not on path (Conditions 2 and 3)
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Algorithm 3: The function P1
input: Base state ub = (x, i) and the current node N = (u1, . . . , ut)
if N contains an invalid state then
return N unchanged ; // Not on path (Condition 1)
end
if uj = v(i+ 1) then
Set u1 ← v(1);
return (u1, . . . , ut);
else
return N unchanged // End of path or not on path (Condition 2)
end
Algorithm 4: The function Pj for j > 1
input: Base state ub = (x, i) and the current node N = (u1, . . . , ut)
if N contains an invalid state then
return N unchanged ; // Not on path (Condition 1)
end
if uj is free then
return Pj−1(ub, N) ; // Third part
else if uj = v(i+ 2
j−1) then
if for every k ∈ [j − 1], uk is either free or uk < uj then
N ′ ← Sj−1(ub, N) ; // Second part
if N ′ 6= N then
return N ′;
else if for all k ∈ [j − 1], uk = v(i+ 2j−1 − 2k−1) then
Set uj ← v(1) ; // Second part end, third part start
return (u1, . . . , ut);
end
return N unchanged ; // Not on path (Condition 4)
else if for every k ∈ [j − 1], uk is either free or uk > uj then
N ′ ← Pj−1(uj, N) ; // First part
if N ′ 6= N then
return N ′;
else if for all k ∈ [j − 1], uk is free then
return Sj−1(ub, N) ; // First part end, third part start
end
end
end
return N unchanged ; // Not on path (Conditions 2, 3, and 4)
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Chapter 4
Obfuscation from Ideal Multilinear Maps
This chapter gives a construction of virtual black box obfuscation based on ideal
multilinear maps. The construction is presented and analyzed in the ideal multilinear
map model. More generally, the analysis gives a reduction that can be leveraged to
prove security properties of obfuscation based on multilinear maps even in the plain
model.
This chapter is based on [BGK+14].
4.1 Overview
This section gives a high-level overview of the results and techniques introduced in
this chapter. We start by recalling the relevant background and motivation that were
briefly described in Section 1.2.2.1 of the introduction.
4.1.1 Background and Motivation
The goal of general-purpose program obfuscation is to make an arbitrary computer
program “unintelligible” while preserving its functionality. At least as far back as
the work of Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [DH76]1, researchers have contemplated ap-
plications of general-purpose obfuscation. The first mathematical definitions of ob-
fuscation were given by Hada [Had00] and Barak et al. [BGI+01]. However, until
1Diffie and Hellman suggested the use of general-purpose obfuscation to convert private-key
cryptosystems to public-key cryptosystems.
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very recently, even heuristic constructions for general-purpose obfuscation were not
known.
This changed with the work of Garg et al. [GGH+13b] that gave the first candidate
construction for a general-purpose obfuscator. Their obfuscator builds upon a simpli-
fied subset of the multilinear maps framework of Garg, Gentry, and Halevi [GGH13a]
that they call multilinear jigsaw puzzles. Very roughly, a multilinear jigsaw puzzle is
defined by a secret sequence of ring elements and a public set of “valid” polynomials.
It is possible to test if a valid polynomial vanishes on the elements, but the elements
are otherwise hidden.
Following the obfuscator of Garg et al., several other multilinear map based ob-
fuscators were suggested [BR14, BGK+14, AGIS14, MSW14, PST14, AB15, Zim15,
GLSW15, BMSZ16]. Given the importance of general-purpose obfuscation, under-
standing the security properties of candidate constructions is imperative.
Potential attacks on obfuscators constructed from multilinear jigsaw puzzles can
be classified into two types: attacks exploiting the underlying multilinear jigsaw puz-
zle construction, and ideal attacks that treat the multilinear jigsaw puzzles as a black
box. Our focus in this chapter is to find out whether there exist ideal attacks against
candidate obfuscation schemes. To this end we study obfuscation in an idealized
model where the underlying multilinear jigsaw puzzles are replaced by a perfectly
secure black box implementing the same functionality.2
What security can we hope for in the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model?
Hada [Had00] suggested the first simulation-based definition for secure obfuscation
that we call ideal security. An obfuscator has ideal security if for every efficient ad-
versary, there exists an efficient simulator such that for every circuit C, the output of
2Some obfuscation constructions, for example the constructions based on [BV15, AJ15, GGHZ16],
cannot be described in the ideal model since they do not use the underlying multilinear jigsaw puzzles
as a black-box. In this chapter, our focus is only on black-box constructions of obfuscation from
multilinear jigsaw puzzles, such as the constructions mentioned above.
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the adversary given an obfuscation of C is indistinguishable from the output of the
simulator given oracle access to C.
As observed by Hada, if given oracle access to C it is hard to learn an implemen-
tation for C, then ideal security is unachievable. Consider the adversary that, given
an obfuscation of C, outputs this obfuscation as is. Since the adversary outputs an
implementation of C, it cannot be simulated efficiently. This attack applies also in
the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model, and we therefore cannot hope to prove ideal
security.
Barak et al. [BGI+01] suggested a relaxation of ideal security called virtual-
black-box (VBB) security. In VBB, we only consider adversaries that try to learn a
deterministic function of the obfuscated circuit C. The impossibility of Hada does not
extend to VBB obfuscation where the obfuscator is randomized. Nonetheless, Barak
et al. show that for some functions, VBB obfuscation is also impossible. Unlike Hada’s
attack, the attack on VBB security requires the complete implementation of the
obfuscated circuit, including the implementation of the underlying multilinear jigsaw
puzzle. This leaves open the possibility of VBB obfuscation in the ideal multilinear
jigsaw puzzle model.
4.1.2 Results
We construct VBB obfuscation against ideal attacks. More specifically, we prove the
following:
Theorem 4.1 (Informal). The following obfuscators exist in the the ideal multilinear
jigsaw puzzle model:
• An obfuscator for low-depth (NC1) circuits that is unconditionally VBB secure.
• A VBB obfuscator for all polynomial-size circuits assuming leveled fully homo-
morphic encryption that can be decrypted by an NC1 circuit.
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Our NC1 obfuscator is a variant of the [GGH+13b] obfuscator. Obfuscation
for all polynomial-size circuits is obtained following the bootstrapping technique of
[GGH+13b, BR14].
Interpretations. The model of ideal attacks fails to capture the attack of Barak et
al. on VBB (In fact we show that VBB is possible in this model). In light of this, we
discuss different interpretations of Theorem 4.1, motivating the study of obfuscation
in the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model.
1. By proving security against all ideal attacks, we focus cryptanalysis efforts on
attacks exploiting the underlying multilinear jigsaw puzzle construction. Specif-
ically, we are left with the following types of potential attack:
• Attacks against a specific multilinear jigsaw puzzle construction. Such At-
tacks may be eliminated by improved multilinear jigsaw puzzle construc-
tion.
• Generic attacks that make non-black-box use of an arbitrary multilinear
jigsaw puzzle implementation. Currently, such attacks are only known
for contrived functions [BGI+01], or when considering obfuscation with
stronger security [GK05, BCC+14].
2. Since generic non-black-box attacks on VBB security are only known for con-
trived functions, obfuscation that is secure against ideal attacks may be used
heuristically to obfuscate natural function.
3. The proof of Theorem 4.1 gives a reduction from the security of the obfuscation
construction to that of the underlying multilinear jigsaw puzzle. This reduction
may be leveraged to prove that the obfuscation construction in the plain model
provides some meaningful security guarantees (that are weaker than VBB) based
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on multilinear jigsaw puzzles with sufficiently strong security. We follow this
path in Chapter 5.
The above interpretations are similar to the common interpretations of security
proofs in the random oracle model [BR93, CGH04].
4.1.3 The Model
We start by elaborating on the notions of multilinear maps [BS02, GGH13a] and
multilinear jigsaw puzzles [GGH+13b]. Then we describe our ideal model.
4.1.3.1 Multilinear maps.
The notion of multilinear maps that we consider here is very similar to the notion
of asymmetric graded encoding of Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13a]. A multilinear
map is an encoding scheme for elements of some ring R. In this thesis, we focus on
maps encoding elements from an exponentially large field F . The encodings support
homomorphic evaluation of multilinear polynomials, as well as a zero-test operation
that can identify encodings of zero.
Every encoding contains an auxiliary tag called a control set that keeps track of
the homomorphic operations that can be evaluated over this encoding. The control
sets are subsets of some universe set U . When encoding an element α ∈ F , the
encoder specifies a control set S ⊆ U . We denote the resulting encoding by [α]S. The
encodings support the following operations:
Addition and subtraction Two encodings [α]S and [β]S containing the same con-
trol set can be homomorphically added (or subtracted). The result is an encod-
ing of the form [α + β]S (or [α− β]S).
Multiplication Two encodings [α]S and [β]T containing disjoint control sets S∩T =
∅ can be homomorphically multiplied. The result is an encoding of the form
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[α · β]S∪T . Intuitively, the restriction that S ∩ T = ∅ guarantees that evaluated
polynomials are multilinear since it disallows polynomials where an element is
multiplied with itself.
Zero test An encoding [α]U containing the universe sets U can be tested. The test
returns 1 if and only if α = 0.
4.1.3.2 Multilinear jigsaw puzzles.
Multilinear jigsaw puzzles were introduced by Garg et al. [GGH+13b] to capture a
subset of the multilinear maps functionality used in their obfuscation construction. In
multilinear maps, elements are encoded one by one, and any encoding can be combined
with any other encoding in a homomorphic computation. In contrast, multilinear
jigsaw puzzles encode a sequence of elements (with their respective control sets). The
puzzle supports the same homomorphic operations as multilinear maps, but only over
the elements encoded in the puzzle. There is no way to compute on elements encoded
in different puzzles.
Once the sequence of encoded elements is fixed and the puzzle is initialized, all the
evaluator can do is homomorphically evaluate some polynomial over the encodings and
test if the polynomial vanishes or not. In contrast to multilinear maps, in multilinear
jigsaw puzzles, the homomorphic operations and zero-test operation are not performed
one by one on individual encodings, and the evaluator does not obtain encodings of
intermediate steps of the homomorphic computation. Instead, the puzzle evaluator
specifies a solution polynomial in the form of an arithmetic circuit, and tests if it
“solves” the puzzle. The polynomial is evaluated over all the encoded elements and
the evaluator learns if the polynomial vanishes or not.
Just like in multilinear maps, the evaluator can only test a limited set of valid
polynomials defined with respect to the puzzle’s control sets. We say that a solution
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polynomial is valid with respect to a sequence of control sets, if the polynomial can be
evaluated on a sequence of encodings with the respective control sets via the supported
homomorphic multilinear map operations. We also require that the homomorphic
evaluation results in an encodings that contains the maximal universe sets U and can
be zero-tested.
4.1.3.3 Obfuscation in the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model.
Next we describe the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model, where parties have ac-
cess to an oracle implementing a multilinear jigsaw puzzle with ideal security. For
simplicity, our model is tailor to the settings of obfuscation. We also limit the way
the obfuscation construction uses the multilinear jigsaw puzzle. Namely, we assume
that the obfuscation of a circuit is given by a puzzle, and to evaluate the obfuscation
on some input x, we simply test this puzzle with a polynomial Ex. While not every
obfuscation construction fits this simple framework, the construction described in this
chapter does (and so do many of the other constructions referenced above).
Our simplified ideal model does not capture the full functionality of multilinear
maps or even that of multilinear jigsaw puzzles. Still, as we argue later in this
chapter, VBB obfuscation in our model immediately implies VBB obfuscation in the
more general ideal multilinear map model.
An obfuscation scheme in the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model consists of an
obfuscator Obf and an evaluator Eval, as follows.
• The obfuscator Obf, given a circuit C (with a single bit output), produces a
universe set U , a sequence of control sets ~S ∈ (2U)m, and a sequence of field
elements ~V ∈ Fm.
• Based on the output of the obfuscator, we initialize an ideal puzzle oracle
IdealPuzzle(U, ~S, ~V ). Given a query polynomial E, the oracle IdealPuzzle first
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verifies that E is valid with respect to the control sets ~S. If E is not valid,
IdealPuzzle answers ⊥. For a valid E, IdealPuzzle answers 1 if E(~V ) = 0 and 0
otherwise.
• The evaluation algorithm Eval accesses the oracle IdealPuzzle(U, ~S, ~V ). Given
an input x, Eval queries IdealPuzzle with a solution polynomial Ex. Based on
the test result, Eval produces the output C(x).
VBB security in this model is with respect to an adversary that is given access to
the initialized puzzle oracle IdealPuzzle. (Note that the evaluation algorithm Eval is
public.)
Comparison with the ideal multilinear map model. One can consider a more
general ideal model that allows for the full functionality of multilinear maps. In the
ideal multilinear map model, every element is encoded by a string. The encoding
string itself does not reveal any information about the encoded element. Encodings
can only be manipulated through an ideal multilinear map oracle that implements
the homomorphic operations and the zero-test operation.
Clearly, any obfuscation construction in the multilinear jigsaw puzzle model can
be translated into one based on multilinear maps by including the ideal encodings
of all the puzzle’s elements in the obfuscation. Moreover, VBB security in the ideal
multilinear jigsaw puzzle model implies the same security in ideal multilinear map
model. Intuitively, this is the case since anything that can be learned from the
sequence of ideal included in the obfuscation, can also be learned given access to the
ideal puzzle oracle IdealPuzzle.
4.1.4 Main Ideas
In this section, we outline the VBB obfuscation construction in the ideal jigsaw puzzle
model. We start with a basic construction and gradually improve it to facilitate the
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security proof.
4.1.4.1 The basic construction.
Our starting point is a simplified variant of the obfuscator of [GGH+13b] for NC1
circuits. The construction uses the fact that NC1 computation can be expressed as
matrix branching programs of polynomial size. A matrix branching program of length
n, width w, taking inputs of length λ, is defined by
• A sequence of 2n matrices {Bi,σ ∈ {0, 1}w×w}i∈[n],σ∈{0,1}, two matrices for every
level.
• A map Inp : [n] → [λ] that says which input bit is read by the branching
program in every level.
The branching program is evaluated on an input x ∈ {0, 1}λ by multiplying one
matrix from every level based on the value of the input bit associated with the level
Px =
n∏
i=1
Bi,x[Inp(i)] , (4.1)
where x[j] denotes the j-th bit of x. The product Px is guaranteed to be one of two
possible matrices Paccept, Preject ∈ {0, 1}w×w. The program accepts or rejects x based
on the product Px.
Randomizing the branching program. Before encoding the branching program
into a puzzle, Obf randomizes the branching program using Kilian’s randomization
technique [Kil88]. Let {Ri ∈ Fw×w}i∈[n−1] be n− 1 random invertible matrices over a
field F , and let R0 and Rn denote the identity matrix Iw. The randomized branching
program’s matrices are:
{B˜i,σ = adj(Ri−1)Bi,σRi}i∈[n],σ∈{0,1} ,
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where adj(Ri) = det(Ri)R
−1
i is the adjugate matrix. The map Inp of the randomized
branching program is the same as in the original program. Note that since det(Ri) 6=
0, the randomized branching program has the exact same functionality as the original
program.
The obfuscator Obf. Given an NC1 circuit C, the obfuscator expresses C as a
matrix branching program, randomizes it, and obtains the randomized program
{B˜i,σ ∈ Fw×w}i∈[n],σ∈{0,1} .
Recall that the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle obfuscator Obf must produce a
universe set U , a sequence of elements ~V and a sequence of control sets ~S, used to
initialize the ideal puzzle oracle. These are produces by encoding the entries of the
level-i randomized branching program matrices with the control set {i}:
U = [n] , ~S = ({i})i∈[n],σ∈{0,1},(r,c)∈[w]2 , ~V =
(
B˜i,σ[r, c]
)
i∈[n],σ∈{0,1},(r,c)∈[w]2
.
The evaluator Eval. Eval is given an input x ∈ {0, 1}n and access to the ideal
puzzle oracle IdealPuzzle(U, ~S, ~V ). Recall that IdealPuzzle lets the evaluator test valid
solution polynomials. For the control sets ~S, the valid solution polynomials include
multilinear operations such as matrix multiplication. Specifically, for every row and
column indexes r, c ∈ [w], Eval can test if Px[r, c] is zero or not (Px is given by Equa-
tion 4.1). Since Px ∈ {Paccept, Preject}, and Paccept and Preject are distinct matrices in
{0, 1}w×w, there exist indexes rout, cout ∈ [w] such that exactly one of the expressions
Paccept[rout, cout], Preject[rout, cout] is zero. The puzzle evaluator tests a solution polyno-
mial for Px[rout, cout], learns if the branching program accepts or rejects x, and outputs
a bit accordingly.
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Security of the basic construction. Next, we give an outline of our security
proof. For the basic construction described above, we will only demonstrate a simu-
lator for a limited set of adversaries. We then introduce several modifications to the
construction required to prove full-fledged VBB security.
Proving the VBB security of the construction amounts to demonstrating a simu-
lator Sim for every ideal model adversary Adv. For every NC1 circuit C, Adv is given
access to the puzzle oracle IdealPuzzle, initialized by Obf(C). Sim must simulate the
output of Adv, given only oracle access to C.
Sim will execute Adv and answer any query Adv makes to the oracle IdealPuzzle. In
the real experiment, Adv queries the oracle IdealPuzzle with a valid solution polynomial
E, and IdealPuzzle tests if E vanishes on the entries of the randomized branching
program matrices {B˜i,σ}i∈[n],σ∈{0,1}. In the simulation, however, Sim does not know
C (it only has oracle access to C), and therefore, it cannot compute the matrices
{B˜i,σ}. Instead, Sim determines whether E vanishes or not based on the structure of
the polynomial E and the oracle C.
For the basic construction, we only demonstrate a simulator that answers queries
testing input-respecting polynomials. Before defining input-respecting polynomials we
introduce the following notation. For every input x ∈ {0, 1}λ, denote by B˜x the sets
of matrices used in the evaluation of the randomized branching program on x
B˜x = {B˜i,x[Inp(i)]}i∈[n] .
We say that a valid solution polynomial E is respecting the input x, if E only depends
on the entries of the matrices B˜x and ignores all its other inputs.
Input-respecting queries are answered based on the following simulation property
of the randomized branching program [Kil88]: the randomized matrices B˜x do not
reveal any information about the original branching program, except for the product
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Px (see Equation 4.1). That is, given only the product Px, the distribution of the
matrices B˜x can be simulated perfectly.
We note that the simulation property may not hold for more than one input at a
time. For a pair of distinct inputs x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}λ, the matrices B˜x1 , B˜x2 are derived
from the same random matrices {Ri}. Therefore, B˜x1 and B˜x2 together may reveal
information about the original branching program beyond the products Px1 , Px2 .
To answer a test query for a polynomial E that respects the input x, Sim queries
its oracle C on x and learns the value Px (either Paccept or Preject). It then simulates
the matrices B˜x based on their product and evaluates E on the simulated entries. Sim
answers 1 if E vanishes and 0 otherwise.
If Adv only makes a single input-respecting test query, it follows directly from
the simulation property that the outputs of Adv in the real experiment and in the
simulated experiment are identically distributed. Next we argue that even if Adv
makes multiple input-respecting test queries (each query may be respecting a different
input) then the real output and the simulated one are statistically close.
In the real experiment, queries respecting two distinct inputs x1, x2, are answered
based on matrices sampled from the correlated distributions B˜x1 , B˜x2 derived from
the same initial program and random matrices {Ri}. The simulation, however, draws
independent uncorrelated samples from each of the distributions B˜x1 and B˜x2 .
We argue that in the real experiment, the answers to queries respecting two dis-
tinct inputs x1, x2 are not significantly effected by the correlation between the dis-
tributions B˜x1 and B˜x2 . To that end, we show that the answer to every query E
respecting an input x is fixed with overwhelming probability over the sample drawn
from B˜x. First observe that the degree of a valid polynomial E in the entries of the
matrices B˜x is at most n. Since every entry of the matrices B˜x can itself be expressed
as a degree w polynomial in the entries of the random matrices {Ri}, we can write
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E as a low-degree (negligible in the size of the field F ) polynomial in the entries of
{Ri}. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, E is either identically zero, or it vanishes with
negligible probability over {Ri}.
4.1.4.2 Testing multi-input-respecting polynomials.
Next we consider adversaries querying multi-input-respecting polynomials. A valid
solution polynomial E is multi-input respecting if it is the sum of a polynomial number
d of input-respecting polynomials E =
∑
i∈[d] Ei. We emphasize that the structure of
the arithmetic circuit E is required to be of the form of such sum, and, in particular,
given E the circuits E1, . . . , Ed can be efficiently extracted.
Consider, for example, a multi-input-respecting polynomial E = E1 + E2 where
E1 and E2 are respecting the inputs x1 and x2 respectively. Recall that in the real
experiment the answer to the query depends on the correlated distributions of matri-
ces B˜x1 and B˜x2 . However, the simulator Sim, that only has oracle access to C, can
only sample independently from B˜x1 and B˜x2 . As a result, Sim is able to determine if
each of the polynomials E1 and E2 vanish separately, but is not able to simulate any
correlations that will make the sum E = E1 + E2 vanish. Next we modify the basic
constructions to account for multi-input-respecting polynomials.
The modified construction. Following an idea of [BR14] we introduce more ran-
domness into the construction that will “break” possible dependencies between the
evaluations of polynomials respecting different inputs. Concretely, the obfuscator Obf
will sample 2n random non-zero scalars
{βi,σ ∈ F ∗}i∈[n],σ∈{0,1} .
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Before encoding the entries of the randomized branching program matrices, Obf will
multiply every entry of the matrix B˜i,σ by the scalar βi,σ and produce the puzzle
U = [n] ,
~S = ({i})i∈[n],σ∈{0,1},(r,c)∈[w]2 ,
~V =
(
βi,σ · B˜i,σ[r, c]
)
i∈[n],σ∈{0,1},(r,c)∈[w]2
.
We argue that these scalars do not change the obfuscated program’s functionality.
Recall that on input x, the evaluator tests a polynomial computing an entry of the
product matrix Px[rout, cout]. After introducing the scalars {βi,σ}, the same polynomial
will evaluate to βx · Px[rout, cout], where βx denotes the product
βx =
∏
i∈[n]
βi,x[Inp(i)] . (4.2)
Since βx 6= 0, the test result does not change.
The new simulator. By the choice of control sets, any valid solution polynomial
E that respects an input x must have the following multilinear structure: every
monomial in the formal polynomial computed by E is the product of exactly one
entry from every matrix in B˜x. Therefore, after introducing the scalars {βi,σ} the
value of E is multiplied by βx (see Equation 4.2).
Follows the new simulation strategy, Sim answers multi-input-respecting polyno-
mial queries of the form E =
∑
i∈[d] Ei, where Ei is valid and respects the input
xi. For every Ei, Sim queries C on xi, simulates the matrices B˜xi and evaluates the
polynomial Ei. If all the Ei polynomials vanish, Sim answers that E vanishes. If,
however, at least one polynomial Ei does not vanish, Sim answers that E does not
vanish.
To show that the above simulation is accurate, we argue that in the real exper-
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iment, the probability that E vanishes but at least one polynomial Ei does not, is
negligible. Since every Ei is valid and respect the input xi, after introducing the
scalars {βi,σ}, the polynomial E evaluates to
E(~V ) =
∑
i∈d
βxi · ri ,
where ri is a coefficient that depends on the matrices B˜xi . If, during the simulation,
at least one polynomial Ei does not vanish, then, in the real experiment ri 6= 0
with overwhelming probability. We can, therefore, write E as a non-zero, low-degree
polynomial in the variables {βi,σ}. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, E vanishes only
with negligible probability.
Beyond multi-input respecting polynomial. To prove VBB security, Sim must
correctly answer test queries for all valid polynomials, even ones that are not multi-
input respecting. We distinguish between two type of valid polynomials that are not
multi-input respecting.
No multi-input decomposition Some valid polynomials cannot be written as a
sum of input-respecting polynomials. Consider, for example, a valid monomial
that contains an entry from the matrices B˜i,0 and B˜j,1 for some distinct i, j such
that Inp(i) = Inp(j). Recall that a polynomial respecting an input x ∈ {0, 1}n
only depends on the matrices
B˜x = {B˜i,x[Inp(i)]}i∈[n] .
Since no set B˜x contains both matrices B˜i,0 and B˜j,1, the monomial does not
respect any input.
Inefficient multi-input decomposition Some valid polynomials can be written as
a sum of input-respecting polynomials, albeit, this representation is not efficient.
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Consider, for example, a valid polynomial computing some entry of the matrix
n∏
i=1
(B˜i,0 + B˜i,1) .
Such a polynomial is the sum of exponentially many input-respecting polyno-
mials, one for every possible input.
The simulation strategy described above may answer such test queries incorrectly.
Next we further modify the construction and, in particular, the control sets, to inval-
idated the polynomials that cannot be simulated.
4.1.4.3 Eliminating polynomials with no decomposition.
We modify the construction’s control sets so that with respect to the new control
every valid polynomial E can be represented (perhaps inefficiently) as a sum of input-
respecting polynomials. In this overview we simply represent E as a sum of monomials
and require that every monomial is input-respecting.
Recall that a monomial is respecting an input x if and only if it is the product
of exactly one entry from every matrix in B˜x. In other words, let Zj denote the set
of levels that look at the j-th bit of the input. We require that for every j ∈ [λ]
the monomial contains exactly one entry from every matrix {B˜i,0}i∈Zj or, exactly one
entry from every matrix {B˜i,1}i∈Zj .
We change the control sets to enforce this constraint. We consider a new universe
set U ′ of size 2n that consists of two disjoint copies of U ,
U ′ =
⋃
z∈[n]
{z, z′} .
For ` = |Zj| let zj,1, . . . , zj,` be the indexes in the set Zj. So far, for k ∈ [`] we encoded
the entries of both matrices B˜zj,k,0 and B˜zj,k,1 with the same control set {zj,k}. Now,
we encode the entries of the matrix B˜zj,k,0 under the set {zj,k, z′j,k} and the matrix
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B˜zj,k,1 under the set {zj,k, z′j,k+1} where z′j,`+1 = z′j,1.
We refer to these control sets as a straddling set system and exploit their following
properties:
• The only way to reach the new universe set U ′ is to multiply to together, for
every j ∈ [λ], one entry from every matrix {B˜zj,k,0}k∈[`] or one entry from every
matrix {B˜zj,k,1}k∈[`].
• The union of the control sets of the matrices {B˜i,0}i∈Zj is equal to the union of
the control sets of the matrices {B˜i,1}i∈Zj .
The first property ensures that every monomial is input respecting, while the
second property is crucial for functionality. Choosing one matrix in some level fixes
the choice of all the matrices in all the levels that look at the same input, but puts
no constraints on the matrices chosen in levels that look at a different input.
4.1.4.4 Eliminating polynomials with inefficient decomposition.
Under the new straddling set system, valid polynomials cannot contain monomials
that are not input respecting. However, a valid polynomial may still decompose into
an exponential sum of input-respecting polynomials. For example, for every j ∈ [λ],
consider the products Pj,0 and Pj,1 as follows
Pj,0 =
∏
i∈Zj
B˜i,0 , Pj,1 =
∏
i∈Zj
B˜i,1 .
The resulting control sets for Pj,1 and Pj,1 are equal and we can, therefore, consider
the sum Pj,0 + Pj,1 as well as the product of sums
∏
j∈[λ]
(Pj,0 + Pj,1) .
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An entry of this product can be computed by a valid polynomial that decomposes into
an exponential sum of input-respecting polynomials, one for every input in {0, 1}λ.
We again modify the construction, further restricting the set of valid polynomials
so it does not contain any polynomial with inefficient multi-input decomposition. To
this end, we change the structure of the matrix branching programs as well as the
control sets.
Dual-input branching programs. In a standard matrix branching program we
choose one of two matrices based on one input bit. We turn such program into a
dual-input matrix branching program by grouping together every pair of consecutive
levels into one big level where we choose one of four matrices based on two input
bits. Clearly, dual-input branching programs can emulate any standard branching
program.
Our new obfuscator express the input circuit as a dual-input matrix branching
program and randomizes it in the same manner. We assume without loss of generality
that every pair of input bits is examined by at least one level of the program. We use
a similar straddling set system to ensure that choosing a matrix in some level fixes
the values of the two input bits such that in any other level looking at one of these
input bits, the matrices must be chosen consistently.
Intuitively, in a standard branching program, a malicious evaluator fixes the value
of every input bit independently by choosing one matrix in every level. However, in a
dual-input branching program, in every level the evaluator must fix the value of two
input bits together.
Going back to the example above, we were able to add together the two polynomial
Pj,0, Pj,1 that disagree on the value of the j-th input bit by multiplying together entries
from all the levels that look at the j-th bit. Since every pair of input bits is examined
by at least one level of the dual-input branching program, this fixes the value of all
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other input bits. Therefore, the resulting product can contribute more than one input
respecting polynomial to the decomposition.
In the analysis we exploit the structure of the dual-input branching programs
and the control sets to demonstrate a an efficient procedure decomposing any valid
polynomial into a sum of input-respecting polynomials.
4.1.5 Related Work.
Garg at et. [GGH+13b] made the first step towards proving the security of their
construction in an ideal model. They consider the generic colored matrix model,
where adversaries are limited to multiplying together matrices (rather than individual
elements) in some prescribed order.
Brakerski and Rothblum [BR14] give the first security proof in the ideal multi-
linear map model. They prove that a variant of the [GGH+13b] obfuscator satisfies
the weaker notion of indistinguishability security where the simulator is unbounded.
They also suggest a construction with quasi-polynomial-time simulation assuming
the exponential time hypothesis from computational complexity [IP01]. The con-
struction in this chapter is based on that of Brakerski and Rothblum, and it achieves
polynomial-time simulation (VBB security) without assumptions.
Other works suggest general-purpose obfuscators in idealized models which cur-
rently do not have candidate instantiations in the standard model. Goyal et al.
[GIS+10] and Bitansky et al. [BCG+11] construct VBB obfuscation with the help of
a simple ideal oracle that can be implemented with trusted hardware of fixed polyno-
mial size. Canetti and Vaikuntanathan [CV13] obtain VBB obfuscation in an ideal
model implementing a pseudo-free group with a certain structure.
Miles, Sahai and Weiss [MSW14], Badrinarayanan et al. [BMSZ16], and Garg et
al. [GMM+16] study obfuscation in different ideal models which captures multilinear
maps with weakened security.
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4.1.6 Chapter Organization
In Section 4.2 we define obfuscation in the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model.
In Sections 4.3 and 4.4 we define the notions of branching programs and straddling
set systems used in our construction. In Section 4.5 we present the obfuscation
construction. In Section 4.6 we analyze the obfuscator’s security.
4.2 Obfuscation from Ideal Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles
In this section we define VBB obfuscation in the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model.
For simplicity of presentation, the ideal oracle interfaces and the syntax of the obfus-
cation scheme are specialized to our setting. See Section 4.1.3 in the overview of this
chapter for motivation and a high-level description of the model.
We start by describing the syntax and functionality of multilinear jigsaw puzzles
(in the plain model) and of the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzles oracle. Then we define
VBB obfuscation based on this oracle.
4.2.1 Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles
A multilinear jigsaw puzzle encodes a sequence of ring elements. In this thesis, we
focus on multilinear jigsaw puzzles encoding elements from a large field. The puzzle’s
solutions are the polynomials that vanishes on the elements. The puzzle is also defined
by a sequence of sets that control which polynomials are valid and can be tested. The
puzzle allows testing if a valid polynomial is a solution to the puzzle or not.
A multilinear jigsaw puzzle scheme [GGH+13b] is given by a tuple of PPT algo-
rithms
(KeyGen,PuzzleGen,Test) ,
with the following syntax:
• KeyGen is a randomized algorithm generating a secret key for the scheme. It
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takes as input the security parameter 1λ and outputs a secret key sk that includes
the description of a field F such that |F | = λω(1).
• PuzzleGen is a randomized algorithm generating a puzzle. It takes as input the
secret key sk, a size bound Q ∈ N, a universe set U , a sequence of control sets
~S ∈ (2U)m, and a sequence of elements ~V ∈ Fm. It outputs a puzzle Z.
• Test is a deterministic algorithm testing a solution to a puzzle. It takes as input
a puzzle Z and a polynomial E, represented as an arithmetic circuit of size at
most Q. It either outputs a bit or the special symbol ⊥.
The syntax of multilinear jigsaw puzzles above is designed to fit existing candidate
implementations. We offer a couple of remarks on the syntax.
Remark 4.1 (On ignoring input wires). For simplicity of notation we require that
given a puzzle Z with m elements, Test can test arithmetic circuits with exactly m
inputs. We therefore allows the arithmetic circuits to “ignore” some of their input
wires. A polynomial E that ignores some input variable is said to be independent of
that variable.
Remark 4.2 (On bounding the solutions size). Existing candidate constructions of
multilinear jigsaw puzzles are based on candidate multilinear maps [GGH13a, CLT15,
GGH15]. In these candidate multilinear maps the encoding procedure is randomized
and every encoding contains some random “noise”. The magnitude of the noise grows
as a result of homomorphic operations. If the magnitude of the noise becomes too
high, the encoded information may be lost. Therefore, when generating multilinear
jigsaw puzzles, we put an explicit bound on the size of the arithmetic circuits that can
be evaluated correctly. Existing candidate constructions of multilinear jigsaw puzzles
support any fixed polynomial bound.
Remark 4.3 (On sampling a field). In some of the existing candidate constructions
of multilinear jigsaw puzzles, such as the one based on the [GGH13a] maps, the field F
is sampled during the generation of the scheme’s secret key. Therefore, in the syntax
above, we separate the generation of a puzzle into two steps. First, a secret key is
sampled, including a description of a field F . Then, based on F , the puzzle generator
can specify a sequence of elements to be encoded.
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Before defining the functionality of multilinear jigsaw puzzles, we define the set
of valid arithmetic circuits that can be tested based on the puzzle’s control sets.
Definition 4.1 (Valid arithmetic circuits). Let U be a universe set, and let ~S =
(S1, . . . , Sm) ∈ (2U)m be a sequence of control sets. An arithmetic circuit E with
addition, subtraction, and multiplication gates and no constants, is valid with respect
to U and ~S, if E has m input wires and there exists a function Tag from the wires of
E to 2U , such that:
• For every i ∈ [m] the i-th input wire wi of E satisfies Tag(wi) = Si.
• For every addition or subtraction gate of E connecting the wires u and v to the
wire w:
Tag(u) = Tag(v) = Tag(w) .
• For every multiplication gate of E connecting the wires u and v to the wire w:
Tag(u) ∩ Tag(v) = ∅ , Tag(u) ∪ Tag(v) = Tag(w) .
• The output wire wout of E satisfies Tag(wout) = U .
We also consider the sub-circuits computing the internal wires of a valid arithmetic
circuit, and refer to them as partially valid. The notion of partial validity is used in
the analysis.
Definition 4.2 (Partially valid arithmetic circuits). Let ~S = (S1, . . . , Sm) be a se-
quence of control sets. An arithmetic circuit E is partially valid with respect to ~S,
if there exists sub-sequence ~S ′ of ~S such that E is valid with respect to ~S ′ and the
universe set
U ′ =
⋃
S∈~S′
S .
We denote the set U ′ by Tag(E).
Definition 4.3 (Multilinear jigsaw puzzle functionality). A multilinear jigsaw puz-
zle scheme (KeyGen,PuzzleGen,Test) satisfies the following functionality requirement.
For every security parameter λ ∈ N, every secret key sk in the support of KeyGen(1λ)
including the description of a field F , every size bound Q ∈ N, every universe set
81
U , every sequence length m ∈ N, every sequence of control sets ~S ∈ (2U)m, every
sequence of elements ~V ∈ Fm, and every arithmetic circuit E of size at most Q, the
following holds.
• If E is not valid with respect to U and ~S
Pr[Test(PuzzleGen(sk, Q, U, ~S, ~V ), E) = ⊥] = 1 .
• If E is valid and E(~V ) = 0
Pr[Test(PuzzleGen(sk, Q, U, ~S, ~V ), E) = 1] = 1 .
• If E is valid and E(~V ) 6= 0
Pr[Test(PuzzleGen(sk, Q, U, ~S, ~V ), E) = 0] = 1 .
Remark 4.4 (Candidate constructions). Garg at al. [GGH+13b] suggested a simple
construction of multilinear jigsaw puzzles based on multilinear maps. Their puzzle
contains the public parameters of the multilinear maps and individual encodings of
the puzzle’s elements under their respective control sets. Candidate constructions of
multilinear maps were given in [GGH13a, CLT15, GGH15].
Next, we define the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model, where the multilin-
ear jigsaw puzzle scheme is replaced by an ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle oracle
IdealPuzzle that is initialized like a puzzle and answers test queries. Specifically,
IdealPuzzle is initialized with the field F , a size bound Q ∈ N, a universe set U , a
sequence of control sets ~S ∈ (2U)m, and a sequence of elements ~V ∈ Fm. Given a
test query consisting of an arithmetic circuit E of size at most Q, IdealPuzzle either
answers with a bit or with the special symbol ⊥.
The functionality of the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle oracle is defined similarly
to the functionality of multilinear jigsaw puzzles.
Definition 4.4 (Ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle oracle functionality). For every field
F , every size bound Q ∈ N, every universe set U , every sequence of control sets
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~S ∈ (2U)m, every sequence of elements ~V ∈ Fm, and every arithmetic circuit E
of size at most Q, the oracle IdealPuzzle(F,U, ~S, ~V ), given the query E, answers as
follows
• If E is not valid with respect to U and ~S, IdealPuzzle answers ⊥.
• If E is valid and E(~V ) = 0, IdealPuzzle answers 1.
• If E is valid and E(~V ) 6= 0, IdealPuzzle answers 0.
4.2.2 Obfuscation in the Ideal Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzle Model
Next, we define VBB obfuscation in the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model. Let
C = {Cλ}λ∈N be a collection of polynomial-size circuits such that every circuit in Cλ
has λ input wires and one output wire. An obfuscation scheme for C in the ideal
multilinear jigsaw puzzle model is given by a pair of PPT algorithms (Obf,Eval) with
the following syntax
• The obfuscator Obf is given a description of a field F and a circuit C ∈ Cλ.
Obf outputs a size bound Q ∈ N, a universe set U , a sequence of control sets
~S ∈ (2U)m, and a sequence of elements ~V ∈ Fm.
• The evaluator Eval is given the security parameter 1λ and an input x ∈ {0, 1}∗.
Eval accesses an ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle oracle IdealPuzzle and outputs
a bit.
We say that (Obf,Eval) is an obfuscator for all polynomial-size circuits, if it is
an obfuscator for every collection C = {Cλ}λ∈N of polynomial-size circuits, such that
all the circuits in Cλ are of the same size and have the same number of input wires.
We say that Obf is an obfuscator for NC1, if it is an obfuscator for every collection
of polynomial-size circuits C = {Cλ}λ∈N, such that for some constant c ∈ N and for
every λ ∈ N, all circuits in Cλ are of depth exactly c · log λ.
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Next, we define the functionality and VBB security requirement for obfuscation
in the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model. We also define a stronger notion of VBB
security against semi-bounded adversaries. A semi-bounded adversary is computa-
tionally unbounded, but it only makes a polynomial number of oracle queries.
Definition 4.5 (VBB Obfuscation in the Ideal Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzle Model). A
worst-case VBB obfuscation scheme (Obf,Eval) in the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle
model for a collection of circuits C = {Cλ}λ∈N satisfies the following requirements
Functionality. For every field F , every circuit C ∈ Cλ and every input x to C
Pr
[
EvalIdealPuzzle(F,Q,U,
~S,~V )(x) = C(x)
∣∣∣ (Q,U, ~S, ~V )← Obf(F,C)] = 1 .
VBB security. For every sequence of fields {Fλ}λ∈N such that |Fλ| = λω(1) and every
polynomial-size adversary Adv there exists a polynomial-size simulator Sim and
a negligible function µ such that for every polynomial-size distinguisher D and
every C ∈ Cλ∣∣∣∣∣ Pr
[
D(AdvIdealPuzzle(Fλ,Q,U,~S,~V )(1λ)) = 1
∣∣∣ (Q,U, ~S, ~V )← Obf(Fλ, C)]
−Pr [D(SimC(1λ)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ(λ).
We say that (Obf,Eval) is VBB secure against semi-bounded adversaries if the
above requirement holds also for every (possibly unbounded) adversary Adv as
long as there is some polynomial q, such that Adv(1λ) makes at most q(λ) queries
to IdealPuzzle.
Remark 4.5. Unlike the definition of VBB obfuscation given in [BGI+01], the defi-
nition above allows the adversary to output an unbounded number of bits.
4.3 Branching Programs
We define the notion of matrix branching programs. Branching programs can simulate
NC1 circuits.
A matrix branching program consists of a sequence of levels, each defined by a
pair of matrices. In each level the program examines one input bit, and depending
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on its value the program chooses one of the matrices. The product of the matrices
chosen in all levels takes one of two possible values and it determines the program’s
output.
Definition 4.6 (Matrix Branching Program). A matrix branching program of width
w and length n for inputs of length λ is given by
• A pair of distinct matrices Paccept, Preject ∈ {0, 1}w×w.
• A sequence of 2n regular matrices {Bi,σ ∈ {0, 1}w×w}i∈[n],σ∈{0,1}.
• A bit selection function Inp : [n]→ [λ].
The output of the branching program on input x ∈ {0, 1}λ is determined by the product
Px =
n∏
i=1
Bi,x[Inp(i)] ,
where x[j] denotes the j-th bit of x. The program outputs 1 if Px = Paccept, and 0 if
Px = Preject. Otherwise the program’s output is ⊥.
Theorem 4.2 ([Bar86]). There exist a polynomial-time reduction RBP with the fol-
lowing properties. For any collection of polynomial-size circuits C = {Cλ}λ∈N in NC1
such that every circuit C ∈ Cλ has λ input wires, there exist a polynomial n such
that for every λ ∈ N and every C ∈ Cλ, RBP(C) outputs the description of a matrix
branching program of length n(λ) and width 5 computing the same function as C.
Moreover, the reduction RBP is oblivious: for every C,C ′ ∈ Cλ, the programs RBP(C)
and RBP(C ′) are given by the same matrices Paccept, Preject and the same bit selection
function Inp.
Remark 4.6. Our obfuscation construction does not require constant width branching
programs and can be based on any reduction that results in a polynomial-size branching
program.
In our construction we will use a variant of branching programs that we call dual-
input branching programs. Instead of reading one input bit in every level, a dual-input
branching program inspects a pair of input bits and chooses a matrix based on the
values of both bits.
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Definition 4.7 (Dual-Input Branching Program). A dual-input matrix branching
program of width w and length n for inputs of length λ is given by
• A pair of distinct matrices Paccept, Preject ∈ {0, 1}w×w.
• A sequence of 4n regular matrices {Bi,σ1,σ2 ∈ {0, 1}w×w}i∈[n],(σ1,σ2)∈{0,1}2.
• A pair of bit selection functions Inp1, Inp2 : [n]→ [λ].
The output of the branching program on input x ∈ {0, 1}λ is determined by the product
Px =
n∏
i=1
Bi,x[Inp1(i)],x[Inp2(i)] ,
where x[j] denotes the j-th bit of x. The program outputs 1 if Px = Paccept, and 0 if
Px = Preject. Otherwise the program’s output is ⊥.
Remark 4.7 (Simulating branching program with dual-input branching program).
any branching program can be simulated by a dual-input branching program with the
same width and length, since the dual-input branching program can always “ignore”
one input bit in each pair. Therefore, the reduction in Theorem 4.2 can be modified
to output dual-input branching programs.
4.4 Straddling Set System
In this section, we give a simple construction of a straddling set system which is an
ingredient of the obfuscation construction.
Construction 4.1 (Straddling set system). For n ∈ N, let Un = {ui}i∈[2n] be a
universe set of size 2n. The straddling set system Sn of size 2n over the universe Un
is the collection of 2n sets
Sn = {Si,σ ⊆ Un}i∈[n],σ∈{0,1},
where
Si,0 = {u2i−1, u2i} , Si,0 = {u2i, u(2i+1 mod 2n)} .
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The straddling set system satisfies the following combinatorial properties. Recall
that a collection S′ ⊆ Sn is an exact cover of a set U ′ ⊆ Un if the sets in S′ are pairwise
disjoint and the union of all the sets in S′ is U ′.
Fact 4.1. For every n ∈ N the straddling set system given by Construction 4.1
satisfies the following properties
• The universe set Un has exactly two exact covers in Sn. These covers are
{Si,0}i∈[n] , {Si,1}i∈[n] .
• Any strict subset U ′ ⊂ Un has at most one exact covers in Sn.
4.5 Construction
In this section we describe our VBB obfuscation scheme (Obf,Eval) for NC1 in the
ideal graded encoding model.
4.5.1 The Obfuscator Obf
The obfuscator Obf takes as input the description of a field F and a circuit C with λ
inputs. Next we describe the obfuscation process.
Converting C into a branching program. The obfuscator Obf start by convert-
ing C into a dual-input branching program. First, C is converted into a (standard)
branching program of length n and width 5 via the reduction in Theorem 4.2. Since
C comes from a circuit collection in NC1 we have that n = poly(λ). The branching
program is then simulated by a dual-input branching program (see Remark 4.7). The
dual-input branching program is given by
• A pair of matrices Paccept, Preject ∈ {0, 1}w×w.
• A sequence of 4n regular matrices {Bi,σ1,σ2 ∈ {0, 1}w×w}i∈[n],(σ1,σ2)∈{0,1}2 .
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• A pair of bit selection functions Inp1, Inp2 : [n]→ [λ].
Recall that by the obliviousness property of the reduction in Theorem 4.2, the ma-
trices Paccept, Preject and the functions Inp1, Inp2 only depend on λ and not depend on
the circuit C in any other way.
We make the following assumptions on the function Inp1, Inp2. These assumptions
are without loss of generality, since we can always add “dummy levels” to the pro-
grams that do not change the functionality and only increase the program’s length
polynomially.
• Every level inspects two different input bits. That is, for every i ∈ [n], we have
Inp1(i) 6= Inp2(i).
• Every pair of different input bits are inspected by some level. That is, for every
distinct j1, j2 ∈ [λ] there exists i ∈ [n] such that (Inp1(i), Inp2(i)) = (j1, j2).
• Every bit of the input is inspected by the same number of levels. More precisely,
for input bit j ∈ [λ], we denote by Inp−1(j) the set of steps that inspect the j’th
bit:
Inp−1(j) = {i ∈ [n] : Inp1(i) = j} ∪ {i ∈ [n] : Inp2(i) = j} .
We assume that there exists ` ∈ N such that for every j ∈ [λ], we have
|Inp−1(j)| = `.
Randomizing the branching program. Next, the obfuscator Obf randomizes
the branching program as follows.
• Obf samples 4n random non-zero scalars {αi,σ1,σ2 ∈ F}i∈[n],(σ1,σ2)∈{0,1}2
• Obf samples n− 1 random regular matrices {Ri ∈ Fw×w}i∈[n−1].
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Let R0 and Rn denote the identity matrix Iw. For every i ∈ [n] and σ1, σ2 ∈ {0, 1},
Obf computes the matrices B˜i,σ1,σ2 and C˜i,σ1,σ2
B˜i,σ1,σ2 = Ri−1 ·Bi,σ1,σ2 · adj(Ri) , C˜i,σ1,σ2 = αi,σ1,σ2 · B˜i,σ1,σ2 . (4.3)
Control sets. Let {Uj}j∈[λ] be λ pairwise disjoint sets, each of size 2`, and let U
be their union U =
⋃
j∈[λ] Uj. For every j ∈ [λ], let Sj` be a straddling set system of
size 2` over the universe set Uj. We associate the set system Sj` with the j-th input
bit, and index the 2` sets of Sj` by the levels of the branching program that inspect
the j-th bit. Namely we write,
Sj` = {Sjk,σ}k∈Inp−1(j),σ∈{0,1} .
For every step i ∈ [n] and bits σ1, σ2 ∈ {0, 1} we denote by S(i, σ1, σ2) the union of
pairs of sets that are indexed by i
Si,σ1,σ2 = S
Inp1(i)
i,σ1
∪ SInp2(i)i,σ2 . (4.4)
Note that by the definition of the set Inp−1(j), and by the way the elements of Sj`
are indexed, indeed, S
Inp1(i)
i,σ1
∈ SInp1(i)` and SInp2(i)i,σ2 ∈ SInp2(i)` .
Output. For every i ∈ [n] and σ1, σ2 ∈ {0, 1}, the obfuscator Obf encodes the all
entries of the matrix C˜i,σ1,σ2 with the control set Si,σ1,σ2 . That is, Obf outputs
• A size bound Q that will be specified below in the description of the evaluation
procedure.
• The universe set U .
• The sequence of control sets ~S
~S = (Si,σ1,σ2)i∈[n],(σ1,σ2)∈{0,1}2,(r,c)∈[w]2 .
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• The sequence of field elements ~V
~V =
(
C˜i,σ1,σ2 [r, c]
)
i∈[n],(σ1,σ2)∈{0,1}2,(r,c)∈[w]2
.
4.5.2 The Evaluator Eval
The evaluator Eval is given an input x ∈ {0, 1}λ and access to an oracle IdealPuzzle
initialize based on the output of Obf. Eval constructs an arithmetic circuit Ex and
queries its oracle. Recall that the oracle IdealPuzzle first verifies that Ex is valid with
respect to the control sets ~S, and if so, it evaluates Ex on the field elements ~V where
~S and ~V are as produced by Obf
~S = (Si,σ1,σ2)i∈[n],(σ1,σ2)∈{0,1}2,(r,c)∈[w]2 ,
~V =
(
C˜i,σ1,σ2 [r, c]
)
i∈[n],(σ1,σ2)∈{0,1}2,(r,c)∈[w]2
.
The circuit Ex may depend on the matrices Paccept and Preject and on the functions
Inp1 and Inp2 which, by the obliviousness property of the reduction in Theorem 4.2,
depend only on λ and not on the obfuscated circuit.
Recall that Paccept and Preject are distinct matrices in {0, 1}w×w. Let (rout, cout) ∈
[w]2 be indexes of an entry where Paccept and Preject differ. We assume without loss of
generality that
Paccept[rout, cout] = 0 , Preject[rout, cout] = 1 . (4.5)
Otherwise, Eval flips its output bit.
The circuit Ex emulates an evaluation of the dual-input branching program defined
by the matrices {C˜i,σ1,σ2} on the input x by implementing straightforward matrix
multiplication. Next we describe the structure of Ex. For every i ∈ [n] and every row
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and a column indexes r, c ∈ [w] Ex contains a sub-circuit Ei,r,cx computing
Ei,r,cx =
(
i∏
j=1
C˜j,x[Inp1(j)],x[Inp2(j)]
)
[r, c] .
These sub-circuits are defined as follows. For i = 1
E1,r,cx = C˜1,x[Inp1(1)],x[Inp2(1)][r, c] , (4.6)
and for 1 < i ≤ n
Ei,r,cx =
∑
k∈[w]
E(i−1),r,kx · C˜i,x[Inp1(i)],x[Inp2(i)][k, c] . (4.7)
The circuit Ex outputs the same as E
n,rout,cout
x .
The evaluator Eval queries the the oracle IdealPuzzle with the circuit Ex. We
therefore set the bound Q on the oracle query size to be |Ex|. The oracle responds
with a bit (next we show that the oracle never responds with ⊥) and Eval outputs
the same bit.
4.5.3 Functionality
We show that the construction satisfies the functionality requirement. Specifically,
we show that for every field F , for every circuit C taking inputs of length λ, for every
universe set U and sequences ~S and ~V produced by Obf(F,C)
~S = (Si,σ1,σ2)i∈[n],(σ1,σ2)∈{0,1}2,(r,c)∈[w]2 ,
~V =
(
C˜i,σ1,σ2 [r, c]
)
i∈[n],(σ1,σ2)∈{0,1}2,(r,c)∈[w]2
,
and for every input x ∈ {0, 1}λ the following holds
1. The circuit Ex queried by Eval is valid with respect to U and ~S.
2. Ex(~V ) = 0 if and only if C(x) = 1.
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For every i ∈ [n] we denote by σi1 and by σi2 the input bits
σi1 = x[Inp1(i)] , σ
i
2 = x[Inp2(i)] .
Proof of (1) Recall that the circuit Ex is constructed from the sub-circuits {Ei,r,cx }
as defined in Equations 4.6 and 4.7. We first prove the following claim.
Claim 4.1. For every i ∈ [n] and every r, c ∈ [w], the circuit Ei,r,cx is partially valid
and
Tag(Ei,r,cx ) =
⋃
j∈[i]
Sj,σj1,σ
j
2
.
Proof. We prove by induction. For i = 1 and for every r, c ∈ [w] the claim holds since
Tag(E1,r,cx ) = Tag(C˜1,σ11 ,σ12 [r, c]) = S1,σ11 ,σ12 .
(Here, and in the rest of the proof of (1) we abuse notation and think of the matrix
entry C˜i,σi1,σi2 [r, c] as an input wire of the circuit E
i,r,c
x ) For 1 < i ≤ n and for every
r, c ∈ [w] the sub-circuit Ei,r,cx is given by
Ei,r,cx =
∑
k∈[w]
E(i−1),r,kx · C˜i,σi1,σi2 [k, c] .
For every k ∈ w we have
Tag(E(i−1),r,kx ) =
⋃
j∈[i−1]
Sj,σj1,σ
j
2
, Tag(C˜i,σi1,σi2 [k, c]) = Si,σi1,σi2 .
Next we show that the circuit Ei,r,cx is partially valid. We need to show that
Tag(E(i−1),r,kx ) ∩ Tag(C˜i,σi1,σi2 [k, c]) = ∅ .
This is the case since for every j ∈ [i− 1]
Si,σi1,σi2 ∩ Sj,σj1,σj2 =
(
S
Inp1(i)
i,σi1
∪ SInp2(i)
i,σi2
)
∩
(
S
Inp1(j)
j,σj1
∪ SInp2(j)
j,σj2
)
= ∅ ,
where the first equality is by the definition of Si,σ1,σ2 in Equation 4.4, and the second
equality follows from the fact that in every straddling set system Sj`, for every distinct
i, j ∈ Inp−1(j), and every σ ∈ {0, 1} we have Sji,σ ∩ Sjj,σ = ∅.
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Finally, we have
Tag(Ei,r,cx ) = Tag(E
(i−1),r,k
x ) ∪ Tag(C˜i,σi1,σi2 [k, c]) =
⋃
j∈[i]
Sj,σj1,σ
j
2
,
as required.
By the above claim the circuit Ex = E
n,rout,cout
x is partially valid and
Tag(Ex) =
⋃
i∈[n]
Si,σi1,σi2 =
⋃
i∈[n]
S
Inp1(i)
i,σi1
∪ SInp2(i)
i,σi2
=
⋃
j∈[λ]
⋃
k∈Inp−1(j)
Sjk,x[i] =
⋃
j∈[λ]
Uj = U ,
where the first equality is by the definition of Si,σ1,σ2 in Equation 4.4, and the second
equality follows from the way we index the elements of the straddling sets systems.
Therefore, the circuit Ex is valid.
Proof of (2) Evaluating Ex over ~V gives
Ex(~V ) =
(
n∏
i=1
C˜i,σi1,σi2
)
[rout, cout]
=
(
n∏
i=1
αi,σi1,σi2 ·Ri−1 ·Bi,σi1,σi2 · adj(Ri)
)
[rout, cout]
=
(
n∏
i=1
αi,σi1,σi2 · det(Ri)
)
·
(
n∏
i=1
Ri−1 ·Bi,σi1,σi2 ·R−1i
)
[rout, cout]
=
(
n∏
i=1
αi,σi1,σi2 · det(Ri)
)
·
(
n∏
i=1
Bi,σi1,σi2
)
[rout, cout] ,
where the first equality is by the construction of the circuit Ex, and the second equality
is by the definition of the matrices B˜i,σ1,σ2 and C˜i,σ1,σ2 (see Equation 4.3).
Since the scalars {αi,σi1,σi2} are non-zero and since the matrices {B˜i} are full rank
we have
Ex(~V ) = 0 ⇔
(
n∏
i=1
Bi,σi1,σi2
)
[rout, cout] = 0 .
By the correctness of the dual-input branching program and the choice of the indexes
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rout, cout (see Equation 4.5), we have
Ex(~V ) = 0 ⇔
(
n∏
i=1
Bi,σi1,σi2
)
[rout, cout] = 0 ⇔ C(x) = 1 .
4.6 Proof of VBB Security
In this section we prove the VBB security of the obfuscation scheme (Obf,Eval) in
Section 4.5.
Theorem 4.3. The obfuscation scheme (Obf,Eval) for NC1 in the ideal multilinear
map model is VBB secure against semi-bounded adversaries.
The following is a corollary of Theorem 4.3, and of the bootstrapping theorem of
[BR14] giving a transformation from VBB obfuscation for NC1 to VBB obfuscation for
all polynomial-size circuits. The transformation relies on computational assumptions
and, as a result, the new obfuscation is not secure against semi-bounded adversaries.
Corollary 4.1. Assuming leveled fully homomorphic encryption with decryption in
NC1, there exists VBB secure obfuscation for all polynomial-size circuits in the ideal
multilinear map model.
We refer the reader to [GGH+13b, BR14] for the definition of leveled fully homo-
morphic encryption with decryption in NC1 and a discussion of the known instantia-
tions.
Next we prove Theorem 4.3. Let C = {Cλ}λ∈N be a collection of circuits in NC1
such that all the circuits in Cλ are of the same depth and takes λ input wires. Let
{Fλ}λ∈N be a sequence of fields such that |Fλ| = λω(1). Let Adv be a semi-bounded
adversary and let q be a polynomial bounding the number of queries and the size
of every query Adv makes to the ideal puzzle oracle.3 We construct a simulator Sim
3Definition 4.5 explicitly bounds the size of every query by a polynomial Q that is independent
of the adversary. We prove that security holds even without such bound.
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such that for some negligible function µ the following holds. For every polynomial-
size distinguisher D, every λ ∈ N and every C ∈ Cλ, let (Q,U, ~S, ~V ) be the output of
Obf(Fλ, C). We require∣∣∣Pr [D(AdvIdealPuzzle(Fλ,Q,U,~S,~V )(1λ)) = 1]− Pr [D(SimC(1λ)) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ µ(λ) .
The simulator Sim. The simulator Sim is given 1λ and oracle access to the circuit
C. Based on λ, Sim sets the branching program parameters n and `, the universe set
U and the control sets ~S. Note that these depend only on λ and depth of the circuits
in Cλ and do not depend on the specific circuit C. Sim emulates Adv(1λ). When Adv
makes a query E to the ideal puzzle oracle, Sim first checks if E is valid with respect
to U and ~S and if it is not, Sim answers the query with ⊥ just as the ideal oracle
would. Before describing how Sim answers a valid query we introduce some notation.
Input profiles. Let F be a partially valid arithmetic circuit with respect to ~S
and let T = Tag(F ) be the control set associated with the output wire of F (see
Definition 4.2). We define the input profile of F , denoted by prof(F ), to be a string
in {0, 1, ∗}λ∪{⊥}. Intuitively, if we think of F as an computing an intermediate step
in evaluation of the obfuscated program on some input x, the input profile prof(F )
represents the partial information that can be inferred about x based on the control
set T . We emphasize, however, that input profile is defined for all valid arithmetic
circuits, even circuits that are not computing an intermediate step of the the honest
evaluation of the obfuscated program on some input.
Formally, since F is partially valid with respect to ~S , there exists a function Tag
from the wires of F to control sets that satisfies the conditions in Definitions 4.1 and
4.2. Recall that
~S =
(
Si,σ1,σ2 = S
Inp1(i)
i,σ1
∪ SInp2(i)i,σ2
)
i∈[n],(σ1,σ2)∈{0,1}2,(r,c)∈[w]2
.
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For every j ∈ [λ], we say that the j-th bit of F ’s input profile is consistent with the
value σ ∈ {0, 1} if F has an input wire w such that Tag(w) = Si,σ1,σ2 and either
j = Inp1(i) and σ1 = σ, or j = Inp2(i) and σ2 = σ. In other words, denoting the
function Tag(·) ∩ Uj by Tagj, the j-th bit of F ’s input profile is consistent with the
value σ ∈ {0, 1} if F has an input wire w such that Tagj(w) = Sji,σ for some i ∈ [n].
If there exist j ∈ [λ] such that the j-th bit of F ’s input profile is consistent with
both 0 and 1, then prof(F ) = ⊥. Otherwise, for every j ∈ [λ] let prof(F )[j] denote
the j-th bit of F ’s input profile. For σ ∈ {0, 1} we set prof(F )[j] = σ if the j-th bit
of prof(F ) is consistent with σ. If the j-th bit of prof(F ) is not consistent with either
0 or 1 then prof(F )[j] = ∗. If prof(F ) ∈ {0, 1}λ we say that F is input respecting.
Answering queries. Next we describe how Sim answers a valid query E. We start
with a overview of the strategy and then elaborate on each step. See also Section 4.1.4
for a detailed overview of the simulation.
• Sim decomposes the circuit E into a set of input respecting circuits {Gi}i∈[d]
such that
E(~V ) =
∑
i∈[d]
Gi(~V ) .
The decomposition process is described in Section 4.6.1.
• For every i ∈ [d], Sim queries its oracle with the input xi = prof(Gi) (prof(Gi) ∈
{0, 1}λ since Gi is input respecting). Based on the value C(xi), Sim simulates
values ~Vxi such that, with overwhelming probability, Gi(
~V ) = 0 if and only if
Gi(~Vxi) = 0. The simulation of
~Vxi is described in Section 4.6.2.
• If Gi(~Vxi) = 0 for every i ∈ [d], Sim answers 1 to the query E. Otherwise Sim
answers 0. In Section 4.6.3 we prove that every query is answered correctly with
overwhelming probability, concluding the proof of Theorem 4.3.
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4.6.1 The Decomposition Procedure.
In this section we define a recursive procedure Dec decomposing a circuit into a sum
of input respecting circuits. Formally, the procedure Dec satisfies the following
Claim 4.2. Let F be a a partially valid circuit. Dec(F ) outputs a set of circuits that
satisfy the following properties.
1. F (~V ) =
∑
G∈Dec(F ) G(~V )
2. Every G ∈ Dec(F ) is partially valid and Tag(G) = Tag(F ).
3. The input profiles of the circuits in Dec(F ) are distinct.
4. If F is valid then for every G ∈ Dec(F ) is input respecting.
5. If F is valid then Dec(F ) is polynomial-time and |Dec(F )| ≤ |F |.
We first describe the procedure Dec and proceed to prove that is satisfies the
properties above. Given an input circuit F , the procedure Dec is as follows
• If F is an input wire (it contains no gates), Dec outputs the singleton set {F}.
• If F is of the form F1 + F2, Dec executes recursively and obtains the set
G = Dec(F1) ∪ Dec(F2) .
Next, Dec eliminates repeating input profiles from G by replacing any pair of
circuits G1, G2 ∈ G that have the same input profile with the single circuit
G1 +G2. Note that indeed, if G1 and G2 have the same input profile, then the
circuit G1 +G2 has the same profile as G1 and G2.
• If F is of the form F1 × F2, Dec executes recursively and obtains the sets
G1 = Dec(F1) , G2 = Dec(F2) .
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For every G1 ∈ G1 and G2 ∈ G2, Dec adds the circuit G1×G2 to the output set
G. Finally, Dec eliminates repeating input profiles from G as described above
and outputs the set G.
Proof of Claim 4.2. The fact that the procedure Dec satisfies Properties 1, 2 and 3
follows by a straightforward induction. Next we prove Properties 4 and 5.
Property 4. Let F be a valid circuit. For every G ∈ Dec(F ) and for every j ∈ λ
we first argue that the j-th bit of G’s input profile is consistent with either 0 or 1,
and then we show that it is not consistent with both.
Intuitively, if the j-th bit of G’s input profile is not consistent with either 0 or 1
then none of the control sets of G’s inputs wires contains elements in Uj and therefore,
Tag(G) cannot cover the universe set U and G cannot be valid. Formally, since F is
valid, by Dec’s Property 2 we have
Uj ⊆ U = Tag(F ) = Tag(G) .
Therefore, G must have some input wire w such that Tagj(w) 6= ∅ (recall that
Tagj(w) = Tag(w) ∩ Uj. ). This implies that Tag(w) = Si,σ1,σ2 for some i ∈ Inp−1(j)
and hence, the j-th bit of G’s input profile is consistent with either 0 or 1.
Next we prove that the j-th bit of G’s input profile is not consistent with both
0 and 1. More generally we prove that for every sub-circuit H of F , there is no
G ∈ Dec(H) such that prof(G) = ⊥. Assume towards contradiction that there exists
a sub-circuit H of F and G ∈ Dec(H) such that prof(G) = ⊥. Further assume
that H is minimal. That is, for every sub-circuit H ′ of H and every G′ ∈ Dec(H ′),
prof(G′) 6= ⊥. We separate the proof into cases based on the structure of H.
If H is an input wire (it contains no gates) then Dec(H) = {H} and Tag(H) =
Si,σ1,σ2 for some i ∈ n and some σ1, σ2 ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, for (Inp1(i), Inp2(i)) =
(j1, j2), the j1-th bit of prof(H) is consistent with σ1, the j2-th bit of prof(H) is
consistent with σ2, and all other bits of prof(H) are not consistent with either 0 or
1. By our assumptions on the functions Inp1, Inp2, we have j1 6= j2 and therefore
prof(H) 6= ⊥.
If H is of the form H1 + H2 and there exists G ∈ Dec(H) with prof(G) = ⊥,
then there also exists G′ ∈ Dec(F1) ∪ Dec(F2) with prof(G′) = ⊥ contradicting the
minimality of H.
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In the rest of the proof we analyze the case where H is of the form H1×H2. By our
choice of H there must exist G1 ∈ Dec(H1) and G2 ∈ Dec(H2) such that prof(G1) 6= ⊥
and prof(G2) 6= ⊥ but prof(G1 × G2) = ⊥. We can therefore assume without loss of
generality that for some j ∈ λ the j-th bit of prof(G1) is consistent with 0 and the
j-th bit of prof(G2) is consistent with 1. That is, there exists an input wire w1 of G1
and an input wire w2 of G2 such that Tag(w1) = S
j
i1,0
and Tag(w2) = S
j
i2,1
for some
i1, i2 ∈ Inp−1(j).
Next we derive a contradiction to Fact 4.1 by demonstrating an exact cover S ⊆ Sj`
of Tagj(F ) = Uj that contains both S
j
i1,0
and Sji2,1.
We start with the following claim showing that for every partially valid circuit H
and every sub-circuit H ′ of H any exact cover of Tagj(H
′) can be “extended” to an
exact cover of Tagj(H).
Claim 4.3. If H is partially valid then for every sub-circuit H ′ of H, every j ∈ [λ],
and every exact cover S′ ⊆ Sj` of the set Tagj(H ′) there exists an exact cover S of the
set Tagj(H) such that S′ ⊆ S ⊆ Sj`.
Before proving the claim we use it to derive a contradiction. Since Tag(w1) = S
j
i1,0
by Claim 4.3 there exists an exact cover S1 ⊆ Sj` of Tagj(H1) that contains Sji1,0.
Similarly, there exists an exact cover S2 ⊆ Sj` of Tagj(H2) that contains Sji2,1. Since
H is of the form H1 ×H2 we have
Tagj(H1) ∩ Tagj(H2) = ∅ , Tagj(H1) ∪ Tagj(H2) = Tagj(H) ,
and therefore S1 ∪ S2 is an exact cover of Tagj(H). Since H is a sub-circuit of F , by
Claim 4.3 there exists an exact cover S ⊆ Sj` of Tagj(H) such that S1 ∪ S2 ⊆ S, and
in particular, S contains both Sji1,0 and S
j
i2,1
. This contradicts Fact 4.1.
Proof of Claim 4.3. Let H ′ be a sub-circuit of H and let S′ ⊆ Sj` be an exact cover of
the set Tagj(H
′). We prove the claim by induction on the structure of H. If H is an
input wire then it has no non-trivial sub-circuits and the claim holds trivially.
If H is of the form H = H1 + H2, assume without loss of generality that H
′ is a
sub-circuit of H1. By the induction hypothesis there exists an exact cover S1 of the
set Tagj(H1) such that S′ ⊆ S1 ⊆ Sj`. Since Tagj(H1) = Tagj(H) the claim holds for
H as well.
If H is of the form H = H1 ×H2, assume without loss of generality that H ′ is a
sub-circuit of H1. By the induction hypothesis there exists an exact cover S1 of the
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set Tagj(H1) such that S′ ⊆ S1 ⊆ Sj`.
Next we argue that the set Tagj(H2) also has an exact cover S2 ⊆ Sj`. Consider a
sub-circuit H ′2 of H2 that contains a single input wire. Since Tag(H
′
2) is of the form
Tag(H ′2) = Si,σ1,σ2 = S
Inp1(i)
i,σ1
∪ SInp2(i)i,σ2 ,
for some i ∈ [n] and σ1, σ2 ∈ {0, 1}, then either Tagj(H ′2) = ∅ or Tagj(H ′2) = Sji,σ ∈ Sj`
for some σ ∈ {0, 1}. In any case, Sj` contains an exact cover of Tag(H ′2), and therefore,
by the induction hypothesis, Tag(H2) also also has an exact cover S2 ⊆ Sj`.
Finally, since
Tagj(H1) ∩ Tagj(H2) = ∅ , Tagj(H1) ∪ Tagj(H2) = Tagj(H) ,
we have that S1 ∪ S2 is an exact cover of Tagj(H) and the claim holds for H as well.
Property 5. Let F be valid circuit. It is straightforward to verify that the running
time of the procedure Dec on F is polynomial in the size of the output set Dec(F ).
In what follows, we bound |Dec(F )| by the size of the circuit F . More specifically,
we prove that for every circuit G ∈ Dec(F ) there exists a sub-circuit H of F such
that Dec(H) is a singleton set {G′} and prof(G) = prof(G′). By Dec’s Property 3 the
input profiles of the circuits in Dec(F ) are distinct, so we have |Dec(F )| ≤ |F |.
Fix G ∈ Dec(F ) and let H be a minimal sub-circuit of F such that there exists
G′ ∈ Dec(H) with prof(G) = prof(G′). It is therefore left to prove that |Dec(H)| = 1.
Assume towards contradiction that |Dec(H)| > 1. Clearly, H is not an input wire
since then |Dec(H)| = |{H}| = 1. Also, H cannot be of the form H = H1 +H2, since
then there must exist some G′′ ∈ Dec(H1)∪Dec(H2) such that prof(G′′) = prof(G′) =
prof(G) contradicting the minimality of H.
Therefore, H must be of the form H = H1 × H2. Since |Dec(H)| > 1 either
|Dec(H1)| > 1 or |Dec(H2)| > 1. Assume without loss of generality that |Dec(H1)| >
1. Let G1 ∈ Dec(H1) and G2 ∈ Dec(H2) be such that prof(G1 ×G2) = prof(G′), and
let G′1 ∈ Dec(H1) be such that prof(G1) 6= prof(G′1). Since F is valid and H1 is a sub-
circuit of F , it follows from the proof of Property 4 that prof(G1) 6= ⊥ and prof(G′1) 6=
⊥. Therefore, there exists some j ∈ [λ] such that prof(G1)[j] 6= prof(G′1)[j].
By Dec’s Property 2, Tag(G1) = Tag(G
′
1). Therefore it follows from Claim 4.4
below that Tagj(G1) = Uj.
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Claim 4.4. Let E1 and E2 be partially valid circuits such that
• Tag(E1) = Tag(E2).
• prof(E1) 6= ⊥ and prof(E2) 6= ⊥.
• For some j ∈ [λ], prof(E1)[j] 6= prof(E2)[j].
Then Tagj(E1) = Tagj(E2) = Uj.
The proof of Claim 4.4 appears below.
Since Tagj(G1) = Uj and prof(G1) 6= ⊥ it follows from Claim 4.5 below that
prof(G1) ∈ {0, 1}λ.
Claim 4.5. For every partially valid circuit E such that Tagj(E) = Uj, either
prof(E) = ⊥ or prof(E) ∈ {0, 1}λ.
The proof of Claim 4.5 appears below.
Since prof(G1) ∈ {0, 1}λ and prof(G1 × G2) = prof(G′) 6= ⊥ it must be that
prof(G1) = prof(G
′) contradicting the minimality of H.
The proofs of Claims 4.4 and 4.5 conclude the proof of Property 5.
Proof of Claim 4.4. Since Tag(E1) = Tag(E2) also Tagj(E1) = Tagj(E2). However,
prof(E1)[j] 6= prof(E2)[j]. Therefore, it follows from Claim 4.6 below that both
prof(E1)[j] and prof(E2)[j] are in {0, 1}.
Claim 4.6. Let F be a partially valid arithmetic circuit with respect to ~S such that
prof(F ) 6= ⊥. For every j ∈ [λ], prof(F )[j] = ∗ if and only if Tagj(F ) = ∅.
Proof. Both the condition Tagj(F ) = ∅ and the condition prof(F ) 6= ⊥ are true if
and only if Tagj(w) = ∅ for every input wire w of F .
Assume without loss of generality that prof(E1)[j] = 0 and prof(E2)[j] = 1. Next
we argue that the set Tagj(E1) = Tagj(E2) has two different exact covers. We start
with the following simple claim.
Claim 4.7. Let j ∈ [λ], let S be a collection of sets, and let E be a partially valid
circuit. If for every input wire w of E, Tagj(w) ∈ S ∪ {∅}, then S contains an exact
cover of Tagj(E).
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The proof of the claim follows by a straightforward induction.
Since prof(E1)[j] = 0, every input wire w of E1 satisfies
Tagj(w) ∈ {Sji,0 ∈ Sj`}i∈Inp−1(j) ∪ {∅} .
Therefore, by Claim 4.7 there is an exact cover S1 ⊆ {Sji,0}i∈Inp−1(j) of Tagj(E1).
Similarly, since prof(E2)[j] = 1 there is an exact cover S2 ⊆ {Sji,1}i∈Inp−1(j) of Tagj(E2).
Since Tagj(E1) = Tagj(E2), the set has two different exact covers in S
j
` and therefore,
by Fact 4.1, Tagj(E1) = Tagj(E2) = Uj.
Proof of Claim 4.5. Let E be a partially valid circuit such that Tagj(E) = Uj and
prof(E) 6= ⊥. To prove that prof(E) ∈ {0, 1}λ it is sufficient to show that for every
j′ ∈ [λ], prof(E)[j′] 6= ∗, that is, the j′-th bit of E’s input profile is consistent with
some σ ∈ {0, 1}.
Fix any j′ ∈ [λ]. By our assumptions on the functions Inp1, Inp2 there exists some
i ∈ Inp−1(j) such that {Inp1(i), Inp2(i)} = {j, j′}. Assume without loss of generality
that Inp1(i) = j and Inp2(i) = j
′. Note that E must have an input wire w such that
Tagj(w) ∈ {Sji,0, Sji,1}. Otherwise, by Claim 4.7, Tagj(E) = Uj would have an exact
cover in Sj` \ {Sji,0, Sji,1}, contradicting Fact 4.1.
Let w be an input wire of E such that Tagj(w) = S
j
i,σ1
for some σ1 ∈ {0, 1}.
Therefore, Tag(w) must be of the form Si,σ1,σ2 for some σ2 ∈ {0, 1} and hence, the
j′-th bit of E’s input profile is consistent with σ2.
4.6.2 Simulating Input Respecting Circuits.
Recall that the obfuscation Obf(Fλ, C) outputs the sequences ~S and ~V . In this section
we describe an efficient procedure SimInp such that for every polynomial G respecting
the input x ∈ {0, 1}λ, SimInp given the value C(x) simulates a sequence of elements
~Vx such that, with overwhelming probability, G(~V ) = 0 if and only if G(~Vxi) = 0.
Formally, the procedure SimInp satisfies the following
Claim 4.8. There exists a negligible function µ such that for every polynomial G that
is valid with respect to ~S and respects an input x ∈ {0, 1}λ
Pr
[
G(~V ) = 0⇔ G(SimInp(x,C(x))) = 0
]
≥ 1− µ(λ) .
Where the probability is over the coins of the algorithms Obf and SimInp.
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We describe the procedure SimInp and them prove Claim 4.8. We first recall a
version of Kilian’s simulation technique.
Theorem 4.4 ([Kil88]). Let n,w ∈ N, and let F be a field. Let {Bi ∈ Fw×w}i∈[n]
be n regular matrices, and let P =
∏n
i=1Bi be their product. Let {Ri ∈ Fw×w}i∈[n−1]
be n − 1 random regular matrices, and let R0 and Rn denote the identity matrix Iw.
There is a PPT procedure SimMatrix such that the distribution {Ri−1 ·Bi ·adj(Ri)}i∈[n]
is identical to the distribution SimMatrix (1n, F, P ).
Given an input x ∈ λ and the corresponding output C(x) ∈ {0, 1}, the procedure
SimInp is as follows
• Based on λ, SimInp sets the branching program parameters n, ` and the bit
selection functions Inp1, Inp2.
• Based on the output C(x), SimInp set the product matrix P ∈ Paccept, Preject.
• SimInp samples a random non-zero scalar α ∈ Fλ.
• Using the procedure SimMatrix, SimInp simulates the matrices
{D˜i,x[Inp1(i)],x[Inp2(i)]}i∈[n] ← SimMatrix(1n, Fλ, α · P ) .
• SimInp sets arbitrary values to the other matrices
{D˜i,σ1,σ2}i∈[n],(σ1,σ2)∈{0,1}2\{(x[Inp1(i)],x[Inp2(i)])} .
• SimInp output the values
~Vx = {D˜i,σ1,σ2 [r, c]}i∈[n],(σ1,σ2)∈{0,1}2,(r,c)∈[w]2 .
Proof of Claim 4.8. Recall that Obf(Fλ, C) outputs the sequences ~S
~V =
(
C˜i,σ1,σ2 [r, c]
)
i∈[n],(σ1,σ2)∈{0,1}2,(r,c)∈[w]2
.
where
B˜i,σ1,σ2 = Ri−1 ·Bi,σ1,σ2 · adj(Ri) , C˜i,σ1,σ2 = αi,σ1,σ2 · B˜i,σ1,σ2 .
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Let x = prof(G), and let (σi1, σ
i
2) = (x[Inp1(i)], x[Inp2(i)]). Let αx =
∏
i∈[n] αi,σi1,σi2 .
By the correctness of the branching program program
n∏
i=1
C˜i,σi1,σi2 =
n∏
i=1
Ri−1 ·
(
αi,σi1,σi2 ·Bi,σi1,σi2
)
· adj(Ri) = αx · P .
Both αx and α are random non-zero scalers and, therefore, by Theorem 4.4 the
distributions {C˜i,σi1,σi2}i∈[n] and {D˜i,σi1,σi2}i∈[n] are identical.
Since G is respecting the input x, for every input wire w of G, Tag(w) is of the
form Si,σi1,σi2 for some i ∈ [n] and therefore G only depends on the inputs variables
that take entries of {C˜i,σi1,σi2}i∈[n] in ~V . It follows that
Pr[G(~V ) = 0] = Pr[G(~Vx) = 0] .
To prove the claim it is therefore sufficient to show that
Pr[G(~V ) = 0] ≥ 1− µ(λ)
2
∨ Pr[G(~V ) = 0] ≤ µ(λ)
2
.
To prove this we first show that G is a low degree polynomial. It follows by a
straightforward induction on the structure ofG that the total degree of the polynomial
computed by G is at most |Tag(G)| and therefore bounded by |U | = 2n. We can also
write the value of every element C˜i,σ1,σ2 [r, c] of ~V as a polynomial of total degree w in
the entries of the matrices Ri−1 and Ri (in the case i = 1 or i = n−1 the polynomial is
in the entries of Ri only). Therefore, we can write the value G(~V ) as a polynomial G
′
of degree 2n ·w in the entries of the matrices R1, . . . , Rn−1 (unlike G, the polynomial
G′ explicitly depends on the circuit C and the coins of Obf).
Let {R′i ∈ Fw×w}i∈[n−1] be n − 1 independent random matrices. The matrices
{Ri} are distributed exactly the same as {R′i} conditioned on all the matrices being
regular. This occurs with probability at least 1 − n · |Fλ|−1 = 1 − λ−ω(1) ≥ 0.5.
Therefore
Pr[G′(R′1, . . . , R
′
n−1) = 0] ≤ Pr[G(~V ) = 0] ≤ 2 · Pr[G′(R′1, . . . , R′n−1) = 0] .
Clearly, if G′ is identically zero
Pr[G(~V ) = 0] = 1 .
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Otherwise, if G′ is not identically zero then, by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma
(Lemma 2.1)
Pr[G′(R′1, . . . , R
′
n−1) = 0] ≤ 2n · w · |Fλ|−1 .
Setting µ(λ) = 8n · w · |Fλ|−1 = λ−ω(1) we get that
Pr[G(~V ) = 0] <
µ(λ)
2
.
4.6.3 Correctness of the Simulation.
In this section we conclude the proof of Theorem 4.3. Recall Adv is a semi-bounded
adversary making at most a polynomial number q of queries to the ideal puzzle oracle.
We prove that there exists a negligible function µ such that for every polynomial-size
distinguisher D, every λ ∈ N and every C ∈ Cλ,∣∣∣Pr [D(AdvIdealPuzzle(Fλ,Q,U,~S,~V )(1λ)) = 1]− Pr [D(SimC(1λ)) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ µ(λ) ,
where (Q,U, ~S, ~V ) is the output of Obf(Fλ, C).
The simulator Sim emulates Adv(1λ) and answers every query Adv makes to the
ideal puzzle oracle. It is sufficient to show that for every query E, Sim answers the
same as the ideal puzzle oracle with probability at least 1− µ(λ)
q(λ)
.
Given a query E, if E is not valid with respect to ~S, Sim answers ⊥ just as the
ideal oracle would. Otherwise, Sim decomposes the query into d input respecting
polynomials
{G1, . . . , Gd} ← Dec(E) .
By Claim 4.2, Dec is efficient, d ≤ q(λ), and for every i ∈ [d], Gi is valid and respects
some distinct input xi ∈ {0, 1}λ. For every i ∈ [d], Sim queries its oracle C with xi,
105
obtains C(xi), and simulates the sequence of values
~Vxi ← SimInp(xi, C(xi)) .
Sim answers the query E with 1 if and only if for all i ∈ [d], G(~Vxi) = 0. Therefore,
we need to prove
Pr
E(~V ) = 0⇔ ∧
i∈[d]
Gi(~Vxi) = 0
 ≥ 1− µ(λ)
q(λ)
.
By Claim 4.2 we have
E(~V ) =
∑
i∈[d]
Gi(~V ) .
By Claim 4.8, there exists a negligible function µ1 such that
Pr
[
Gi(~V ) = 0⇔ G(~Vxi) = 0
]
≥ 1− µ1(λ) .
Therefore, it is sufficient to prove
Pr
∑
i∈[d]
Gi(~V ) = 0⇔
∧
i∈[d]
Gi(~V ) = 0
 ≥ 1− (µ(λ)
q(λ)
− q(λ)µ1(λ)
)
. (4.8)
To prove Equation 4.8 we show that the polynomials Gi must have a multi-linear
structure. The formal statement is given by Claim 4.9 below. We start by introducing
some notation.
Recall that the sequence ~V is of the form
~V =
(
C˜i,σ1,σ2 [r, c] = αi,σ1,σ2 · B˜i,σ1,σ2 [r, c]
)
i∈[n],(σ1,σ2)∈{0,1}2,(r,c)∈[w]2
.
Let ~V ∗ denote the same sequence of elements without multiplying by the scalers
αi,σ1,σ2
~V ∗ = {B˜i,σ1,σ2 [r, c]}i∈[n],(σ1,σ2)∈{0,1}2,(r,c)∈[w]2 .
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For x ∈ {0, 1}λ, let αx denote the product
αx =
∏
i∈[n]
αi,x[Inp1(i)],x[Inp2(i)] .
Claim 4.9. For every polynomial G that is valid with respect to ~S and respects an
input x ∈ {0, 1}λ
G(~V ) = αx ·G(~V ∗) .
Before proving the lemma, we use it to prove Equation 4.8. By Claim 4.9 and
since αx is always non-zero, we can rewrite Equation 4.8 as
Pr
∑
i∈[d]
αxi ·Gi(~V ∗) = 0⇔
∧
i∈[d]
Gi(~V
∗) = 0
 ≥ 1− (µ(λ)
q(λ)
− q(λ)µ1(λ)
)
.
Clearly, it is sufficient to prove that
Pr
∑
i∈[d]
αxi ·Gi(~V ∗) = 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∨
i∈[d]
Gi(~V
∗) 6= 0
 ≤ µ(λ)
q(λ)
− q(λ)µ1(λ) .
Let NZ be the event that Gi(~V
∗) 6= 0 for some i ∈ [d]. We can write the
value
∑
i∈[d] αxi · Gi(~V ∗) as a non-zero polynomial P of degree n in the variables
{αi,σ1,σ2}i∈[n],(σ1,σ2)∈{0,1}2 (the polynomial P explicitly depends the values Gi(~V ∗)).
Conditioned on NZ, P is not identically zero.
Let ~α′ = {α′i,σ1,σ2 ∈ F}i∈[n],(σ1,σ2)∈{0,1}2 be 4n independent random scalars. The
scalers {αi,σ1,σ2} are distributed exactly the same as ~α′ conditioned on all the scalars
being non-zero. This occurs with probability at least 1−4n·|Fλ|−1 = 1−λ−ω(1) ≥ 0.5.
Therefore
Pr
∑
i∈[d]
αxi ·Gi(~V ∗) = 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ NZ
 ≤ 2 · Pr [P (~α′) = 0 | NZ] .
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If P is not identically zero, by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma (Lemma 2.1)
Pr [P (~α′) = 0] ≤ n · |Fλ|−1 .
Setting
µ(λ) = 2n · q(λ) · |Fλ|−1 + q2(λ)µ1(λ) = λ−ω(1) ,
we get that
Pr
∑
i∈[d]
αxi ·Gi(~V ∗) = 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ NZ
 ≤ µ(λ)
q(λ)
− q(λ)µ1(λ) .
The proof of Claim 4.9 concludes the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Proof of Claim 4.9. We prove a more general statement. Let H be partially valid
polynomial with prof(H) 6= ⊥. We define a coefficient αH and prove that
H(~V ) = αH ·H(~V ∗) . (4.9)
We also show that for a valid H, αH = αprof(H).
The coefficient αH is defines as follows. Let IH be a set of tuples (i, σ1, σ2) ∈
[n]× {0, 1} × {0, 1} such that
• prof(H)[Inp1(i)] = σ1 and prof(H)[Inp2(i)] = σ2.
• Si,σ1,σ2 ⊆ Tag(H).
Intuitively, IH contains tuples (i, σ1, σ2) such that one of the input variables of H is
multiplied by αi,σ1,σ2 in ~V . Let αH =
∏
(i,σ1,σ2)∈IH αi,σ1,σ2 .
First note that if H is valid then Tag(H) = U and by Claim 4.5, prof(H) ∈ {0, 1}λ.
It follows that
IH = {(i, prof(H)[Inp1(i)], prof(H)[Inp2(i)])}i∈[n] ,
and therefore, αH = αprof(H).
We prove Equation 4.9 by induction on the structure of H. If H is an input
wire, then Tag(H) is of the form Si,σ1,σ2 and I = {(i, σ1, σ2)}. In this case we have
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αH = αi,σ1,σ2 and indeed, for some r, c ∈ [w]
H(~V ) = C˜i,σ1,σ2 [r, c] = αi,σ1,σ2 · B˜i,σ1,σ2 = αH ·H(~V ∗) .
If H is of the form H1 +H2 and Equation 4.9 holds for H1 and H2, it is sufficient
to show that αH = αH1 = αH2 , or, equivalently, IH = IH1 = IH2 . We prove that IH =
IH1 . The proof that IH = IH2 is analogues. Since Tag(H) = Tag(H1) it is sufficient
to show that prof(H) = prof(H1). Since Hi is a sub-circuit of H and prof(H) 6= ⊥ we
have that for every j ∈ [λ], Tag(H1)[j] ∈ {Tag(H)[j], ∗}. Therefore, since Tagj(H) =
Tagj(H1) it follows from Claim 4.6 that, in fact, Tag(H)[j] = Tag(H1)[j].
If H is of the form H1×H2 and Equation 4.9 holds for H1 and H2, it is sufficient
to show that αH = αH1 · αH2 , or, equivalently
IH = IH1 ∪ IH2 ∧ IH1 ∩ IH2 = ∅ .
The fact that IH1 ∩ IH2 = ∅ follows from Tag(H1) ∩ Tag(H2) = ∅. We first prove
that IH1 ⊆ IH . The proof that IH2 ⊆ IH is analogues. Since H1 is a sub-circuit of
H and since prof(H) 6= ⊥, we have that Tag(H1) ⊆ Tag(H) and for every j ∈ [λ]
and σ ∈ {0, 1}, prof(H1)[j] = σ implies that prof(H1)[j] = σ as well. It follows that
IH1 ⊆ IH .
To prove that IH ⊆ IH1 ∪ IH2 let (i, σ1, σ2) ∈ IH . We first show that H must have
in input wire w such that Tag(w) = Si,σ1,σ2 . Assume that no such wire exists. Let
j = Inp1(i), since prof(H)[j] = σ1, for every input wire w of H either Tagj(w) = ∅ or
Tagj(w) = S
j
i′,σ1 for some i
′ 6= i. In any case Tagj(w) ∩ Sji,σ1 = ∅. This contradicts
the fact that (i, σ1, σ2) ∈ IH and therefore Sji,σ1 ⊆ Tagj(H).
Let w be an input wire of H with Tag(w) = Si,σ1,σ2 . w must also be an input wire
of either H1 or H2. Assume without loss of generality that w is an input wire of H1.
It follows that Si,σ1,σ2 ⊆ Tag(H1), the Inp1(i)-th bit of prof(H1) is consistent with σ1
and the Inp2(i)-th bit of prof(H1) is consistent with σ2. Since H1 is a sub-circuit of
H and prof(H) 6= ⊥, we have that prof(H1)[Inp1(i)] = σ1 and prof(H1)[Inp2(i)] = σ2.
It follows that (i, σ1, σ2) ∈ IH1 .
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Chapter 5
Virtual Grey Box Obfuscation form
Multilinear Maps
This chapter connects the security of obfuscation and the security of multilinear maps
in the plain model. We focus on virtual-grey-box obfuscation, a natural and useful
security notion that lies between indistinguishability and virtual-black-box security.
We study an “uber security” assumption for multilinear maps, and show that it is
necessary and sufficient for virtual-black-box obfuscation.
A central component in our analysis is a new strengthening of indistinguishability
obfuscation that we call strong indistinguishability obfuscation. We prove that this
notion is equivalent to virtual-grey-box obfuscation.
This chapter is based on [BCKP14a].
5.1 Overview
This section gives a high-level overview of the results and techniques introduced in
this chapter. We start by recalling the relevant background and motivation, that were
briefly described in Section 1.2.2.2 of the introduction.
5.1.1 Background and Motivation
Program obfuscation, namely the ability to efficiently compile a given program into a
functionally equivalent program that is “unintelligible”, is an intriguing concept. In-
deed, much effort has been devoted to understanding this concept from the definitional
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aspect, the algorithmic aspect, and the applications aspect. Here we concentrate on
the first two aspects.
The first formulation of secure program obfuscation as suggested by Hada [Had00].
It requires that the output of any efficient adversary given an obfuscated program can
be efficiently simulated given only black box access to the program. Hada observed
that this strong security requirement is achievable only for learnable programs.
Following the work of Hada, a number of weaker security definitions have been
proposed. We briefly review three notions of interest. The first, virtual black box
(VBB) obfuscation [BGI+01], requires that the obfuscation hides any deterministic
predicate of the program. Concretely, focusing on programs represented as circuits,
an obfuscator Obf for a family of circuits is worst-case VBB if for any polynomial-
time adversary Adv, there exists a polynomial-time simulator Sim, such that for any
circuit C from the family, and any predicate pi(·), Adv cannot learn pi(C) from Obf(C)
with noticeably higher probability than Sim can, given only oracle access to C. The
obfuscator Obf is average-case VBB if the above is only required to hold for circuits
C that are sampled at random from some distribution on the family.
While VBB obfuscation is natural and expressive notion, Barak et al. [BGI+01]
showed that this definition, and variants thereof, are unobtainable in general by
demonstrating a family of unobfuscatable functions where any circuit computing the
function inherently leaks secrets that are infeasible to compute given only black-box
access.
A weaker variant of VBB, called indistinguishability obfuscation [BGI+01], allows
the simulator Sim to be computationally unbounded. Equivalently, Obf is an indistin-
guishability obfuscator for a circuit collection if for any two circuits C0 and C1 in the
collection, having the same size and functionality, the obfuscated circuits Obf(C0) and
Obf(C1) are indistinguishable. While indistinguishability obfuscation has some at-
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tractive properties, and strong cryptographic applications [GR14, GGH+13b, SW14],
indistinguishability security is significantly weaker than VBB security. Consider for
example the task of obfuscating a point circuit that outputs 1 on a single secret
point and 0 everywhere else. VBB obfuscation guarantees that guessing the secret
point given the obfuscated circuit is as hard as given no information at all. Such a
guarantee, however, is not known to follow from indistinguishability obfuscation.
A third notion that lies between VBB and indistinguishability obfuscation is vir-
tual grey-box (VGB) obfuscation [BC10] where the simulator Sim is allowed to be
semi-bounded, namely it can be computationally unbounded, while still making only
a polynomial number of queries to the circuit C. While weaker than VBB in gen-
eral, VGB is still meaningful for circuits that are unlearnable even by semi-bounded
learners. This included, for example, point circuits (or, more generally, evasive cir-
cuit studied in [BBC+14]) where indistinguishability security may not be meaningful.
Furthermore, VGB obfuscators for circuits escape the general impossibility results
that apply to VBB obfuscators.
On the algorithmic level, for many years we had candidate obfuscators only for
very simple functions such as point functions and variants. The landscape has changed
completely with the recent breakthrough work of [GGH+13b], which proposed a can-
didate general-purpose obfuscation algorithm for all circuits. Their obfuscator builds
upon a simplified subset of the multilinear maps framework of Garg, Gentry, and
Halevi [GGH13a] called multilinear jigsaw puzzles.
Considerable efforts have been made to analyze the security of the [GGH+13b]
obfuscator and variants. [GGH+13b] show that their scheme resists some simple
attacks; but beyond that, they do not provide any analytic evidence for security.
The difficulty appears to be in capturing the security properties required from the
multilinear jigsaw puzzles.
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The first step towards understanding the security of the [GGH+13b] obfuscator
is described in Chapter 4. There we consider an ideal model, where the adversary
is given black-box access a multilinear jigsaw puzzle with perfect security. There
we show that, in this model, variants of the [GGH+13b] scheme are VBB for all
polynomial-size circuits. In fact, for circuits in NC1, we show security even against
semi-bounded adversaries. In this context, semi-bounded means that the adversary is
computationally unbounded, but makes only a polynomial number of queries to the
multilinear jigsaw puzzle. The proof demonstrates an efficient simulator that only
invokes the semi-bounded adversary as a black box.
In light of the result of Chapter 4, we investigate the security of obfuscation in
the plain model. Much of the recent progress in this area has been confined to the
notion of indistinguishability obfuscation. Next, we discuss one line of work that is
the starting point for this work.
Pass et al. [PST14] obtain indistinguishability obfuscation based on some natural
hardness assumption in the plain model. Specifically, they define a property that we
call uber security for multilinear jigsaw puzzles,1 which is aimed at capturing some
of the security properties of multilinear jigsaw puzzles in the ideal model. They then
show that a specially-crafted variant of the obfuscator in Chapter 4, with the ideal
multilinear jigsaw puzzle replaced by an uber secure multilinear jigsaw puzzle scheme,
satisfies indistinguishability security for all circuits.
In this work we ask whether we can construct obfuscators in the plain model that go
beyond indistinguishability security, and under which assumptions.
1Uber security was first formulated by Boneh and Boyen [BBG05] in the context of bilinear
maps. Pass et al. [PST14] consider the notion of uber secure multilinear maps. However, the results
in [PST14] can be based on an analogues uber security property for multilinear jigsaw puzzles as
presented in this chapter.
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5.1.2 Results
We first put forth a new strengthened variant of indistinguishability obfuscation,
called strong indistinguishability obfuscation. Informally, an obfuscator Obf satisfies
strong indistinguishability security for a class of circuits C if Obf(C0) and Obf(C1)
are computationally indistinguishable not only when C0, C1 ∈ C have the same func-
tionality, but also when C0 and C1 come from distributions over circuits in C that
are “close together”, in the sense that for any given input x, the probability that
C0(x) 6= C1(x) is negligible.2
We then show that:
• Strong indistinguishability obfuscation for a given class of circuits is in fact
equivalent to worst-case VGB obfuscation for the same class. Furthermore, for
certain classes of functions, such as point functions, hyperplanes, or fuzzy point
functions, we show that strong indistinguishability obfuscation is equivalent to
full-fledged worst-case VBB obfuscation. These equivalences hold uncondition-
ally.
• Assuming the existence of multilinear jigsaw puzzles satisfying a somewhat
stronger variant of the uber security notion of Pass et al. [PST14], we show
that known obfuscation schemes satisfy strong indistinguishability security for
NC1 circuits. More generally, we show that any obfuscator for a class of circuits
C that is VBB against semi-bounded adversaries in the ideal multilinear jig-
saw puzzle model is a strong indistinguishability obfuscator in the plain model,
when the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle is replaced by a puzzle satisfying the
mentioned variant of the [PST14] assumption. (Currently, VBB obfuscation
2An alternative view of the definition (which turns out to be equivalent) is that Obf(C0) and
Obf(C1) are computationally indistinguishable if no semi-bounded adversary can distinguish oracle
access to a circuit sampled from C0 from oracle access to a circuit sampled from C1.
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against semi-bounded adversaries in the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model
is only known for NC1.)
• Uber secure multilinear jigsaw puzzles are necessary for obtaining VGB. Specif-
ically, assuming existence of VGB obfuscators for all polynomial-size circuits,
there exist multilinear jigsaw puzzles satisfying our notion of uber security.
5.1.3 Main Ideas
This section provides a more detailed overview of our results and techniques. Section
5.1.3.1 presents the implication from strong indistinguishability obfuscation to VGB
and VBB obfuscation. Section 5.1.3.2 provides background on multilinear jigsaw
puzzles and the uber security property. Section 5.1.3.3 presents the construction of
strong indistinguishability obfuscation from uber secure multilinear jigsaw puzzles.
5.1.3.1 From strong indistinguishability security to VGB and VBB.
We first define strong indistinguishability security a bit more precisely. A distribution
C˜ over circuits is said to be ν-concentrated around a boolean function f if for any
value x in the domain of f we have that Pr[C˜(x) 6= f(x)] ≤ ν. We say that C˜ is
simply concentrated if it is ν-concentrated for some negligible function ν and function
f . An obfuscator Obf satisfies strong indistinguishability security for a class C of
circuits if for any two (not necessarily efficiently samplable) distributions C˜0, C˜1 over
circuits in C that are concentrated around the same function, it holds that Obf(C˜0)
and Obf(C˜1) are computationally indistinguishable.
We show the following.
Theorem 5.1. [informal] An obfuscator satisfies strong indistinguishability security
for a class C of circuits if and only if it is worst-case VGB for C.
Theorem 5.1 motivates the study of strong indistinguishability obfuscation as an
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independent notion, beyond its role in the construction of worst-case VGB obfusca-
tion for NC1 from uber secure multilinear jigsaw puzzles. Future results obtaining
strong indistinguishability obfuscation for more functions, or based on different as-
sumptions, will directly apply for VGB obfuscation as well. We note that existing
candidate indistinguishability obfuscation for all circuits (e.g. [GGH+13b]), may also
be considered as candidates for strong indistinguishability obfuscation, and thus also
for VGB obfuscation, for all circuits.
Ideas behind the proof of Theorem 5.1. Showing that VGB implies strong
indistinguishability security is straightforward. If two circuit distributions C˜0, C˜1 are
concentrated around the same function, then no semi-bounded simulator with oracle
access to a circuit sampled from either C˜0 or C˜1 is able to distinguish. Therefore,
VGB security implies that no computationally bounded adversary can distinguish
Obf(C˜0) and Obf(C˜1).
In the other direction, we show how strong indistinguishability security implies
the existence of a semi-bounded simulator Sim for any computationally bounded
adversary Adv. Recall that, for any target circuit C∗ ∈ C in the given collection C,
the all-powerful simulator Sim should simulate what Adv learns from an obfuscation
Obf(C∗), given only polynomially many oracle queries to C∗. Following previous
work in the context of worst-case obfuscation, the distinguishing gap between the
outputs of Adv and Sim, often called the simulation accuracy, can be bounded by an
arbitrarily small (inverse) polynomial, when we allow the number of oracle queries
that Sim makes to grow with this polynomial. (See Remark 5.1.)
The high level idea is as follows: Sim will use its oracle to C∗ in order to learn
enough information about C∗. Sim does so by gradually reducing the set K of possible
candidates for the circuit C∗, starting from K0 = C, and continuing with progressively
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smaller sets of candidates:
Ki ( Ki−1 ( · · · ( K0 = C .
Sim will continue this process until it obtains a set K∗ where Adv cannot distinguish
an obfuscation Obf(C∗) of the target circuit C∗ from an obfuscation Obf(C) of a
random circuit C ∈ K∗. Sim will then simulate the output of Adv by executing Adv
on an obfuscation Obf(C) of a random circuit C ∈ K∗.
To carry out this plan, Sim iteratively performs two main steps: concentration,
and majority separation. After each invocation of the two steps, the set of candidates
for the circuit C∗ shrinks significantly. This process stops when the set K∗ is reached.
We will be able to bound the number of iterations as well as the total number of
queries made by Sim in the process.
Concentration. In each concentration step, Sim tries to learn C∗ in a straightfor-
ward way: it queries C∗ on a point x that splits the current set of candidate circuits
Ki as evenly as possible. Based on the value of C∗(x), Sim rules out some of the
candidates. This process is repeated until there is no point that shrinks the set of
candidates by a factor of at least 1 − ε. At the end of the concentration step, it
is the case that for every point, all but perhaps an ε-fraction of the candidates in
Ki agree on the point. Therefore, the set Ki is ε-concentrated (we say that a set
of circuits is concentrated if the uniform distribution over this set is concentrated).
This occurs after at most ε−1 log |C| queries. Throughout, ε is a parameter of the
simulation chosen such that 1/ε is a polynomial, depending only on Adv and on the
required simulation accuracy.
Note that the concentration step alone essentially suffices to ensure average-case
VGB simulation; indeed, it follows from strong indistinguishability security that when
the target circuit C∗ is chosen at random from a concentrated set Ki, Adv cannot
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compute any predicate pi(C∗), given Obf(C∗), better than it can given an obfuscation
Obf(C) of an independent random circuit C ∈ Ki.
Majority separation. The concentration step alone does not guarantee worst-case
simulation. In particular, Adv may have some hardwired information that allows it
to distinguish C∗ from a random circuit in Ki. In this case, however, we show that
Sim can further reduce the set of candidates Ki by making a query x that separates
C∗ from most of the circuits in Ki; namely, C∗(x) 6= majKi(x) where majKi is the
majority of all circuits in Ki. We call such a point x a separating point. In fact,
we show that there is a small set LAdv(Ki) of separating points such that C∗ must
disagree with the majority function in Ki on at least one x ∈ LAdv(Ki).
In more detail, we define the set DAdv(Ki) of distinguishable circuits in Ki as those
circuits C ∈ Ki such that Adv can ε-distinguish Obf(C) from Obf(C ′) for a random
C ′ ∈ Ki. The set LAdv(Ki) will consist of roughly ε−1 log |C| points that will separate
any distinguishable circuit in DAdv(Ki) from the majority majKi , and our simulator
will query the oracle C∗ on all points in LAdv(Ki). If the oracle C∗ agrees with majKi
on all points x ∈ LAdv(Ki), then Adv cannot tell apart Obf(C∗) from Obf(C) for a
random C ∈ Ki, in which case, the simulation can be completed. Otherwise, if C∗
disagrees with majKi on some point x ∈ LAdv(Ki), Sim obtains a new set of candidates
Ki+1 ( Ki which is necessarily smaller by an ε-factor, since Ki is ε-concentrated.
By iteratively applying the two steps, we either reach some K∗ for which Adv
cannot distinguish Obf(C∗) from Obf(C) for a random C ∈ K∗, or we have completely
exhausted the collection C and found exactly the circuit C∗. Since we reduce Ki at
each step by a (1−ε)-factor at the least, the process must end after at most ε−1 log |C|
steps, and at most poly(ε−1 log |C|) queries.
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The separating points. But how do we establish the existence of a small set
LAdv(Ki) that separates DAdv(Ki) from the majority in Ki? Here we rely on the
strong indistinguishability security of Obf. Specifically, strong indistinguishability
security implies that no subset S of the distinguishable circuits DAdv(Ki) can be ε-
concentrated around majKi . Indeed, Adv distinguishes Obf(C), for a random C ∈ Ki
from Obf(C ′) for a random C ′ ∈ S ⊆ DAdv(Ki).3
Since no subset S ⊆ DAdv(Ki) is ε-concentrated around majKi , we can show that it
is possible to separate all of the circuits in DAdv(Ki) from majKi with at most ε−1 log |C|
points, as required. Specifically, the set LAdv(Ki) of separating points is constructed
by iteratively selecting a point that separates as many circuits as possible from the
remaining circuits in majKi (that were not already separated by previously selected
points). Since in every iteration the set of remaining circuits is not ε-concentrated
around majKi , there must be a point that separates at least an ε-fraction of these
circuits from majKi . It follows that after adding at most ε
−1 log |C| points, no circuit
in DAdv(Ki) remains.
On the possibility of VBB obfuscation. The simulation strategy described
above requires only a polynomial number of queries, however, the overall running
time of the simulator may not be bounded in general. Indeed, in the concentration
step, finding a point that significantly splits Ki may require super-polynomial time.
Also, in the majority-separation step, while the set LAdv(Ki) is small, computing it
from Ki may also require super-polynomial time.
Nevertheless, we show that for certain classes of circuits simulation can be effi-
cient. Specifically, abstracting away from the above simulation process, we consider
the notion of learning via a majority-separation oracle, where a given circuit C in a
3For simplicity of exposition, we assume here that the distinguishing gap is always of the same
sign, and is thus preserved on any subset of DAdv(Ki).
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prescribed family is learned via oracle access to C and access to the majority separa-
tion oracle M, which is given the description of a concentrated subset K that includes
C and outputs a point x that separates C from the majority in K.
While the strategy described above shows that any class of circuits can be learned
with polynomially many queries to C and M, the learner itself may be inefficient,
which results in inefficient simulation. We show that a more efficient learning proce-
dure can sometimes be translated into a more efficient simulation strategy, depending
on pattern of queries made by the learning algorithm. We identify several function
classes, for which such efficient learning is possible, yielding new feasibility results for
worst-case VBB obfuscation. Examples include fuzzy point functions, conjunctions,
and constant-dimension linear subspaces.
Connection to previous worst-case VBB/VGB obfuscators. The majority
separation technique is rooted in the sack of distinguishable points technique of Canetti
[Can97]. There, and in [Wee05], it was used to get worst-case VBB obfuscation
from a simple indistinguishability-based notion of obfuscation, for the simple case of
point functions. The technique was then extended to VBB obfuscation of constant-
dimension hyperplanes [CRV10] and VGB obfuscation of set functions [BC10]. The
majority separation technique generalizes the above for arbitrary functions. Indeed, in
the above works, the indistinguishability guarantee considered is equivalent to strong
indistinguishability security (for the classes in question). Thus, we get a unified proof
for all existing worst-case VBB and VGB obfuscation results.
Connection to VGB obfuscation of evasive functions. Evasive collections
are function collections concentrated around the all-zero function. Barak et al.
[BBC+14] show that average-case VGB obfuscation for all evasive collections implies
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weak average-case VGB for all collections.4 Here “weak” means that the simulator is
allowed to make a slightly super-polynomial number of queries.
We show that an obfuscator satisfies strong indistinguishability security for a
collection C of circuits if and only if it satisfies indistinguishability security for C and
in addition, it is average-case VGB for any evasive sub-collection of C. In particular,
it follows that an indistinguishability obfuscator for C that is also average-case VGB
for all evasive collections in C, is also a worst-case VGB obfuscator for C. This is
incomparable to the Barak et al. result: on the one hand, they do not need to
assume indistinguishability security; on the other hand they only prove average-case
weak VGB, rather than worst-case standard VGB.
To better compare the two techniques, let us state the result we would get us-
ing our techniques, assuming only average-case VGB for all evasive collections, and
without assuming indistinguishability security. Roughly, we would get a weak kind of
obfuscation where any adversary Adv has an Adv-designated obfuscator ObfAdv. The
obfuscator ObfAdv may be inefficient, but it outputs an obfuscated circuit ObfAdv(C)
of polynomial size p(|C|) that depends only on the class C, but not on Adv. The
security guarantee is that Adv has a worst-case VGB simulator Sim, such that for
any circuit C ∈ C, it holds that Adv(ObfAdv(C)) is statistically close to Adv(SimC);
namely, Adv cannot tell an Adv-designated obfuscation of C from a circuit sampled
by the semi-bounded simulator using only black-box access to C.
Assuming also indistinguishability security allows us to “switch quantifiers”, and
show that there is a single efficient obfuscator Obf that works for all adversaries. This
obfuscator would simply output an indistinguishability obfuscation of C (padded up
to size p(|C|)). Security against all adversaries would then follow from the fact that
an indistinguishability obfuscator is the “best-possible” obfuscator [BGI+01, GR14],
4In fact, for concentrated, and in particular evasive, collections, average-case VGB and average-
case VBB are equivalent.
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and thus would achieve the same security as any adversary-designated obfuscator.5
5.1.3.2 Uber secure multilinear jigsaw puzzles.
Before describing how we get strong indistinguishability obfuscation from uber secure
multilinear jigsaw puzzles, we provide some background on the latter.
Very roughly, a multilinear jigsaw puzzle is defined by a secret sequence of ring
elements and a public set of “valid” polynomials. It is possible to test if a valid
polynomial vanishes on the ring elements, but the elements are otherwise hidden. For
more background on multilinear jigsaw puzzles and on the more general notion of
multilinear maps see Section 4.1.3.
The high-level approach of Pass et al. [PST14] is to devise a security property
for multilinear jigsaw puzzles that hides any information about the encoded elements
that cannot be learned by testing valid polynomials. Based on such a property they
are able to leverage VBB obfuscation in the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model.
More specifically, Pass et al. take the following approach (described first in an
oversimplified manner). Consider a puzzle sampler M that samples a sequence of ring
elements from one of two distributions D0 or D1 together with a public set of valid
polynomials. Intuitively, we require that the only way to distinguish between puzzles
encoding elements sampled from D0 and from D1 is by testing the puzzle with a valid
polynomial. More precisely, we say that the sampler is admissible if no polynomially
bounded “ideal adversary” can distinguish between elements sampled from D0 and
from D1. The ideal adversary is only allowed to access the elements by querying an
“ideal puzzle oracle” with a valid polynomial and learning if the polynomial vanishes
on the elements or not. The requirement is that for such an admissible sampler no
efficient adversary can distinguish between puzzles encoding elements sampled from
5We note that, in the body, our actual proof relies directly on strong indistinguishability security
which we show to follow from average-case VGB for evasive collections and standard indistinguisha-
bility security.
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D0 and from D1.
As noticed by Pass et al. the requirement above is too strong and cannot be sat-
isfied by any multilinear jigsaw puzzle. This follows from a diagonalization argument
in the spirit of the [BGI+01] impossibility result for general VBB obfuscation. To get
around this caveat, Pass et al. strengthen the admissibility property of the puzzle
sampler to require that D0 and D1 are indistinguishable even to a semi-bounded ideal
adversary, namely an ideal adversary that is computationally unbounded, but makes
only a polynomial number of queries to the ideal puzzle oracle.
Pass et al. show that even this relaxed notion of uber security suffices for obtaining
indistinguishability obfuscation in the plain model. The idea is to rely on obfuscation
for NC1 in the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model that is VBB against semi-bounded
adversaries (as in Chapter 4), and replace the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle with
a concrete multilinear jigsaw puzzle satisfying uber security as stated above. To
show that obfuscations of two equivalent circuits C0, C1 are indeed indistinguishable,
consider a puzzle sampler M that samples a pair of distributions D0,D1 such that
the distribution Di is an obfuscation of the circuit Ci in the ideal multilinear jigsaw
puzzle model. The admissibility of this sampler follows from the security of the
obfuscator against semi-bounded adversaries. Specifically, an semi-bounded ideal
adversary accessing an puzzle oracle encoding Di can be simulated given black-box
access to the circuit Ci. Since C0, C1 cannot be distinguished given only black-box
access, their obfuscations are indistinguishable as well.
In this work we consider the relaxed uber security requirement above. Existing
graded encoding candidates [GGH13a, CLT15, GGH15] do not satisfy this require-
ment as demonstrated by recent attacks [GGH13a, CHL+15, CGH+15, HJ16]. The
eventual Pass et al. assumption is further relaxed in several ways, while still yielding
their main application to indistinguishability obfuscation. See [PST14, BCKP14b]
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for a discussion on relaxations of the uber security assumption.
5.1.3.3 Strong indistinguishability obfuscation from uber secure multilin-
ear jigsaw puzzles, and back again.
We sketch our variant of the uber security assumption, and explain how we obtain
strong indistinguishability obfuscation for NC1 circuits from this variant. We also
show that uber security is necessary for strong indistinguishability obfuscation.
Essentially, the reason that uber security of multilinear jigsaw puzzles implies
strong indistinguishability obfuscation is that uber security considers any admissible
puzzle sampler, not only ones that come out of obfuscating a given program. In
particular, for two circuit distributions that are concentrated around the same func-
tion the distributions that consist of their ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle obfuscations
are admissible, and therefore, their instantiations via uber secure multilinear jigsaw
puzzles are guaranteed to be indistinguishable.
Note however, that strong indistinguishability security considers even distributions
that are not necessarily efficiently samplable. (Indeed, this property is crucial in the
proof that strong indistinguishability security implies worst-case VGB.) We therefore
consider a variant that we call strong-sampler uber security where the puzzle sample
is computationally unbounded.6
Theorem 5.2 (informal). Let Obf be any obfuscator for a class C of circuits, that is
VBB against semi-bounded adversaries in the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model.
Instantiating the multilinear jigsaw puzzle oracle with a strong-sampler uber secure
multilinear jigsaw puzzle results in a strong indistinguishability obfuscator for C in
the plain model.
Then, relying on the obfuscation for NC1 in the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle
model from Chapter 4, we obtain the following corollary.
6Formalizing the strong-sampler uber security property so that it is not too strong requires some
care. See Remark 5.6 for more details.
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Corollary 5.1 (informal). Assume there exists a strong-sampler uber secure multi-
linear jigsaw puzzles, there exists strong indistinguishability obfuscation for NC1.
We also observe that the existence of uber secure multilinear jigsaw puzzles is
implied by VGB obfuscation for all polynomial-size circuits. To see why this is the
case, consider the circuit P that has a sequence of of ring elements hardwired into it,
together with a public set of valid polynomials. The circuit P takes as input a valid
polynomial and tests if it vanishes on the hardwired elements. A multilinear jigsaw
puzzle is simply a VGB obfuscation the circuit P . The uber security of this puzzle
follows directly from the VGB security of the obfuscation.
5.1.4 Related Work
Pass, Seth and Telang [PST14] base indistinguishability obfuscation on multilinear
maps satisfying a relaxation of uber security that they call semantic security.
Lin [Lin16] constructs indistinguishability obfuscation from multilinear maps with
a constant degree bound satisfying a similar notion of uber security. Gentry et al.
[GLSW15], Lin and Vaikuntanathan and the works of Bitansky and Vaikuntanathan
[BV15], Ananth and Jain [AJ15], and Garg et al. [GGHZ16] give constructions of
indistinguishability obfuscation from different assumptions on multilinear maps (that
are not a type of uber assumption).
Agrawal, Prabhakaran and Yu [APY16] generalize the notion of strong indistin-
guishability obfuscation and the equivalence to VGB obfuscation to a broad class of
cryptographic primitives.
5.1.5 Chapter Organization
In Section 5.2 we define VBB, VGB, and indistinguishability obfuscation. In Sec-
tion 5.3 we define strong indistinguishability obfuscation. In Section 5.4 we prove the
equivalence of strong indistinguishability obfuscation and VGB obfuscation. We also
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prove that for certain classes of functions strong indistinguishability obfuscation is
equivalent to VBB obfuscation. In Section 5.4 we show a connection between strong
indistinguishability obfuscation and average-case VBB obfuscation for concentrated
distributions. In Section 5.6 we construct strong indistinguishability obfuscation from
uber secure multilinear jigsaw puzzles and vice versa.
5.2 Obfuscation: VBB, VGB, Indistinguishability
An obfuscator Obf for a collection of circuits C = {Cλ}λ∈N is a PPT algorithm that
takes as input a circuit C ∈ Cλ and outputs an obfuscated circuit Obf(C).
We say that Obf is an obfuscator all polynomial-size circuits if it an obfuscator for
every collection C = {Cλ}λ∈N of polynomial-size circuits such that for every λ ∈ N,
all the circuits in Cλ are of the same size, have the same number of input wires and
the same number of output wires.
We say that Obf is an obfuscator for NC1 if it an obfuscator for every collection
C = {Cλ}λ∈N of polynomial-size circuits such that for some constant c ∈ N and for
every λ ∈ N, all the circuits in Cλ are of the same size, have the same number of input
wires, the same number of output wires, and are of depth exactly c · log λ.
We next define the required functionality of an obfuscator and review three basic
definitions of security that are used throughout this Chapter.
Definition 5.1 (Functionality). A PPT algorithm Obf is an obfuscator for a collec-
tion C = {Cλ}λ∈N of polynomial-size circuits if for any C ∈ Cλ,
Pr
Obf
[∀x : Obf(C)(x) = C(x)] = 1 .
VBB obfuscation. Virtual Black Box (VBB) obfuscation [BGI+01] guarantees
that an obfuscated circuit Obf(C) does not reveal any predicate pi(C) that cannot be
learned by an efficient simulator that is given only black-box access to C. The basic
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definition is worst-case in the sense that the simulator needs to be successful for any
circuit in a given circuit collection. We also address an average-case notion where the
security guarantee only holds for a random circuit sampled from a distribution. In
the definition below we use a slightly weaker definition than the standard one, and
allow the simulator to depend on the distinguishing probability p (See Remark 5.1).
Definition 5.2 (VBB Obfuscation). An obfuscator Obf for a collection C = {Cλ}
of polynomial-size circuits is worst-case VBB if for every polynomial-size adversary
Adv, and polynomial p, there exists a polynomial-size simulator Sim, such that for
every λ ∈ N, every predicate pi : Cλ → {0, 1}, and every C ∈ Cλ:∣∣∣∣ PrAdv,Obf[Adv(Obf(C)) = pi(C)]− PrSim[SimC(1λ) = pi(C)]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1p(λ) .
Obf is average-case VBB for a distribution ensemble C˜ = {C˜λ}λ∈N on the collection
C if the above holds for a random C ← C˜λ, rather than for every C ∈ Cλ
VGB obfuscation. Virtual Grey Box (VGB) obfuscation [BC10] relaxes VBB by
allowing the simulator to have unbounded computational power, but still only a
bounded number of oracle queries to C.
Definition 5.3 (VGB Obfuscation). An obfuscator Obf for a collection C = {Cλ}
of polynomial-size circuits is worst-case VGB if for every polynomial-size adversary
Adv, and polynomial p, there exists an unbounded simulator Sim, and a polynomial q,
such that for every λ ∈ N, every predicate pi : Cλ → {0, 1}, and C ∈ Cλ:∣∣∣∣ PrAdv,Obf[Adv(Obf(C)) = pi(C)]− PrSim[SimC[q(λ)](1λ) = pi(C)]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1p(λ) ,
where C[q(λ)] is an oracle that allows at most q(λ) queries.
Obf is average-case VGB for a distribution ensemble C˜ = {C˜λ}λ∈N on the collection
C if the above holds for a random C ← C˜λ, rather than for every C ∈ Cλ
Remark 5.1 (Simulation accuracy). In the above definitions (and throughout this
chapter), the simulator Sim, and in VGB, also its number of queries q, are allowed
to depend on the required simulation accuracy 1/p(λ). This is the case in all previous
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works that have established worst-case VBB or VGB (for specific classes) [Can97,
Wee05, BC10, CRV10]. This definition is implied by original definition of [BGI+01]
where the same simulator Sim should be 1/p(λ)-accurate for all polynomials p (for
large enough security parameter λ).
Indistinguishability Obfuscation. We next define the notion of indistinguisha-
bility obfuscation, introduced in [BGI+01].
Definition 5.4 (Indistinguishability obfuscation [BGI+01]). An obfuscator iO for a
collection C = {Cλ} of polynomial-size circuits is an indistinguishability obfuscator if
for any polynomial-size distinguisher D, there exists a negligible function µ such that
for all λ ∈ N, and any two circuits C0, C1 ∈ Cλ of the same size and functionality,
Pr [D(C0, C1, iO(Cb)) = b | b← {0, 1}] ≤ 1
2
+ µ(λ) .
It can be readily seen that if an obfuscator Obf is worst-case VBB for a circuit
collection C then it is also worst-case VGB for C. Furthermore, if Obf is worst-case
VGB for C then it is also an indistinguishability obfuscator for C.
5.3 Strong Indistinguishability Obfuscation
In this section we define the notion of strong indistinguishability obfuscation. We
start by defining the notion of concentrated distributions over circuits.
Concentrated Circuit Distributions. At a high-level, a distribution ensemble C˜,
over a circuit collection C, is concentrated, if given polynomially many oracle queries
to a random circuit C from the distribution, it is information theoretically hard to
find an input x such that C does not agree with majC˜ on the point x, where majC˜
is the common output of circuits distributed according to C˜. If C˜ corresponds to
the uniform distribution on some collection C, majC˜ is simply the majority vote.
Concentrated distributions naturally generalize the concept of evasive distributions
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studied in [BBC+14], in which the majority is always the all-zero function, that is,
majC˜ ≡ 0.
Definition 5.5 (Concentrated circuit distributions). Let C = {Cλ}λ∈N be a collection
of polynomial-size circuits, where Cλ consists of circuits C : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}, and
let C˜ = {C˜λ}λ∈N be a distribution ensemble on the collection C. Let majC˜λ(x) =
bEC←C˜λ C(x)e be the common output at point x of circuits drawn from C˜λ.
1. For any ε ∈ [0, 1], C˜λ is said to be ε-concentrated if
max
x∈{0,1}λ
Pr
C←C˜λ
[
C(x) 6= majCλ(x)
] ≤ ε .
2. C˜ is said to be concentrated if for some negligible µ(·), and any λ ∈ N, C˜λ is
µ(λ)-concentrated.
3. C˜ is said to be evasive if it is concentrated, and for any λ ∈ N and any x ∈
{0, 1}λ, majC˜λ(x) = 0.
4. We say that the collection C itself is concentrated (evasive) if the uniform dis-
tribution ensemble on circuits in C is concentrated (evasive).
Strong Indistinguishability Obfuscation. Strong Indistinguishability Obfusca-
tion requires that indistinguishability holds, even when C0 and C1 do not necessarily
compute the exact same function, but are taken from two distributions C˜0λ and C˜1λ
that are concentrated around the same function; namely, majC˜0λ ≡ majC˜1λ :
Definition 5.6 (Strong indistinguishability obfuscation). An obfuscator Obf for a
collection C = {Cλ}λ∈N is said to be a strong indistinguishability obfuscator for C, if
for any two concentrated distribution ensembles C˜0 = {C˜0λ}λ∈N, C˜1 = {C˜1λ}λ∈N on C,
such that ∀λ ∈ N : majC˜0λ ≡ majC˜1λ, and any polynomial-size distinguisher D, there
exists a negligible function µ such that for all λ ∈ N,
Pr
[
D(Obf(Cb)) = b
∣∣∣∣ b← {0, 1}(C0, C1)← (C˜0λ, C˜1λ)
]
≤ 1
2
+ µ(λ) .
We observe that any strong indistinguishability obfuscator for C is also an indis-
tinguishability obfuscator for C. Indeed, for any two circuits C0, C1 of equivalent
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functionality, each of these circuits on its own is trivially concentrated around their
common functionality.
5.4 Strong Indistinguishability is Equivalent to VGB
In this section, we prove that strong indistinguishability security is equivalent to
worst-case VGB. Clearly, any worst-case VGB obfuscator for a class C also satisfies
strong indistinguishability security for C. We show that the converse is true as well.
Namely, we show that any strong indistinguishability obfuscator Obf for a class C of
circuits is a worst-case VGB obfuscator for C. In addition, we show that for classes C
with some additional properties, Obf is in fact worst-case VBB. We refer the reader
to Section 5.1.3.1 for an overview.
5.4.1 Definitions and Statement of Main Theorem
Notation and terminology. For a function f : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}, we say that a
point x ∈ {0, 1}λ separates a circuit C from f if C(x) 6= f(x). We say that a set
L ⊆ {0, 1}λ separates C from f , if some x ∈ L separates C from f . Given a set
of circuits K, we say that L separates K from f , if L separates any C ∈ K from
f . Recall, that K is said to be ε-concentrated if the uniform distribution on K is
ε-concentrated around its majority function majK.
Definition 5.7 (Majority-separating oracle). Let C = {Cλ}λ∈N be a collection circuits,
where Cλ consists of circuits C : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}, let C ∈ Cλ, and let ε > 0. An
oracle M is said to be (C, C, ε)-separating if given any ε-concentrated subset K ⊆ Cλ,
represented by a circuit that samples uniform elements in K, M(K) outputs a point
x ∈ {0, 1}λ that separates C from majK, or ⊥ if no such point exists.
Remark 5.2. In the above definition, and throughout this section, we often abuse no-
tation and denote by K both the subset and the circuit that samples uniform elements
from the subset.
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Definition 5.8 (Learnability by majority-separating oracles). A collection C = {Cλ}
of boolean circuits is said to be (t, σ, c, s, ε)-learnable by a majority-separation oracle
if there exists a deterministic oracle-aided machine L such that for every C ∈ Cλ,
given oracle access to C and a (Cλ, C, ε(λ))-separating oracle M, LC,M(1λ) outputs
Cˆ ∈ Cλ of equivalent functionality to C, in time t(λ), using at most s(λ) queries to
M, and most σ(λ) queries to C before the last call to M, and at most c(λ) queries to
C overall.
Our main technical theorem shows that any strong indistinguishability obfuscator
for a circuit collection C that is learnable via a majority separation oracle is also a
worst-case simulation-based obfuscator. The size and query complexity of the worst-
case simulator, in particular whether it is a VBB or VGB simulator, is determined
by the learnability parameters (t, σ, c, s, ε).
Theorem 5.3. Let C = {Cλ}λ∈N be a collection of polynomial-size circuits, and let
Obf be a strong indistinguishability obfuscator for C. Let Adv be a boolean polynomial-
size adversary, and let p be a polynomial. There exists a polynomial q, such that if C is
(t, σ, c, s, 1
q
)-learnable by a majority-separating oracle, and (t, σ, c, s) are polynomially
bounded, then Adv has a worst-case VGB simulator Sim with accuracy p and size
O(|Adv|+ t · s · qs · 2σ), making O(c+ q · s) oracle queries.
In Section 5.4.3 we show that for any 2 < q ≤ λO(1), any circuit collection C
is indeed (t, σ, c, s, 1
q
)-learnable by a majority-separation oracle, for some setting of
parameters (t, σ, c, s) that are all polynomially bounded.
5.4.2 Proof of Theorem 5.3
Fix C,Obf,Adv, p satisfying the conditions of the theorem. The proof of the theorem
will rely on the following key lemma that essentially shows that the set of circuits,
whose obfuscation Adv can 1/p-distinguish, can always be separated from the majority
of circuits by a small separating set.
Lemma 5.1. There exists a polynomial q, such that for any λ ∈ N, and any 1
q(λ)
-
concentrated subset K ⊆ Cλ, there exists a set LK ⊆ {0, 1}λ of size at most q(λ), such
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that for any C ∈ K that is not separated from majK by LK:∣∣∣Pr[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]− Pr
C′←K
[Adv(Obf(C ′)) = 1]
∣∣∣ ≤ 1/2p(λ) ,
where the probability is also over the coins of Adv and Obf.
Proof. For any λ ∈ N, and subset K ⊆ Cλ, let us denote by Db(K) the set of all
circuits C ∈ K such that
(−1)b
(
Pr[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]− Pr
C′←K
[Adv(Obf(C ′)) = 1]
)
≥ 1
2p(λ)
,
namely, D(K) = D0(K) ∪ D1(K) consist of all the “distinguishable circuits” in K.
Assume towards contradiction that the lemma does not hold. Then there exists
a super-polynomial function T (λ) = λω(1), such that for an infinite sequence N∗ ⊆ N,
and any λ ∈ N∗, there exists a 1
T (λ)
-concentrated subset Kλ ⊆ Cλ such that any set LKλ
separating the distinguishable circuits D0(Kλ)∪D1(Kλ) from majKλ is of size greater
than T (λ). In particular, for some bλ ∈ {0, 1}, any set separating Dbλ(Kλ) from
majKλ is of size greater than T (λ)/2. For ease of notation, let us assume throughout
that bλ = 0, and simply denote D(Kλ) = D0(Kλ). (This is indeed without loss of
generality, by flipping the output of Adv if needed.)
Claim 5.1. For any λ ∈ N∗, there exists a non-empty concentrated subset D∗(Kλ) ⊆
D(Kλ). Specifically,
max
x∈{0,1}λ
{
Pr
C←D∗(Kλ)
[
C(x) 6= majKλ(x)
]} ≤ α(λ) = 2 log |Cλ|
T (λ)
.
Proof. We describe an iterative process that results in the required D∗(Kλ). Let
D0 = D(Kλ), and let L0 = ∅. Starting from i = 0, if Di satisfies the property given by
the claim, output D∗(Kλ) = Di. Otherwise, we define Di+1 as follows. There exists a
point xi ∈ {0, 1}λ that separates an α(λ)-fraction of the circuits in Di from majKλ .
Add xi to current partial separating set Li+1 = Li ∪ {xi}, and let Di+1 ⊆ Di be the
subset that is not separated from majKλ by xi.
Note that this process ends after at most T (λ)/2 steps (we do not require that it
is efficient). Indeed, it holds that for i ≤ T (λ)/2 and for α = 2 log |Cλ|
T (λ)
,
|Di| ≤ (1− α(λ)) |Di−1| ≤ (1− α(λ))i |D| ≤
(
1− 2 log |Cλ|
T
)i
|Cλ| ≤ |Cλ|1−
2i
T (λ) .
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Moreover, this process must end with a non-empty set. This is the case since otherwise
after T (λ)/2 steps we separated all of the original D(Kλ) from majKλ with a set
LT (λ)/2 ⊆ {0, 1}λ of size less than T (λ)/2. This contradicts the fact that D(Kλ)
cannot be separated from majKλ by T (λ)/2 elements or less.
We now show how to violate the strong indistinguishability security of Obf for C.
Consider the concentrated sub-collections D∗ = {D∗(Kλ)}λ∈N∗ , and K = {Kλ}λ∈N∗ .
(Formally, we need to also define these for λ ∈ N \ N∗. We can do so in an arbitrary
way that will keep them concentrated.) Since both D∗(Kλ) and Kλ are concentrated
around majKλ , it suffices to show that Adv distinguishes
{Obf(C) : C ← Kλ}λ∈N from {Obf(C) : C ← D∗(Kλ)}λ∈N .
Indeed, for any λ ∈ N∗
Pr
C←D∗(Kλ)
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1] − Pr
C←Kλ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1] ≥
min
C∈D∗(Kλ)
Pr[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1] − Pr
C←Kλ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1] ≥ 1
2p(λ)
.
To complete the proof of Theorem 5.3, let us fix q to be the polynomial given by
Lemma 5.1 corresponding to (Adv, p), and assume that C is (t, σ, c, s, 1
q
)-learnable by
a majority-separating oracle. We next describe the simulator Sim for (Adv, p), argue
its validity, and analyze its complexity.
Description of Sim. Given oracle access to C ∈ Cλ, Sim runs the learner LC,M(1λ)
given by Definition 5.8, and emulates for L the oracle C and the majority-separating
oracle M. Any call to C is answered by Sim using its own oracle to C. Oracle calls to
M are handled as follows. Given a subset K ⊆ Cλ that contains C (represented by a
circuit that samples uniform elements in K), Sim first retrieves the set LK separating
the distinguishable circuits D(K) ⊆ K from majK. Then, Sim queries its oracle C on
all the points x ∈ LK, and tests whether C(x) = majK(x), namely whether x separates
133
C from majK. The computation of majK(x) is done by computing C1(x), . . . , Cλ(x),
where each Ci ← K is a random circuit from K and taking their majority.
If Sim found a separating point x, then it uses it to answer L’s query, and continues
its emulation. Otherwise, if no point in LK separates C from majK, then Sim stops
the emulation of L, samples a random C ′ ← K, and outputs the result of running
Adv(Obf(C ′)). In any case, after running L for at most t(λ) steps, L would output
Cˆ ∈ Cλ of equivalent functionality to C, and Sim outputs the result of running
Adv(Obf(Cˆ)).
Validity. The validity of Sim follows from Lemma 5.1, the guarantee on L, and the
correctness of computing majK. In more detail, we first condition on the event that
the simulator Sim always computes majK correctly. In this case, by Lemma 5.1, if at
any point C agrees with majK on all of LK, then Adv distinguishes an obfuscation
Obf(C) from an obfuscation Obf(C ′) for a random C ′ ← K with probability at most
1
2p(λ)
. Otherwise, we successfully implement a (Cλ, C, 1q(λ))-majority-separating oracle
M, and learn Cˆ ∈ Cλ of equivalent functionality to C. Since Obf is a strong indis-
tinguishability obfuscator, and in particular an indistinguishability obfuscator, Adv’s
advantage is also bounded by 1/2p(λ).
To complete the argument, we note that the condition that Sim always computes
majK holds except with negligible probability 2
−Ω(λ) · (c + qs) ≤ 1/2p(λ). Indeed,
each such computations is correct except with probability 2−Ω(λ) (see Claim 5.2),
and the bound follows by taking a union bound over the total number of queries
(c+qs) = λO(1) made by Sim (calculated in detail below). Thus, the overall simulation
error is bounded by 1/2p(λ) + 1/2p(λ) ≤ 1/p(λ), as required.
Complexity of Sim. The queries of Sim to C include the c(λ) queries that L makes
to C, and q(λ) queries for each of the s(λ) queries made by L to M; indeed, remember
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that the size of each LK is bounded by q(λ). Thus the overall query complexity of
Sim is c(λ) + s(λ) · q(λ).
The total circuit size of Sim can be bounded by a fixed polynomial in
1. the size of the adversary |Adv|,
2. the total size t(λ) of L,
3. the number of sets LK that the simulator may have to use throughout the
simulation, times the size q(λ) of each LK,
4. the time it takes to compute the values majK(x) throughout.
We now count the number of sets LK necessary for Sim. In what follows, for
1 ≤ i ≤ s + 1, we denote by ci(λ) the number of queries made by L to the oracle C
between the (i−1)-st and i-th queries to M. Note c(λ) = ∑s+1i=1 ci(λ) and that σ(λ) =∑s
i=1 ci(λ). For ease of notation, from hereon we suppress the security parameter λ.
Consider the (deterministic) learner L, we consider its tree of possible executions.
We view each node at level 0 ≤ i ≤ s, as corresponding to the state of L before
making ci+1 queries to C and the (i + 1)-st query to M. In this tree, a node at the
i-th level has 2ci+1 ·q sons. Indeed, there are at most 2ci+1 possible sequences of queries
and answers made by L to the oracle C, before the (i+ 1)-st query to M; then, each
such possible sequence determines a set LK of q values that L will query M on. The
overall number of sets LK is thus
s−1∑
i=0
qi ·
i+1∏
j=1
2cj ≤ s · qs−1
s∏
i=1
2ci = s · qs−1 · 2σ .
Throughout the simulation, majK(x) is computed at most s(λ) · q(λ) times. The
computation itself is done by computing C1(x), . . . , Cλ(x), where each Ci ← K is a
random circuit from K and taking their majority. Sampling Ci ← K and computing
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Ci(x), can be done in time at most t(λ) (that is, the size of L) since we assume that
the learner L represents each of its queries K to its majority-separating oracle M by
a circuit that samples uniform elements in K.
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.3.
5.4.3 VGB and VBB by Majority-Separation Learning
In this section, we show that any class of circuits is learnable by a majority-separating
oracle, with parameters that yield VGB simulation. We then discuss additional classes
that can be learned with better parameters, yielding VBB simulation. This includes
previously obfuscated classes as well as new ones.
5.4.3.1 VGB obfuscation for all circuits.
We show
Theorem 5.4. Let C be any circuit collection and let Obf be a strong indistinguisha-
bility obfuscator for C. Then Obf is also a worst-case VGB obfuscator for C.
To prove Theorem 5.4, we show that any circuit collection is learnable by a
majority-separating oracle, where the learner is of unbounded size, but only per-
forms a polynomial number of queries to its oracles. Theorem 5.4 then follows from
Theorem 5.3.
Lemma 5.2. For any q > 2, any circuit collection C = {Cλ}λ∈N is (t, σ, c, s, 1q )-
learnable by a majority-separating oracle for t(λ) = 2poly(λ), s(λ) ≤ σ(λ) ≤ c(λ) ≤
q(λ) · log |Cλ|.
Proof. We describe the required learner L. LC,M works iteratively; starting from the
entire collection K0 = Cλ, it each time reduces the current set of candidates Ki to a
strict sub-collection Ki+1 ( Ki, until it finds a circuit Cˆ computing the same function
as C, or C itself. Specifically, as long as Ki contains some x that separates at least
a 1
q
-fraction of the circuits in Ki from majKi , L queries C on x and defines Ki+1 to
be the subset of all circuits in Ki that agree with C on x. If no such x exists then
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Ki is 1q -concentrated, in which case L asks the majority-separating oracle M for a
point x that separates C from majKi . If M returns ⊥, then C ≡ majKi is returned.
Otherwise, L queries C on x and continues as before.
It is left to note that, with each query to C of the first type, Ki is reduced by
a factor of (1 − 1/q(λ)), and with each query of the second type it is reduced by a
factor of 1/q(λ) < 1− 1/q(λ), and thus:
|Ki| ≤ (1− 1/q(λ))i|K0| ≤ 2−i/q(λ)|Cλ| ≤ |Cλ|
(
1− i
q(λ)·log |Cλ|
)
.
This implies that L learns some Cˆ ∈ Cλ of equivalent functionality to C after at most
q(λ) · log |Cλ| iterations, and thus s(λ) ≤ σ ≤ c ≤ q(λ) · log |Cλ|.
5.4.3.2 VBB obfuscation for sets of constant size.
A k-set circuit CS is associated with a set S of k points, it accepts all points in S,
and rejects all other points. A special well-studied case of set circuits is that of point
circuits, where k = 1.
Definition 5.9 (Set circuits). For a set S ⊆ {0, 1}λ of size k, the set circuit CS
returns 1 for any x ∈ S, and 0 for all x /∈ S. Sk = {Skλ}λ∈N, where Skλ = {CS : S ⊆
{0, 1}λ, |S| = k(λ)}, is the collection of k-set circuits.
Theorem 5.5. Let Obf be a strong indistinguishability obfuscator for Sk. Then Obf
is also a worst-case VGB obfuscator for Sk, with a simulator of size λO(k), and poly-
nomially many queries. In particular, for k = O(1) it is also a VBB obfuscator.
As for Theorem 5.4, Theorem 5.5 is proven by showing how to learn set circuits
via a majority-separating oracle with certain efficiency parameters, and plugging it
in Theorem 5.3.
Lemma 5.3. Sk is (t, σ, c, s, ε)-learnable by a majority-separating oracle for t(λ) =
poly(λ), σ(λ) = c(λ) = 0, s(λ) = k(λ), and ε(λ) = 2−Ω(λ).
Proof. We describe the required learner L. LCS ,M works iteratively, revealing the
points in the set S one by one, as follows. Having already revealed a subset T ( S,
L queries M on the subset KT corresponding to all the set circuits CS′ such that
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T ⊆ S ′ and |S ′| = k, where KT is represented via a poly(λ)-size circuit that samples
a random element in KT .
Note that each such subset KT is 2−Ω(λ)-concentrated, since for a point x ∈ T all
circuits in KT return 1, whereas for x /∈ T , all but 2−Ω(λ)-fraction of the circuits in KT
return 0. Eventually, after at most k(λ) queries to M, the entire set S is revealed.
5.4.3.3 VBB obfuscation for linear subspaces over finite fields.
Let F = {Fλ}λ∈N be a sequence of finite fields such that Fλ is of size 2Θ(λ) and
representing elements and computing field operations can be done efficiently as a
function of λ. A subspace circuit tests whether a given x ∈ Fd is a member of some
linear subspace L ⊆ Fd, or equivalently whether x belongs to the kernel of some given
matrix A ∈ Fd×d.
Definition 5.10 (Subspace circuits). Let d(λ) be a polynomially bounded function.
For a matrix A ∈ Fd(λ)×d(λ) let CA be a circuit that returns 1 if and only if x ∈ ker(A).
Let Vd,F = {Vd,Fλ }λ∈N, where Vd,Fλ = {CA : A ∈ Fd(λ)×d(λ)λ } is the collection of subspace
circuits.
A special case of subspace circuit obfuscation, studied by [CRV10], is that of hyper-
plane circuits where rank(A) = 1. They show how to VBB obfuscate hyperplanes for
dimension d = O(1), under a strong variant of Decision Diffie Hellman.
We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.6. Let Obf be a strong indistinguishability obfuscator for Vd,F. Then
Obf is also a worst-case VGB obfuscator for Vd,F, with a simulator of size λO(d), and
polynomially many queries. In particular, for d = O(1) it is also a VBB obfuscator.
As before, the theorem is proven by showing how to learn subspace circuits us-
ing a majority-separating oracle with ceratin efficiency features, and plugging it in
Theorem 5.3.
Lemma 5.4. Vd,F is (t, σ, c, s, ε)-learnable by a majority-separating oracle for t(λ) =
poly(λ), σ(λ) = c(λ) = 0, s(λ) ≤ d(λ), and ε(λ) = 2−Ω(λ).
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Proof. We describe the required learner L. Let d = d(λ) and let A ∈ Fd×dλ . LCA,M
gradually constructs a basis for ker(A). Having found a matrix B ∈ Fd×iλ of rank(B) =
i, for i < d, and such that AB = 0i, L queries the majority separating oracle M on the
subset KB = {CA′ : A′B = 0i}, where KB is represented by a poly(λ)-size circuit that
samples uniform elements from KB. The collection KB is 2−Ω(λ)-concentrated; indeed,
for any x ∈ span(B), x ∈ ker(A′) and CA′(x) = 1 for all CA′ ∈ KB. For x /∈ B, as
long as i < d, x ∈ ker(A′) with probability at most |Fλ|−1 = 2−Ω(λ). Thus, L obtains
a separating vector bi+1 ∈ ker(A) \ span(B), and can extend B to Bi+1 = (Bi|bi+1).
If for some i < d, at the i-th step M returns ⊥, it holds that ker(A) = span(Bi), and
L outputs some A′ such that ker(A′) = span(Bi). Otherwise A = 0d×d.
5.4.3.4 VBB obfuscation for all-or-nothing learnable circuits.
A collection C = {Cλ}λ∈N of polynomial-size boolean circuits is said to be all-or-
nothing learnable if:
• C is evasive. That is, given oracle access to a random C ∈ Cλ is is hard to find
a point x such that C(x) = 1.
• Given oracle access to any C ∈ Cλ and given any point x such that C(x) = 1
the circuit C can be efficiently learned.
Examples of all-or-nothing learnable collections include point circuits (discussed
above), conjunction circuits CT,F (x) = ∧
i∈T
xi ∧
i∈F
¬xi, for disjoint T, F ⊂ [λ], or Ham-
ming ball circuits Cy,d(x) = 1 if and only if |y − x| ≤ d, for y ∈ {0, 1}λ and d ∈ [λ]
(these are also known as fuzzy point circuits).7
Definition 5.11 (All-or-nothing learnable circuits). An evasive circuit collection C =
{Cλ}λ∈N is said to be all-or-nothing learnable, if there exists a polynomial-time learner
R such that for every C ∈ Cλ and x such that C(x) = 1, RC(x) = Cˆ, for some Cˆ ∈ Cλ
that is functionally equivalent to C.
7Indeed, the first two examples are also evasive collections. The Hamming ball collection, for a
given d, is evasive up to a certain threshold d∗ ∈ [λ], and beyond that threshold, every function in
the collection is exactly learnable.
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We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.7. Let Obf be a strong indistinguishability obfuscator for any collection
C of all-or-nothing learnable circuits. Then Obf is also a worst-case VBB obfuscator
for C.
Again, the theorem is proved by showing how to learn am all-or-nothing learnable
circuit collection using a majority-separating oracle with ceratin efficiency features,
and plugging it in Theorem 5.3.
Lemma 5.5. Any collection C = {Cλ}λ∈N of all-or-nothing learnable circuits is
(t, σ, c, s, ε)-learnable by a majority-separating oracle for t(λ) = poly(λ), s(λ) = 1,
σ(λ) = 0, c(λ) = poly(λ), and ε(λ) = λ−ω(1).
Proof. We describe the required learner L. LCS ,M queries the majority-separating M
once, on the entire collection Cλ (which we assume to have a polynomial-size circuit
that samples uniform elements in Cλ), obtains a point x such that C(x) = 1, and uses
the learner R, given by Definition 5.11, to learn Cˆ ∈ Cλ with equivalent functionality
to C. Recall that indeed, since C is evasive, majCλ ≡ 0 and Cλ is µ(λ)-concentrated
for some µ(λ) = λ−ω(1). In particular, no calls are made to C before the query to M,
meaning that σ(λ) = 1. All the c calls made to C, are made after the call to M, when
applying the learner R, and thus c(λ) = poly(λ)
5.4.3.5 Remarks.
Having presented the above results, a few technical remarks are in place.
Remark 5.3. Barak et al. [BBC+14] show that if there exists an average-case VBB
obfuscator for every evasive function collection, then for every collection of poly-
nomial-size circuits, there exists a weak average-case VGB obfuscation, where the
simulator is allowed some super-polynomial number of oracle queries. Their result
can also be scaled down to speak of all collections in NC1. The VGB obfuscators
constructed here are stronger in two aspects: first they are worst-case, rather than
average-case, and second, the obfuscation simulator is only allowed a polynomial num-
ber of queries.
Remark 5.4 (Non-boolean functions). Our results are stated for boolean functions.
For our result on VGB obfuscation for all circuits, this is without loss of generality,
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since for non-boolean circuit C(x), we can obfuscate the boolean circuit C ′(x, i) =
Ci(x) that returns the i-th output bit, given additional input i. As for our VBB results
on restricted classes, such as set circuits, subspace circuits, or all-or-nothing learnable
circuits, our results can be rather directly generalized to also allow a given multi-bit
output. Namely, the image of any circuit is still boolean, but rather than {0, 1} it
consists of {0, s}, for any given string s. These type of multi-bit output circuits were
previously studied in [CD08, CRV10, BC10], and proven useful for strong forms of
encryption.
Remark 5.5 (Auxiliary input). The worst-case VBB and VGB definitions consid-
ered here allow a non-universal simulator [BCC+14]. In particular, the simulator
is allowed to have non-uniform advice that arbitrarily (and inefficiently) depends on
the adversary’s non-uniform advice. As noted in [BC10], in the case of VGB this is
without loss of generality. However, for VBB, universal simulation does not follow
from non-universal simulation, and we do not know how to extend our results to this
setting.
5.5 Strong Indistinguishability Obfuscation for Concentrat-
ed Distributions
In this section we show that strong indistinguishability security for a given collection
C is not only equivalent to VGB for C, but is also equivalent to requiring average-case
VBB for any concentrated distribution on C.
Theorem 5.8. Let C = {Cλ}λ∈N be a circuit collection, and let Obf be an obfuscation
algorithm for C. Then the following two conditions are equivalent:
1. Obf is a strong indistinguishability obfuscator for C.
2. For any concentrated sub-collection B = {Bλ ⊆ Cλ}λ∈N, Obf is average-case
VBB for B.
Before proving the theorem, we first prove the following useful lemma regarding
an alternative definition for average-case obfuscation for concentrated distributions.
The lemma, implicitly proven in [BBC+14] for the special case of evasive distributions,
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shows that, for concentrated distributions, (average-case) VBB obfuscation admits a
universal simulator that essentially runs the adversary on an obfuscation of a random
circuit.
Lemma 5.6. Let C˜ = {C˜λ}λ∈N be a concentrated distribution ensemble on a circuit
collection C = {Cλ}λ∈N. Then Obf is an average-case VBB obfuscator for C˜ if and
only if for any polynomial-size Adv there exists a negligible µ(·), such that for any
λ ∈ N, and any predicate pi : Cλ → {0, 1},∣∣∣∣ Pr
C←C˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = pi(C)]− Pr
C,C′←C˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = pi(C ′)]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ(λ) . (5.1)
Proof. For the first direction, assume that Obf is an average-case VBB obfuscator for
C˜. Fix any polynomial-size Adv. Fix any polynomial p(·), and let Sim be an average-
case VBB simulator for (Adv, p) according to Definition 5.2. Then, for any λ ∈ N and
predicate pi : Cλ → {0, 1},
∣∣∣∣ Pr
C←C˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = pi(C)]− Pr
C,C′←C˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C ′)) = pi(C)]
∣∣∣∣ ≤∣∣∣∣ Pr
C←C˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = pi(C)]− Pr
C←C˜λ
[
SC(1λ) = pi(C)
]∣∣∣∣+∣∣∣∣ Pr
C,C′←C˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = pi(C ′)]− Pr
C,C′←C˜λ
[
SC(1λ) = pi(C ′)
]∣∣∣∣+∣∣∣∣ Pr
C←C˜λ
[
SC(1λ) = pi(C)
]− Pr
C,C′←C˜λ
[
SC(1λ) = pi(C ′)
]∣∣∣∣ ≤
1
p(λ)
+
1
p(λ)
+ 2q(λ) max
x∈{0,1}λ
Pr
C←C˜λ
[
C(x) 6= majC˜λ(x)
] ≤
2
p(λ)
+ 2q(λ) · ν(λ) ,
In the second inequality, the first two summands are bounded by 1/p(λ) by the
security of Obf. The third summand is bounded by the probability that in the two
executions of S, at least one query has a non-zero answer (otherwise the output of
Sim is independent of its oracle). This probability is bounded by 2q(λ) · ν(λ), where
q(λ) is the polynomial bounding the number of queries made by Sim, and ν(λ) is the
negligible concentration of C˜λ.
Note that the above holds for every polynomial p, which implies that there exists
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a negligible function µ such that∣∣∣∣ Pr
C←C˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = pi(C)]− Pr
C,C′←C˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C ′)) = pi(C)]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ µ(λ) ,
as desired.
For the second direction, let Simλ be a simulator that outputs 1 with probability
pλ = Pr
Adv,Obf,C←C˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1] ,
where pλ is non-uniformly hardwired into Simλ. By Equation 5.1, Sim is a valid
simulator for C˜.
Proof of Theorem 5.8. We first prove that (2) implies (1). Specifically, assume that
(1) does not hold, we show that (2) also does not hold. If (1) does not hold then there
exist two concentrated ensembles C˜0, C˜1 such that majC˜0λ ≡ majC˜1λ , a polynomial-size
adversary Adv, and a noticeable function δ such that, for infinitely many λ ∈ N∗ ⊆ N,
Pr
C←C˜0λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]− Pr
C←C˜1λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1] ≥ δ(λ)
(the absolute value is discarded without loss of generality, by flipping Adv’s output if
necessary).
For any circuit C ∈ Cλ, let p(C) = PrAdv,Obf [Adv(Obf(C)) = 1], and for a distribu-
tion D˜ on Cλ, let p(D˜) = EC←D˜[p(C)]. Then, for any λ ∈ N∗,
p(C˜0λ)− p(C˜1λ) ≥ δ(λ) .
Next, denote
S0λ = {C : p(C) ≥ p(C˜0λ)− δ(λ)/4}
S1λ = {C : p(C) ≤ p(C˜1λ) + δ(λ)/4} .
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Note that
p(C˜0λ) ≤ Pr
C←C˜0λ
[C ∈ S0λ] + p(C˜0λ)− δ(λ)/4
⇒ Pr
C←C˜0λ
[C ∈ S0λ] ≥ δ(λ)/4 ,
p(C˜1λ) ≥ Pr
C←C˜1λ
[C /∈ S1λ] ·
(
p(C˜1λ) + δ(λ)/4
)
⇒ Pr
C←C˜1λ
[C ∈ S1λ] ≥ 1−
p(C˜1λ)
p(C˜1λ) + δ(λ)/4
≥ δ(λ)/4
p(C˜0λ)
≥ δ(λ)/4 .
We next consider the following two distributions conditioned on the above events
D˜bλ = C˜bλ|Sbλ , for b ∈ {0, 1} .
Then
p(D˜0λ)− p(D˜1λ) ≥
(p(C˜0λ)− δ(λ)/4)− (p(C˜1λ) + δ(λ)/4) ≥
p(C˜0λ)− p(C˜1λ)− δ(λ)/2 ≥ δ(λ)/2 .
We now consider the distribution D˜λ = D˜
0
λ+D˜1λ
2
that samples from D˜bλ for a uniform b ∈
{0, 1}. We first claim that the corresponding ensemble D˜ = {D˜λ}λ∈N∗ is concentrated.
Indeed, since each D˜bλ is distributed like C˜bλ, conditioned on Sbλ, and since Sbλ has
noticeable density δ(λ)/4, it holds that D˜bλ is concentrated around majC˜bλ . Thus,
majD˜0λ ≡ majC˜0λ ≡ majC˜1λ ≡ majD˜1λ ,
and since D is the average of D0λ,D1λ, it is also concentrated and
majD˜λ ≡ majD˜0λ ≡ majD˜1λ .
Next, define a predicate piλ on the support of Dλ such that piλ(C) = b if and only if
C ∈ Sbλ. Then, it holds that
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Pr
C,C′←D˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C ′)) = piλ(C)]− Pr
C←D˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = piλ(C)] =
Pr
C←D˜λ
[piλ(C) = 0] Pr
C←D˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 0]+
Pr
C←D˜λ
[piλ(C) = 1] Pr
C←D˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]−
Pr
C←D˜λ
[piλ(C) = 1] Pr
C←D˜1λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]−
Pr
C←D˜λ
[piλ(C) = 0] Pr
C←D˜0λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 0] =
Pr
C←D˜λ
[piλ(C) = 0]
(
Pr
C←D˜0λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]− Pr
C←D˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]
)
+
Pr
C←D˜λ
[piλ(C) = 1]
(
Pr
C←D˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]− Pr
C←D˜1λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]
)
=
Pr
C←D˜λ
[C ∈ S0λ]
(
Pr
C←D˜0λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]− Pr
C←D˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]
)
+
Pr
C←D˜λ
[C ∈ S1λ]
(
Pr
C←D˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]− Pr
C←D˜1λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]
)
=
1
2
(
Pr
C←D˜0λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]− Pr
C←D˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]
)
+
1
2
(
Pr
C←D˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]− Pr
C←D˜1λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]
)
=
1
2
(
Pr
C←D˜0λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]− Pr
C←D˜1λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]
)
=
1
2
(
p(D˜0λ)− p(D˜1λ)
)
≥
δ(λ)/4 .
By Lemma 5.6, this contradicts the fact that Obf is average-case VBB for the con-
centrated ensemble D˜.
We next prove that (1) implies (2). Fix any concentrated ensemble C˜ on the
collection C, and assume that (2) does not hold, we show that (1) also does not hold.
By Lemma 5.6, if (1) does not hold, there exists a polynomial-size Adv and noticeable
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δ(·) such that for infinitely many λ ∈ N∗ ⊆ N and predicates piλ : Cλ → {0, 1}, it
holds that
δ(λ) ≤
∣∣∣∣ Pr
C←C˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = piλ(C)]− Pr
C,C′←C˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C ′)) = piλ(C)]
∣∣∣∣ ≤
Pr
C←C˜λ
[piλ(C) = 0]
∣∣∣∣ Pr
C←C˜λ:piλ(C)=0
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]− Pr
C←C˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣+
Pr
C←C˜λ
[piλ(C) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ Pr
C←C˜λ:piλ(C)=1
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]− Pr
C←C˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ .
Then, for infinitely many λ ∈ N∗, one of the two above summands is at least δ(λ)/2,
let us assume without loss of generality that it is the first (the proof is similar in
the second case). Now consider the distribution C˜0λ = {C ∈ C˜λ : piλ(C) = 0}. Since
PrC←C˜λ [piλ(C) = 0] ≥ δ(λ)2 , it holds that C˜0λ, like C˜λ is concentrated around majC˜λ .
Moreover,
δ(λ)/2 ≤
∣∣∣∣ Pr
C←C0λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]− Pr
C←C˜λ
[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ,
implying that strong indistinguishability, required in (2), does not hold.
5.5.1 VBB for Concentrated and Evasive Distributions
We complete this section by showing that indistinguishability obfuscation together
with (average-case) VBB obfuscation for evasive distributions implies (average-case)
VBB obfuscation for concentrated distributions.
We start by noting the following fact.
Claim 5.2. Let S˜ be a 1
3
-concentrated distribution over boolean circuits where each
boolean circuit C in the support of S˜ is defined over {0, 1}λ and is of depth at most d
and size at most `. Then the majority function majS˜ can be computed by a (non-
uniform) circuit of size O(λ · `) and depth O(log λ+ d). Also, if S˜ is samplable by a
circuit of size s, such a majority circuit can be sampled, with overwhelming probability
1− 2−Ω(λ), by a circuit of size O(λ · s).
Proof. Since S˜ is 1
3
-concentrated, by a Chernoff bound and a union bound on 2λ
inputs, the majority of O(λ) random circuits from S˜ computes majS˜ with probability
1− 2−Ω(λ).
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We next state the equivalence lemma. For a circuit C of size at most `, we denote
by [C]` a canonically zero-padded version of C of size `. For a collection C = {Cλ}λ∈N,
and functions `(·), d(·), we denote by [C]d` the class of circuits where each C ∈ Cλ
computes the same function as some C ∈ Cλ and is of size `(λ), and depth d(λ). Let
Mλ be a polynomial-size circuit computing the majority majC˜λ over C˜λ. We denote
by C˜ ⊕Mλ the distribution ensemble {C ⊕Mλ : C ← C˜λ}λ∈N. Observe that C˜ ⊕Mλ
is evasive.
Lemma 5.7. Let C = {Cλ}λ∈N be a circuit collection where each C ∈ Cλ is of
polynomial-size `(λ) and depth at most d, and let C˜ be a concentrated distribution
ensemble on C. For any λ ∈ N let Mλ be a circuit of size O(`(λ) · λ) and depth
O(log λ + d(λ)) that computes majC˜. Assume that there exists an average-case VBB
obfuscator for the evasive distribution ensemble C˜ ⊕ Mλ that blows up the size of
any circuit C by some polynomial B(·). Then there exist a polynomial `′(λ) and a
function d′(λ) = O(d(λ) + log λ), depending only on (`, B, d′), such that if iO is an
indistinguishability obfuscator for [C]d′`′ , then the obfuscator cO, given by
cO(C)← iO([C]`′(λ))
is an average-case VBB obfuscator for C˜.
Proof. Let Mλ be the circuit of size O(`(λ) · λ) and depth O(log λ+ d(λ)) that com-
putes majC˜λ . Let eO be an average-case VBB obfuscator for the evasive distribution
ensemble C˜ ⊕Mλ such that |eO(C)| = B(|C|). For C ∈ Cλ, consider the circuit
Cr = Mλ ⊕ eO(C ⊕Mλ; r) ,
which computes the same function as C, but in a different way—it has hardwired an
obfuscation eO(C ⊕Mλ; r), using some randomness r, that computes its difference
from the majority; it first runs this obfuscation on the given input, and then computes
again the difference from the majority, resulting back in C(x). We let `′(λ) be the
size of Cr and d
′(λ) be its depth. Note that these, indeed, only depend on `, b, d and
d′(λ) = O(d(λ) + log λ).
Next, applying indistinguishability security first and then the guarantee that eO
is an average-case VBB obfuscator for the evasive ensemble {Mλ ⊕ C˜λ}λ∈N, as given
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by Lemma 5.6, we have
Pr
Adv,cO,C←C˜λ
[Adv(cO(C)) = pi(C)] =
Pr
Adv,iO,C←C˜λ
[
Adv(iO([C]`′(λ))) = pi(C)
]
=
Pr
Adv,iO,r,C←C˜λ
[Adv(iO(Cr)) = pi(C)]± λ−ω(1) =
Pr
Adv,iO,r,C←C˜λ
[Adv(iO(Mλ ⊕ eO(C ⊕Mλ; r))) = pi(C)]± λ−ω(1) =
Pr
Adv,iO,r,C,C′←C˜λ
[Adv(iO(Mλ ⊕ eO(C ⊕Mλ; r))) = pi(C ′)]± λ−ω(1) =
Pr
Adv,iO,r,C,C′←C˜λ
[Adv(iO(Cr)) = pi(C ′)]± λ−ω(1) =
Pr
Adv,iO,C,C′←C˜λ
[
Adv(iO([C]`′(λ))) = pi(C ′)
]± λ−ω(1) =
Pr
Adv,cO,C,C′←C˜λ
[Adv(cO(C)) = pi(C ′)]± λ−ω(1) .
Thus, again by Lemma 5.6, we deduce that cO is an average-case VBB obfuscator
for the concentrated ensemble C˜.
5.6 Uber Secure Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles and Strong In-
distinguishability Obfuscation
This section shows that any obfuscation scheme for a class C of circuits that is VBB
secure in the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model against semi-bounded adversaries,
together with uber secure multilinear jigsaw puzzles, implies strong indistinguisha-
bility obfuscation for C. Combined with the obfuscator for NC1 given in Chapter 4
we obtain strong indistinguishability obfuscation for NC1. We also show that VGB
obfuscation for all polynomial-size circuits implies uber secure multilinear jigsaw puz-
zles.
We use the following notions defined in Chapter 4.
• Multilinear jigsaw puzzles (Definition 4.3)
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• The ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle oracle (Definition 4.4).
• VBB obfuscation in the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model (Definition 4.5).
5.6.1 Uber Security
We present the uber security definition for multilinear jigsaw puzzles. The definition
follows that of Pass et al. [PST14] for multilinear maps. (Indeed, uber secure mul-
tilinear jigsaw puzzles will be a restriction that is implied by uber secure multilinear
maps.) We define a variant of uber security with strong samplers (See Remark 5.6).
Although it appears to be somewhat stronger than the notion considered by Pass et
al., we find it natural and appealing. See [BCKP14b] for a number of relaxations of
this basic notion and their relative security.
Central to the definition of uber security is the notion of an admissible puzzle
sampler. An admissible puzzle sampler is given a description of a field F and it
samples two sequences of field elements ~V0, ~V1 that cannot be distinguished by a
semi-bounded “ideal adversary”. The ideal adversary is computationally unbounded,
but it can only access ~V0 or ~V1 by making a polynomial number of queries to the ideal
multilinear jigsaw puzzle oracle IdealPuzzle (Definition 4.4).
In our definition of uber security, we consider inefficient puzzle samplers. Formal-
izing such samplers requires some care. Instead of letting the puzzle sampler itself be
computationally unbounded, we require that the puzzle sampler is efficient, but it is
given an additional auxiliary input sampled by an inefficient algorithm. We do this
in order to guarantee that the sampled elements depend efficiently on the description
of the field F . See Remark 5.6 for more details.
A strong puzzle sampler is defined by a pair of algorithms (Z,M) with the following
syntax and efficiently.
• Z is an unbounded auxiliary input sampler that takes as input the security
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parameter λ and outputs an auxiliary input z. We require that there exists a
polynomial q such that |z| < q(λ).
• M is a PPT algorithm that takes as input the security parameter λ ∈ N, a field
F , an auxiliary input string z, and a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. It outputs a size bound
Q, a universe set U , a sequence of sets ~S ∈ (2U)m and a sequence of elements
~V ∈ Fm.
Definition 5.12 (Admissible puzzle sampler). A strong puzzle sampler (Z,M) is
admissible if for every sequence of fields {Fλ}λ∈N such that |Fλ| = λω(1), every poly-
nomial q and every (unbounded) oracle machine Adv (called the ideal adversary) such
that Adv(λ) makes at most q(λ) oracle queries, there exists a negligible function µ
such that for every λ ∈ N
Pr
[
AdvIdealPuzzle(F,Q,U,
~S,~V )(λ) = b
∣∣∣∣ b← {0, 1}(Q,U, ~S, ~V )←M(1λ, Fλ,Z(λ), b)
]
≤ 1
2
+ µ(λ) ,
where the probability is also over the coins of Adv.
Loosely speaking, a multilinear jigsaw puzzle scheme is uber secure if given a
puzzle encoding the elements sampled by an admissible puzzle sampler given random
bit b ∈ {0, 1} it is computationally hard to predict b with non-negligible advantage.
Definition 5.13 (Uber secure multilinear jigsaw puzzles with strong samplers). A
multilinear jigsaw puzzle scheme (KeyGen,PuzzleGen,Test) is uber secure with strong
samplers if for every admissible strong puzzle sampler (Z,M) and every polynomial-
size adversary Adv, there exist a negligible function µ such that for every λ ∈ N,
Pr
Adv(Z) = b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
b← {0, 1}
sk← KeyGen(1λ)
(Q,U, ~S, ~V )←M(1λ, F,Z(λ), b)
Z ← PuzzleGen(sk, Q, U, ~S, ~V )
 ≤ 1
2
+ µ(λ) ,
where F is the field described in the secret key sk and the probability is also over the
coins of Adv.
Remark 5.6 (strong puzzle samplers). For our results we need to rely on a uber
security that allows for computationally unbounded admissible puzzle samplers. Since
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an efficient puzzle sampler M takes as input the description of a field F associated with
the secret key of multilinear jigsaw puzzle, simply allowing M to be unbounded may
result in an unachievable definition. Specifically, consider a multilinear jigsaw puzzle
scheme where it is possible to recover the secret key sk from the description of the field
F in unbounded time. An inefficient M may recover sk and sample encodings that
reveal it. M may still be admissible since knowing the secret key gives no advantage
to the ideal adversary, however given sk it may be possible to distinguish encodings of
the sampled elements.
Therefore, in a strong sampler (Z,M) we keep the sampler M efficient, but we
give it auxiliary input that is sampled by an inefficient algorithm. Importantly, we do
not give the auxiliary-input sampler the description of the field. Such strong samplers
are sufficient for our application of uber secure multilinear jigsaw puzzles.
5.6.2 Obfuscation from Uber Secure Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles
We show that uber secure multilinear jigsaw puzzles imply strong indistinguishabil-
ity obfuscation, and, as a corollary the results in Section 5.4, also other forms of
obfuscation.
Theorem 5.9. If there exist an uber secure multilinear jigsaw puzzle scheme (Defini-
tion 5.13) and an obfuscation scheme in the ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle model with
for a collection of circuits C = {Cλ}λ∈N that is worst-case VBB secure against semi-
bounded adversaries (Definition 4.5). Then there exists a strong indistinguishability
obfuscator for the circuit class C in the plain model (Definition 5.6).
The following is a corollary of Theorem 4.3, Theorem 5.9, and of the bootstrapping
theorem of [GGH+13b] giving a transformation from indistinguishability obfuscation
for NC1 to indistinguishability obfuscation for all polynomial-size circuits.
Corollary 5.2. Assuming an uber secure multilinear jigsaw puzzle scheme there exist
1. Strong indistinguishability obfuscation for any circuit class in NC1,
2. Indistinguishability obfuscation for any polynomial-size circuit class, assuming
also leveled fully homomorphic encryption with decryption in NC1.
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We refer the reader to [GGH+13b, BR14] for the definition of leveled fully homo-
morphic encryption with decryption in NC1 and a discussion of the known instantia-
tions.
Corollary 5.2 together with the results in Section 5.4 give the following corollary.
Corollary 5.3. Assuming an uber secure multilinear jigsaw puzzle scheme there exist
1. worst-case VGB for any collection in NC1,
2. worst-case VGB obfuscation for the class of set circuits Sk for any k = poly(λ),
and VBB obfuscation for k = O(1),
3. worst-case VGB obfuscation for the class of linear subspaces Vd,F for any d =
poly(λ), and VBB obfuscation for d = O(1),
4. worst-case VBB for any efficiently samplable collection of all-or-nothing learn-
able circuits in NC1, in particular, for Hamming balls and conjunctions.
We now turn to give a proof sketch of Theorem 5.9.
Proof of Theorem 5.9. Let C = {Cλ}λ∈N be a class of polynomial-size circuits, let
(KeyGen,PuzzleGen,Test) be an uber secure multilinear jigsaw puzzle scheme. Let
(Obf,Eval) be an ideal multilinear jigsaw puzzle obfuscation scheme for C.
The obfuscator O˜bf for C: Given C ∈ Cλ, O˜bf samples a secret key sk ←
KeyGen(1λ) for the encoding scheme, including the description of a field F . O˜bf
then executes Obf(1λ, F, C) and obtains a size bound Q, a universe set U , a sequence
of sets ~S ∈ (2U)m, and a sequence of elements ~V ∈ Fm, such that for every input
x, EvalIdealPuzzle(F,Q,U,
~S,~V )(x) = C(x). O˜bf outputs an obfuscated circuit that contains,
hardcoded into it, a puzzle Z = PuzzleGen(sk, Q, U, ~S, ~V ). The obfuscated circuit em-
ulates the evaluation algorithm Eval where any query C to the ideal oracle IdealPuzzle
is answered by Test(Z,C).
Functionality and indistinguishability. The functionality of O˜bf follows readily
from that of the multilinear jigsaw puzzle scheme and the ideal multilinear jigsaw
puzzle obfuscation scheme. We now argue strong indistinguishability based on the
uber security of the multilinear jigsaw puzzles. Let C˜0 = {C˜0λ}λ∈N, C˜1 = {C˜1λ}λ∈N be
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two concentrated distribution ensembles on C such that majC˜0λ ≡ majC˜1λ , and let D be
any polynomial-size distinguisher. We show that D cannot distinguish whether it is
given an obfuscation O˜bf(C0) or O˜bf(C1), for (C0, C1)← (C˜0λ, C˜1λ), with non-negligible
advantage.
Assume towards contradiction that D can predict whether it is given O˜bf(C0)
or O˜bf(C1) with a noticeable advantage over
1
2
. We construct an admissible strong
puzzle sampler (Z,M), and show that together with D it violates the uber security
of the multilinear jigsaw puzzle scheme. The auxiliary input sampler Z samples
(C0, C1)← (C˜0λ, C˜1λ) (note that if C˜0λ, C˜1λ are not efficiently samplable, Z is inefficient).
The puzzle sampler M, given a field F , the auxiliary input (C0, C1), and a bit b
executes the ideal graded encoding obfuscator Obf(1λ, F, Cb) obtains a size bound Q,
a universe set U , a sequence of sets ~S and a sequence of elements ~V which it then
outputs.
To argue that the sampler (Z,M) is admissible, we need to show that for every
sequence of super-polynomial-size fields {Fλ}λ∈N, and every (unbounded) oracle ma-
chine Adv (the ideal adversary) making only polynomially many oracle queries there
exists a negligible function µ such that for and every λ ∈ N
Pr
AdvIdealPuzzle(Fλ,Q,U,~S,~V )(λ) = b
∣∣∣∣∣∣
b← {0, 1}
(C0, C1)← (C˜0λ, C˜1λ)
(Q,U, ~S, ~V )← Obf(1λ, Fλ, Cb)
 ≤ 1
2
+ µ(λ) ,
where the probability is also over the coins of Adv.
This follows from the ideal VBB security of the obfuscation against semi-bounded
adversaries (Definition 4.2). Indeed, for any ideal adversary Adv as above, let q(λ) be
the polynomial bound on its number of queries, and let Sim be its VBB simulator.
We have that for some negligible function µ
Pr
AdvIdealPuzzle(Fλ,Q,U,~S,~V )(λ) = b
∣∣∣∣∣∣
b← {0, 1}
(C0, C1)← (C˜0λ, C˜1λ)
(Q,U, ~S, ~V )← Obf(1λ, Fλ, Cb)
 ≤
Pr
[
SimAdv,Cb(1λ) = b
∣∣∣∣ b← {0, 1}(C0, C1)← (C˜0λ, C˜1λ)
]
+ µ(λ) ≤
1
2
+ q(λ) · ν(λ) + µ(λ) ,
where ν(λ) = max(ν0(λ), ν1(λ)), and νb(λ) is the negligible concentration measure of
C˜bλ around majC˜0λ ≡ majC˜1λ .
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It is left to note that, by the construction of (Z,M) and the assumption that D
predicts b with noticeable advantage (given O˜bf(Cb) for a random b), D breaks the
uber security of the encoding scheme (Definition 5.13).
5.6.3 Uber Secure Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles from VGB Obfuscation
We show that VGB obfuscation for all polynomial-size circuits implies uber secure
multilinear jigsaw puzzles.
Theorem 5.10. Assume there exists worst-case VGB obfuscation for the class of all
polynomial-size circuits. Then there exists an uber secure multilinear jigsaw puzzle
scheme.
Proof. Let Obf be a worst-case VGB obfuscation for the class of all polynomial-size
circuits. We construct an uber secure multilinear jigsaw puzzle scheme
(KeyGen,PuzzleGen,Test) as follows.
Let KeyGen be an algorithm that takes is input the security parameter 1λ, samples
a field Fλ such that |F | = λω(1), and outputs the secret key sk = F . The construction
puts no restriction on the way Fλ is sampled.
Given the secret key sk = F , a universe set U , a sequence of sets ~S ∈ (2U)m,
and a sequence of elements ~V ∈ Fm, the puzzle generation algorithm PuzzleGen is
defined as follows. Let ZF,Q,U,~S,~V be a circuit that takes as input a description of an
arithmetic circuit E of size Q (if |E| < Q the circuit is padded) and answers the same
as the ideal oracle IdealPuzzle(F,Q, U, ~S, ~V ). PuzzleGen obfuscates the circuit Z
Z˜ = Obf(ZF,Q,U,~S,~V ) ,
and outputs the obfuscated circuit Z˜ as the puzzle.
Given a puzzle Z˜, and an arithmetic circuit E of size at most Q, the solution
testing algorithm Test executes the circuit Z˜ on the description of E and outputs the
result.
Functionality and uber security. The functionality of the multilinear jigsaw puz-
zle scheme follows readily from that of the Obf. We now argue that the construction
satisfies uber security.
Let (Z,M) be an admissible strong puzzle sampler. Assume towards contradiction
that exists a polynomial-size adversary Adv, and a polynomial p such that for infinitely
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many values of λ ∈ N
Pr
Adv (Obf(ZF,Q,U,~S,~V )) = b
∣∣∣∣∣∣
b← {0, 1}
F ← KeyGen(1λ)
(Q,U, ~S, ~V )←M(1λ, F,Z(λ), b)
 ≥ 1
2
+
1
p(λ)
,
By the VGB security of Obf there exists a polynomial q and an unbounded simu-
lator Sim making at most q(λ) queries, such that for every λ as above, every F in the
support of KeyGen(1λ), every bit b{0, 1} and every tuple (Q,U, ~S, ~V ) in the support
of M(1λ, F,Z(λ), b),∣∣∣∣ PrAdv,Obf [Adv (Obf(ZF,Q,U,~S,~V )) = b]− PrSim[SimIdealPuzzle(F,Q,U,~S,~V )(1λ) = b]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12p(λ) .
We therefore have that for infinitely many values of λ ∈ N there exists a field F in
the support of support of KeyGen(1λ) such that
Pr
[
SimIdealPuzzle(F,Q,U,
~S,~V )(1λ) = b
∣∣∣∣ b← {0, 1}(Q,U, ~S, ~V )←M(1λ, F,Z(λ), b)
]
≥ 1
2
+
1
2p(λ)
.
This contradicts the admissibility of the inefficient puzzle sampler (Z,M).
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Chapter 6
On the Impossibility of Obfuscation with
Random Oracles
Motivated by the gap between the negative results for virtual-black-box obfuscation
in the plain model and the positive result in the ideal multilinear map model, we
investigate the possibility of virtual-black-box obfuscation in simple ideal models.
Under standard computational assumptions, we show that there exist function
families that cannot be virtual-black-box obfuscated in the random oracle model
where parties have oracle access to a public random function. This is the first impos-
sibility result for obfuscation in a non-trivial ideal model.
Our proof gives a transformation from any virtual-black-box obfuscator in the
random oracle model to a virtual-black-box obfuscator in the plain model that has a
weak correctness guarantee.
This chapter is based on [CKP15].
6.1 Overview
This section gives a high-level overview of the results and techniques introduced in
this chapter. We start by recalling the relevant background and motivation, that were
briefly described in Section 1.2.2.3 of the introduction.
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6.1.1 Background and Motivation
Program obfuscators are efficient compilers that transform a program into one that
has the same functionality but is otherwise “impenetrable”. The widely applicable
interpretation of “impenetrable,” called virtual black-box (VBB) [BGI+01], requires
that the obfuscated version of a program helps learn any predicate of the program no
more than does oracle access to the program’s input-output functionality.
While a number of simple program families are known to be VBB obfuscable un-
der some strong hardness assumptions (e.g. [Can97, Wee05, BCKP14a]), Barak et al.
[BGI+01] show that there is no VBB obfuscator for of all programs. Indeed, assum-
ing one way functions, Barak et al. demonstrate a family of unobfuscatable functions.
These functions have a succinct description that cannot be learned effectively effi-
ciently when having only oracle access to the function. At the same time, however,
this succinct description can be efficiently extracted from any program that computes
the function. Clearly, no program that computes such a function can possibly be VBB
obfuscated.
The construction of [BGI+01] makes crucial use of the fact that programs can be
represented as strings and in particular can be executed with their own specification
as input. In contrast, in some abstract models where programs do not necessarily have
succinct representations as strings VBB obfuscation is in fact obtainable. One exam-
ple is “hardware assisted” obfuscation, where some part of the computation is modeled
as a black-box representing impenetrable secure hardware [GIS+10, BCG+11].
Another example is motivated by the recent candidate construction of obfuscation
for all circuits of Garg et. al. [GGH+13b], that is based on a primitive called multi-
linear jigsaw puzzles. In Chapter 4 we show that a variant of the proposed candidate
is VBB secure in a model where the multilinear jigsaw puzzles are implemented by
an ideal oracle. Canetti and Vaikuntanathan [CV13] study a different construction
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based on ideal pseudofree groups. Here, the idealized models serve as an intermedi-
ate steps on the way to full-fledged obfuscation, namely as a model for developing
potentially viable obfuscators and for understanding their security properties, as well
as the computational assumptions on which their security might be based.
This raises natural questions: what are the simplest and minimally-structured
abstract models that allow for general-purpose VBB obfuscation? For instance, do
general-purpose VBB obfuscators exist in the random-oracle model? Do they exist
in the generic group model [Sho97, BS84]? In fact, is there any non-trivial abstract
model of computation where general-purpose VBB obfuscation is impossible?
Answers to the above question may shed light on what algebraic structure (if any)
is inherent for secure obfuscation – even in the plain model, and even when attempting
to obtain only weaker notions of obfuscation such as indistinguishability obfuscation
[BGI+01].
We note that Barak et al. show that their impossiblity holds even when all entities,
namely the program to be obfuscated, the obfuscator and the obfuscated program
have access to a random oracle.1 Goldwaser and Rothblum [GR14] extend this to
show that even the considerably weaker notion of indistinguishability obfuscation is
unobtainable in general in this setting. However, these results do not answer the above
questions. Specifically, they leave open the possibility of obfuscating fully specified
programs that do not access the random oracle. Indeed, Lynn et al. [LPS04] ask
whether general purpose obfuscation is possible in that setting.
6.1.2 Results
We consider obfuscation in the setting of Lynn et al. [LPS04], where both the ob-
fuscator and the obfuscated program have access to a random oracle, and where the
1In fact, [BGI+01] prove that their negative result holds in the more general settings of bounded
relativization.
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obfuscator is only required to operate on fully specified programs that do not have
access to the random oracle. Furthermore, we give the adversary access to the same
oracle. Here we show:
Theorem 6.1 (informal). Assuming trapdoor permutations there exist function fam-
ilies that cannot be VBB obfuscated, even in a model where the obfuscator and the
obfuscated function have access to a random oracle.
Our impossibility extends to the case where the obfuscator and obfuscated pro-
gram have access to an invertible random permutation rather than a random func-
tion. That is, the oracle represents a random permutation, and can be asked both
to evaluate the function and to invert it. It also extends to the case of approximate
obfuscation, where the obfuscated program is only required to agree with the original
program on a significant fraction of the inputs.
6.1.3 Main Ideas
The starting point of our proof is the existence of robust unobfuscatable functions
which are a strengthening of the unobfuscatable functions of [BGI+01]. Essentially,
robust unobfuscatable functions have a succinct description that cannot be learned
efficiently having only oracle access to the function, but can be efficiently extracted
from any program that approximates the function, namely agrees with the function
on some large fraction of the inputs, say 90%. Bitansky and Paneth [BP13] construct
robust unobfuscatable functions from any trapdoor permutation.
Our proof proceeds by transforming any obfuscator in the random oracle model
into an obfuscator in the plain model, namely one that does not use the random
oracle. The transformation loses in correctness: the resulting plain-model obfuscator
generates a program that computes the function correctly only on some fraction of
the inputs. Still, the impossibility is demonstrated by considering a family of robust
unobfuscatable functions.
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We describe in more detail the transformation from obfuscation in the random
oracle model to obfuscation in the plain model. Let Obf be an obfuscator in the
random oracle model. Our goal is to transform Obf into an obfuscator Obf∗ in the
plain model. We start by describing a simple warm-up. Let Obf∗ be the following
plain-model obfuscator: given a description of a program C, Obf∗ emulates the ran-
dom oracle obfuscator Obf(C), answering every oracle query of Obf randomly and
independently (repeated queries are answered consistently). Obf∗ obtains a random
oracle obfuscation C˜ of C. Let RC be the set of random oracle query-answer pairs
that occurred during the emulation of Obf(C). The obfuscator Obf∗ then outputs
an obfuscated program C˜∗ that has hard-coded to it the description of the random
oracle obfuscation C˜ and the set RC . Given an input x, the obfuscation C˜∗ emulates
the random oracle obfuscation C˜(x). C˜∗ answers any random oracle query made by
C˜ as follows: if the query appears in the set RC it is answered consistently with RC ,
otherwise, a random answer is given.2
When C˜∗ emulates the program C˜, all the random oracle queries made by C˜
are answered randomly and consistently with the answers given to the obfuscator
Obf(C) that generated C˜. Therefore, the correctness of Obf∗ follows directly from
the correctness of Obf in the random oracle model. The security of Obf∗, however,
does not follow from that of Obf in the random oracle model. The obfuscation C˜∗
includes the set RC in the clear and, therefore, it may reveal information about the
program C making Obf∗ completely insecure.
We therefore change the transformation to include with the obfuscation C˜∗ a
different set of random oracle query-answer pairs, RX , that on the one hand, will
give no information about the program C, but on the other hand, will result in a
obfuscation that is only approximately correct.
2This results in a randomized obfuscated program. In the full construction we make the obfuscated
program deterministic by including in the description of the obfuscated program a list of random
oracle answers that are reused in every evaluation.
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The final plain-model obfuscator Obf∗ emulates the random oracle obfuscator
Obf(C) and obtains the random oracle obfuscation C˜ and the set RC as before.
Next, Obf∗ “tests” the random oracle obfuscation C˜ to learn the “heavy queries”
that are often made by C˜ when executed on a random input. Specifically, Obf∗
samples random inputs x1, . . . , x` used to test the program C˜. The set RX is initially
empty. For every i ∈ [`], Obf∗ emulates the random oracle obfuscation C˜(xi) and
answers any random oracle query made by C˜ as follows: if the query appears in the
set RC or in the set RX it is answered consistently, otherwise, a random answer is
given. In both cases, the query-answer pair is added to the set RX . Note that the
final set RX may not contain all the queries in RC and it may also contain queries
outside RC .
Finally, the obfuscator Obf∗ outputs an obfuscated program C˜∗ that has hard-
coded to it the description of the random oracle obfuscation C˜ and the set RX . As
before, the obfuscation C˜∗ on an input x emulates the random oracle obfuscation C˜(x)
and answers any random oracle query made by C˜ as follows: if the query appears in
the set RX it is answered consistently with RX , otherwise, a random answer is given.
We argue that the new set RX gives no information about the program C. Con-
sider the following alternative way to sample the set RX . Let R be a random function
that is consistent with the query-answer pairs in RC . Now execute the random oracle
obfuscation C˜ on random inputs x1, . . . , x` and given oracle access to R. The set RX
simply contains all the query-answer pairs that occur in these executions. Intuitively,
since RX can be sampled given the random oracle obfuscation C˜ and oracle access
to R, it follows from the VBB security of the random oracle obfuscator Obf that RX
reveals no information about the program C.
To argue that C˜∗ is approximately correct, consider an evaluation of C˜∗ on a
random input x. C˜∗ emulates the random oracle obfuscation C˜(x) and answers any
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random oracle query made by C˜ randomly and consistently with the set RX . As
discussed in the warm-up, if all of the queries made by C˜ were answered consistently
with the set RC , perfect correctness would have followed from the correctness of Obf
in the random oracle model. However, the emulation of C˜(x) may make a query that
is in the set RC but not in the set RX . Such a query will be answered randomly
in a way that may not be consistent with the answer in RC and correctness may
be lost. We can therefore bound the probability that C˜∗(x) disagrees with C(x) by
the probability that C˜(x) makes a query R ∈ RC \ RX . Such a query R must not
have been asked by any of the test executions of C˜ on the random inputs x1, . . . , x`,
otherwise it would have been added to the set RX . The probability that a query
in RC is asked by C˜∗(x) but is not asked by C˜∗(xi) for any i ∈ [`] is inversely
proportional to `. Therefore, by making ` large enough, we can make the correctness
error sufficiently small (recall that any constant correctness error that is bounded
away from 1 is sufficient for the negative result of [BP13] to hold).
Connection to [IR88]. Our proof follows the same outline as the proof of Impagli-
azzo and Rudich [IR88] separating key-agreement protocols from one-way functions
(as well as many subsequent works). In essence, Impagliazzo and Rudich show that
there is no key-agreement protocols that is information-theoretically secure in the ran-
dom oracle model. They do so in two steps: first they transform any key-agreement
protocol in the random oracle model into a key-agreement protocol in the plain model.
Then, they rely on the impossibility for information-theoretically secure key agree-
ment. We follow the same two steps: first we transform any obfuscator in the random
oracle model to an approximate obfuscator in the plain model, and then we rely on
the impossibility of the latter. Note that in our case the impossibility in the plain
model is stronger in the sense that it rules out security even against computationally
bounded adversaries.
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6.1.4 Related Work
Lynn, Prabhakaran and Sahai [LPS04] study obfuscation in the random oracle model.
They give constructions for simple functions and pose the question of general purpose
obfuscation in this model.
Pass and shelat [PS16] extend Theorem 6.1 to rule out VBB obfuscation in the
ideal constant-degree multilinear map model. Mahmoody, Mohammed and Nemati-
haji [MMN16] extend Theorem 6.1 to ideal models that implement more general
groups as well as random trapdoor permutations.
Bitansky and Vaikuntanathan [BV16] give transformations from any obfuscation
with approximate correctness to a perfectly correct obfuscation based on different
computational assumptions. These transformations preserve both VBB and indis-
tinguishability security. Combining the transformations of [BV16] with the trans-
formations in the proof of Theorem 6.1 and its extensions allows the conversion of
indistinguishability obfuscation constructions in various ideal models into indistin-
guishability obfuscation in the plain model by eliminating the use of the ideal oracle.
Lin [Lin16], and Lin and Vaikuntanathan [LV16] constructs indistinguishability
obfuscation in the plain model based on constant-degree multilinear maps. We note
that the above transformations from obfuscation in ideal constant-degree multilinear
map model to the plain model cannot be applied to remove the use of multilinear
maps from the constructions of [Lin16, LV16] since these transformations only ap-
plies to obfuscation constructions that use multilinear maps as a black-box, while the
construction of of [Lin16, LV16] uses the implementation of the multilinear maps.
6.1.5 Chapter Organization
In Section 6.2 we define approximate obfuscation in the random oracle model and in
the plain model. In Section 6.3 we state and prove our impossibility result.
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6.2 Approximate Obfuscation
In this section we define approximate obfuscation, both in the random oracle model
and in the plain model. We also state the known impossibility result for approximate
obfuscation in the plain model.
Let C = {Cλ}λ∈N be a collection of polynomial-size circuits, and let Dλ be the
domain of the circuits in Cλ. An obfuscator Obf for a is a PPT algorithm that takes
as input a circuit C ∈ Cλ and outputs an obfuscated circuit Obf(C).
Definition 6.1 (Approximate VBB obfuscation). For a function ε : N → [0, 1], an
ε-approximate VBB obfuscator Obf for C satisfies the following requirements
Approximate functionality For every C ∈ Cλ
Pr
x←Dλ
[Obf(C)(x) = C(x)] ≥ 1− ε(λ) ,
where the probability is also over the coins of the obfuscator Obf.
VBB security For every polynomial-size adversary Adv there exists a polynomial-
size simulator Sim and a negligible function µ such that for every C ∈ Cλ∣∣Pr[Adv(Obf(C)) = 1]− Pr[SimC(1λ) = 1]∣∣ ≤ µ(λ) ,
where the probabilities are over the coins of the obfuscator Obf, the adversary
Adv and the simulator Sim.
Definition 6.2 (Approximate VBB obfuscation in the random oracle model). For a
function ε : N → [0, 1], an ε-approximate VBB obfuscator Obf for C in the random
oracle model satisfies the following requirements
Approximate functionality For every C ∈ Cλ
Pr
x←Dλ
[ObfR(C)(x) = C(x)] ≥ 1− ε(λ) ,
where R : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}λ is a random function, and the probability is also
over R and the coins of the obfuscator Obf.
164
VBB security For every polynomial-size adversary Adv there exists a polynomial-
size simulator Sim and a negligible function µ such that for every C ∈ Cλ∣∣Pr[AdvR(ObfR(C)) = 1]− Pr[SimC(1λ) = 1]∣∣ ≤ µ(λ) ,
where the probabilities are over R, the coins of the obfuscator Obf, the adversary
Adv, and the simulator Sim.
Next we state the known impossibility results for approximate obfuscation in the
plain model. The following is a direct corollary of [BP13, Theorem 3.1, Theorem 4.1,
Lemma 4.1].
Corollary 6.1 ([BP13]). Assuming trapdoor permutations, there exists a collection
of polynomial-size circuits C such that for every noticeable function ε, there is no(
1
2
− ε)-approximate VBB obfuscator for C.
Remark 6.1 (More on the impossibility of approximate obfuscation). The work of
[BP13] constructs a family of error-robust unobfuscatable functions. These are fam-
ilies {Fk}k∈{0,1}∗ such that given oracle access to Fk for a random key k, the key
remains completely hidden. However, given the code of any function that agrees with
Fk on
1
2
+ ε of the inputs, it is possible to fully recover the key k. This implies the fol-
lowing strong impossibility for approximate obfuscation: For any
(
1
2
− ε)-approximate
obfuscator for {Fk}, with probability at least ε2 over the coins the the obfuscation, the
obfuscated function agrees with the original function with probability at least 1+ε
2
.
Therefore, with noticeable probability over the coins the the obfuscation, it is always
possible to reconstruct the entire key from the obfuscated program.
6.3 Impossibility of Obfuscation with Random Oracles
In this section we prove an impossibility result for VBB obfuscation in the random
oracle model. We start by describing a transformation from any (possibly approxi-
mate) obfuscation in the random oracle model to an approximate obfuscation in the
plain model. The approximation error of the resulting obfuscation will be slightly
larger then that of the original obfuscation.
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Theorem 6.2. For every function ε : N→ [0, 1], every collection C of polynomial-size
circuits and every noticeable function δ, if C has an ε-approximate VBB obfuscator
in the random oracle model then it also has an (ε+ δ)-approximate VBB obfuscator.
Combining the transformation in Theorem 6.2 with the known impossibility result
for approximate obfuscation (Corollary 6.1) results in the following impossibility for
obfuscation in the random oracle model
Corollary 6.2. Assuming trapdoor permutations, there exists a collection C of poly-
nomial-size circuits such that for every noticeable function ε, there is no
(
1
2
− ε)-
approximate VBB obfuscator for C in the random oracle model.
Next we prove Theorem 6.2. See Section 6.1.3 for a high-level overview of the
proof.
Proof. Let C = {Cλ}λ∈N be a collection of polynomial-size circuits, and let Dλ be the
domain of the circuits in Cλ. Let Obf be an ε-approximate VBB obfuscator for C in
the random oracle model and let ` be a polynomial such that Obf on input C ∈ Cλ
makes at most `(λ) queries to the random oracle. We construct an (ε+δ)-approximate
VBB obfuscator Obf∗ for C.
The obfuscator Obf∗:
1. On input C ∈ Cλ, emulate Obf with input C, answer every oracle query made
by Obf randomly (assume without loss of generality that Obf never makes the
same query twice), and obtain an obfuscated oracle circuit C˜. Let RC to be the
set of all the queries made by Obf and their answers.
2. Set RX to be the empty set.
3. For i = 1 to
⌈
|C˜|·`(λ)
δ(λ)
⌉
:
(a) Sample xi ← Dλ.
(b) Emulate C˜ with input xi and answer every oracle query made by C˜ as
follows. If the query is in RX ∪ RC then answer consistently, otherwise
answer randomly (assume without loss of generality that C˜ never makes
the same query twice). Add all new pairs of queries made by C˜ and their
answers to RX .
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4. Sample |C˜| random oracle answers {ri}i∈[|C˜|].
5. Output the description of a circuit C˜∗ as follows:
(a) The circuit C˜∗ has the description of C˜, the set RX and the answers {ri}
hardcoded into it.
(b) On input x, C˜∗ emulates C˜ with input x and for every i ∈ [|C˜|], it answers
the i-th oracle query made by C˜ as follows. If the query is in RX , C˜∗
answers consistently, otherwise, C˜∗ answers with ri.
(c) C˜∗ outputs the same as C˜.
Next we show that Obf∗ is a secure (ε+ δ)-approximate obfuscator. That is, Obf∗
satisfies the approximate functionality and the VBB requirements.
Approximate functionality. For every circuit C ∈ Cλ, let ε = ε(λ), δ = δ(λ), and
let x be a random input sampled from Dλ. By the approximate functionality of Obf,
the circuit C˜ produced by Obf(C) satisfies
Pr[C˜R(x) 6= C(x)] ≤ ε(λ) .
where R : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}λ is a random function and the probability is also over R
and the random variables C˜ and x.
Let C˜∗ be the obfuscated circuit generated by the plain-model obfuscator Obf∗.
Recall that C˜∗ emulates the execution of C˜ with input x and the answers the oracle
queries made by C˜. Queries that are in RX are answered consistently with R, and
queries outside RX are answered from the set of random answers {ri}. We consider
another experiment where C˜∗ answers all of C˜’s queries using a random oracle R′
which agrees with R on all the queries in RX . In both experiments, every distinct
query outside RX is answered randomly and independently. The outputs of the
experiments are, therefore, identically distributed and it is sufficient to bound the
probability that C˜R
′
(x) 6= C(x). Let G(x) be the event that the execution of CR′(x)
does not query R′ on any query in the set RC \RX . Since all the answers of R and R′
outside the set RC ∪RX are random independent of C˜ we have that conditioned on
G(x), the output of C˜R
′
(x) and of C˜R(x) are identically distributed, and in particular
Pr
x
[(C˜R
′
(x) 6= C(x)) ∧G(x)] = Pr
x
[(C˜R(x) 6= C(x)) ∧G(x)] ≤ ε(λ) .
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Therefore, we can bound the probability of error on x by bounding the probability of
the event ¬G(x)
Pr
x
[C˜R
′
(x) 6= C(x)] ≤ Pr
x
[(C˜R
′
(x) 6= C(x)) ∧G(x)] + Pr
x
[¬G(x)] ≤ ε(λ) + Pr
x
[¬G(x)] .
Thus, to prove approximate functionality it suffices to show that Prx[¬G(x)] ≤ δ(λ).
In the rest of proof we bound the probability of the event ¬G(x).
We start by giving a high-level overview of the proof. For a random input x, the
execution of C˜(x) makes at most |C˜| oracle queries. To bound the probability of the
event ¬G(x) we bound the probability that the i’th query of C˜R′(x) is the first query
to fall in the set RC \RX , for every i ∈ |C˜|. To this end, we argue that the for every
query q that appears in RC , the probability that the i’th query of C˜R′(x) is indeed
q, but q was never queried during the “testing phase” of Obf∗ (Step 3) is small. (if q
is queried queried during testing phase then it appears in RX .)
Recall that in the testing phase of Obf∗ we execute C˜R on many random inputs.
Since we are only bounding the probability that the i’th query of C˜R
′
(x) is the first
query to fall outside the set RC \RX , we can condition on the event that all previous
queries do not fall in the set RC \ RX . Conditioned on this event, by the definition
of the oracles R and R′, the executions C˜R′ and C˜R up until the i-th query are
identically distributed. In particular, the i-th query of C˜R
′
and of C˜R are identically
distributed and, therefore, it is sufficient to bound the probability that the i’th query
of C˜R(x) is q, but q was never queried in any of the test executions. Since test
executions and the execution C˜R(x) are all identically distributed, we can bound this
probability by the inverse of the number of test executions. Since the number of
different queries q ∈ RC is bounded by `(λ) we get the required bound on probability
that the i’th query of C˜R
′
(x) falls in the set RC \ RX , and therefore also on the
probability of the event ¬G(x).
We continue with the formal proof that Prx[¬G(x)] ≤ δ(λ). Let I be the number
if iterations of the loop in Step 3 of Obf∗.
I =
⌈
|C˜| · `(λ)
δ(λ)
⌉
.
Let qj be the j-th query C˜
R′(x) makes. Let qi,j be the j-th query made by the
emulation of C˜R(xi) in the i-th iteration of the loop in Step 3. For every j ∈ [`], let
168
Gj(x) the event that qj /∈ RC \ {qi,j}i∈[I]. Note that
Gj(x)⇒ qj /∈ RC \ RX ,
and therefore,
∀jGj(x)⇒ G(x) .
Thus we can bound the probability of the event ¬G(x) as follows:
Pr
x
[¬G(x)] ≤ Pr
x
[¬G1(x) ∨ · · · ∨ ¬G|C˜|(x)]
=
∑
j∈|C˜|
Pr
x
[G1(x) ∧ · · · ∧Gj−1(x) ∧ ¬Gj(x)] .
It is therefore sufficient to show that for every j ∈ [|C˜|],
Pr
x
[G1(x) ∧ · · · ∧Gj−1(x) ∧ ¬Gj(x)] ≤ δ|C˜| .
To this end, fix j ∈ [|C˜|] and fix the oracles R and R′. Let G˜j−1(x) denote the
event:
G1(x) ∧ · · · ∧Gj−1(x) .
Note that:
Pr
x
[G˜j−1(x) ∧ ¬Gj(x)] ≤ Pr
x
[¬Gj(x)|G˜j−1(x)]
and therefore, it suffices to prove that:
Pr
x
[¬Gj(x)|G˜j−1(x)] ≤ δ|C˜| .
For every query q denote by pq the probability
pq = Pr
x
[qj = R|G˜j−1(x)] .
Since for every i ∈ [I], x and xi are both uniform in Dλ and since the oracles R and
R′ only differ on queries in the set RC ∩RX we have that conditioned on G˜j−1(x) the
view of the two executions C˜R
′
(x) and C˜R(xi) up until the j-th query, are identically
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distributed. Therefore, for every i ∈ [I]:
pq = Pr
x
[qj = q|G˜j−1(x)] = Pr
x
[qi,j = q|G˜j−1(x)] .
Thus, as desired,
Pr
x
[¬Gj(x)|G˜j−1(x)] ≤∑
q∈RC
Pr
x
[(qj = q) ∧ (∀i, qi,j 6= R) |G˜j−1(x)] ≤
∑
q∈RC
pR(1− pq)
|C˜|·`(λ)
δ(λ) ≤
∑
q∈RC
δ(λ)
|C˜| · `(λ) ≤
δ
|C˜| ,
where the second to last inequality follows from the fact that for every e > 1 the
expression pq(1− pq)e is maximized by pq = 1e+1 .
Virtual Black-Box. Let Adv∗ be an adversary that tries to learn some information
from the obfuscation Obf∗(C) for some C ∈ Cλ. We show how to use Adv∗ to construct
an adversary Adv that learns the same information from the random oracle obfuscation
Obf(C) where both Adv and Obf have access to the same random oracle. That is, we
will show that:
Pr[AdvR(ObfR(C)) = 1] = Pr[Adv∗(Obf∗(C)) = 1] , (6.1)
where the probabilities are over R, the coins of the obfuscators Obf and Obf∗, and the
coins of the adversaries Adv and Adv∗. By the security of Obf, there exist a simulator
Sim and a negligible function µ such that:∣∣Pr[AdvR(ObfR(C)) = 1]− Pr[SimC(1λ) = 1]∣∣ ≤ µ(λ) . (6.2)
It follows from Equations 6.1 and 6.2 that Sim is a good simulator for Adv∗ as well. It
is left to show how to construct an adversary Adv that satisfies Equation 6.1. Loosely
speaking, given a random oracle obfuscation C˜, Adv will use the same strategy of the
obfuscator Obf∗ to transform C˜ into an plain-model obfuscation C˜∗ and then emulate
Adv∗ with input C˜∗. Adv will use its random oracle to answer queries made by C˜.
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Formally, Adv is defined as follows:
1. Given the security parameter 1λ, an obfuscated input circuit C˜ and access to
oracle R, repeat the following for i = 1 to
⌈
|C˜|·`
δ
⌉
:
(a) Sample xi ← Dλ.
(b) Emulate C˜ with input xi and forward C˜’s oracle queries to R.
2. Sample |C˜| random oracle answers {ri}i∈[|C˜|].
3. SetRX to be the set of queries made by C˜ in Step 1 and their answers. Construct
a circuit C˜∗ from C˜, RX and {ri} as in Step 5 of the obfuscator Obf∗.
4. Output the same as Adv∗(C˜∗).
By construction, the circuit C˜∗ used by Adv in Step 4 is distributed identically to the
output of Obf∗(k) and therefore Equation 6.1 holds.
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